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A hazard is a source of risk that can pose a threat to life. Across most cultures, human life is 
valued very highly, and societies are willing to pay a large amount to prevent people dying 
prematurely. There are some hazards, though, that societies seem to regard as particularly 
important to prevent to the extent that they are not only willing to pay considerably more to 
avert deaths caused by them but they are also willing to cede rights and liberties previously 
enjoyed in exchange for protection from them. 
 
My research found that these hazards, which are characterised by violent acts committed by 
people against each other, constitute their own subset of hazards which I refer to as 
‘malicious’ hazards. It further revealed that malicious hazards are characterised by high 
moral significance and low controllability. In addition, risk from this subset of hazards is 
overestimated, whereas risk from hazards in other categories are either underestimated or 
correctly estimated. 
Considering the aspects of malicious hazards that separate them from other hazards, I 
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observed that they are the only type of hazard involving a consciously acting agent 
deliberately harming others, and that they are more angering than other types of hazards. I 
then independently manipulated the factors of agency belief and anger. My results showed 
that anger increased risk perception relative to controls participants, but that there was no 
effect of agency belief on risk perception. 
 
In the General Discussion I emphasise the need to identify a valid agency belief 
manipulation and I conclude that because of anger’s role in creating demand for often 
harmful risk mitigation measures, risk communication about malicious hazards should be 
tailored so as to minimise its potential to elicit anger. 
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 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
   
 
The threat of terrorism, in the last decade and a half, has proved to be very expensive. Some 
of the cost has been in the form of direct expenditure by airlines intended to minimise the 
threat. Niskanen (2006), for example, estimated that airport search procedures 
implemented by the Transport Security Administration in the United States cost around US 
$5 billion a year. The International Air Travel Association (2011) noted that airport security 
cost airlines worldwide $7.4 billion a year. But dwarfing these numbers are costs to the 
public purse and costs related to lost commercial opportunities, which include: reduced sale 
of air tickets due to fear of attacks (in the US, after passenger numbers had risen year-on-
year for 18 of the previous 20 years, 2001 – the year during which the September 11th 
attacks took place – saw the largest percentage drop in passenger numbers since the year 
the World Bank’s (2014) statistics database begins); reduced sale of air tickets due to 
passenger frustration with time-consuming airport security procedures; losses to airports 
caused by increases in the amount of time passengers have to spend clearing security 
(meaning a higher volume of passengers in the airport but not patronising airport shops or 
facilities); losses to taxpayers due to the additional expense of employing personnel to 
administer enhanced screening and profiling and compiling lists of passengers deemed a 
particularly high risk and checking passengers against those lists (a duty which, in the US, 
was previously discharged by airlines); cabin crew vetting and special training; a vast 
expansion of trained dog units; and, in the US, the expense of a Federal Air Marshal Service 
which has grown from 50 air marshals nationwide to 4,000 (an eighty-fold increase) since 
2001 (Stewart & Mueller, 2013). 
There are also costs indirectly related to aviation, such as loss of revenue generated 
by tourism. According to Bonham, Edmonds and Mak (2006), tourism-related sales in the 
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US dropped by $24 billion between 2000-2001. Tourism has recovered somewhat since 
then, but has not kept pace with the expansion of tourism worldwide, and the US’s share of 
the tourism market dropped from 17% in 2000 to 12.4% in 2010 (US Travel Association, 
2011). The US Travel Association projects that, based on the pre-attack trajectory, the 
September 11th attacks cost the US $606 billion in lost revenue. Antipathy towards flying in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks could also have cost non-aviation industry businesses 
revenue because of businesspeople refraining from taking flights that could have resulted in 
lucrative contracts with overseas, and possibly also distant domestic, firms and individuals. 
Furthermore, terrorism’s costs extend well beyond aviation. The US government 
created an entire new government department, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), whose founding mission was combating terrorism (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2014). In 2002 the DHS was endowed with a budget of $19.5 billion. The budget 
for the DHS in 2013 was $59 billion, and has generally increased from year to year since its 
inception despite a return to pre-September 11th rates of terrorism (National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014). The financial impact also 
goes well beyond the US. The British government did not establish a new department, but 
the aggregated budget for relevant intelligence agencies in the decade after the attacks 
increased from £1 billion to £2 billion1 (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2008). The 
combined budget of Australia’s six intelligence agencies more than tripled from 2000-2010 
(Cornall & Black, 2011). Even in countries not as closely allied to the US, such as Germany 
and France, security budgets have seen large increases since 2001 (Deutscher, 2009). 
Perhaps the most pervasive worldwide costs directly associated with combating 
terrorism, though, are those associated with the global ‘war on terror’, declared by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) at the behest of the US and involving 28 nations 
                                                             
1 Note that the figure quoted takes into account projected changes in expenditure from 2008-2010 
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belonging to NATO, and 4 other nations. Several military campaigns in disparate 
geographical regions have been fought, of which the most significant has been in 
Afghanistan. Ongoing since October 2001, the Afghan war has been fought off and on by 52 
countries. Estimates of the financial cost for all participants in the war are not available, but 
it is estimated that by the end of 2010 the US’s participation had cost it $299.6 billion2 
(Belasco, 2009), that by 2013 the war had cost the UK £37 billion (Ledwidge, 2013) and 
Australia $7.5 billion (Brissenden, 2013). Brück, De Groot and Schneider (2011) estimate 
that by the time they wrote their paper the Afghanistan war had cost Germany €17.1 billion. 
During 2010, France spent €450 million on their military presence in Afghanistan (Uludag, 
2013). The threat of terrorism was also used as a pretext for US military action against Iraq. 
That war was fought by fewer parties, but for those involved it cost even more per annum 
than the war in Afghanistan. 
If the purpose of spending such large sums is to save lives that would otherwise 
have been claimed by terrorism, that expenditure will not have succeeded in saving many 
lives, principally because terrorism kills a very small number of people. In the US (the 
country that has spent by far the most trying to alleviate the threat of terrorism), between 
2001-2010 (i.e. including the statistical anomaly that was September 11th) far fewer than 
than 1 person in a million was been killed by terrorism (Institute for Economics & Peace, 
n.d.). Even worldwide, including ‘high risk’ countries such as Iraq, Iran, Israel and Pakistan, 
only 1 person in a million dies as a result of terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2011). Economists use a measure called 
value of a statistical life (VSL, e.g. Lanoie, Pedro & Latour, 1995; Persson, Norinder, Hjalte & 
Gralén, 2001; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) to gauge how much people and organisations are willing 
to pay to save one human life. The VSL measurement is usually applied to workplace, 
                                                             
2 This figure incorporates a projection. 
11 
 
construction and manufacturing regulations and public health interventions, and according 
to Murphy and Topel (2005), the limit to how much society is willing to pay is around $6.3 
million. Stewart and Mueller’s (2008) study of spending by the US aimed at preventing 
terrorism revealed that the US is prepared to pay between $64 million and $600 million to 
save one terrorism-inflicted death. 
As well as the VSL for would-be terrorism victims being at least 10 times higher than 
that of equally unfortunate victims of more mundane hazards, terrorism seems to be the 
only hazard that the US and many of her allies are willing to trade not only money, but lives 
to avert – 4,486 US military personnel have died in the US’s invasion of Iraq and the other 
countries constituting the coalition against Iraq have lost a further 318 servicemen and 
women, while in Afghanistan the US has lost 2,364 members of the armed forces and her 
allies have lost a further 1,132 (iCasualties, 2015). Civilian deaths in both territories have 
totalled inordinately higher numbers, and while it is not known exactly how many have 
perished in the conflict, a recent survey of randomly sampled households in Iraq produced 
an estimate of 500,000 deaths (Hagopian et al, 2013). Estimates in Afghanistan, using a 
different methodology, are that approximately 21,500 civilian fatalities have been incurred. 
The widespread fear of terrorism has not only resulted in the sacrifice of both 
American and foreign lives in the war – a frequently cited and ironic outcome of the 
airborne terrorist attacks is that in the nine months immediately following them road traffic 
increased three-fold. Since the incidence of fatalities on the road is much greater than that 
in the air, this shift in transportation habits produced a large increase in transportation-
related deaths. Gigerenzer (2006) calculated that an estimated 1,595 Americans died due to 
driving in preference over flying, noting that figure was more than six times higher than the 
number of Americans carried in the hijacked planes. 
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Terrorism has also taken up a great deal of legislative time; almost every country 
has enacted some sort of anti-terrorism legislation (Mendoza, 2011). Since 2001, the US has 
enacted at least seven federal laws explicitly aimed at combating terrorism, while the UK 
parliament has passed a raft of anti-terrorism bills, many of them curtailing civil liberties. 
Most notable amongst these may be the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
which allowed for multiple infringements of privacy without judicial oversight and the UK’s 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001, under which terror suspects were 
indefinitely detained without trial.  
It is evident that the response to the September 11th attacks has been financially 
draining, erosive of civil liberties and in some cases life-threatening itself, but perhaps 
justified if, as some perceive, the terrorism attacks represented a qualitatively novel hazard 
(e.g. Slovic & Weber, 2002). This narrative asserts that the world was ambushed by a wholly 
alien threat, and its response can be attributed to the overwhelming shock resulting from it. 
Whilst there is no doubt that they constitute the most devastating individual set of co-
ordinated simultaneous attacks in terms of their death toll and the amount of destruction of 
property, that they were extremely tragic, and that they have given rise to more domestic 
and international upheaval than any previous terrorist acts, terrorism is by no means a 
‘new’ threat – and I would argue that the difference between these attacks and other attacks 
that preceded them is more quantitative than qualitative. Terrorism as a tactic for 
advancing political aims has existed for centuries, and the word was coined around the time 
of the French Revolution and applied to Robespierre, the revolutionary who spearheaded 
the ‘terror’ in France.  
Terrorism, and repressive legislative responses, have been seen in South Africa 
under apartheid, Italy during the Anni di Piombo (Years of Lead), the UK during and after the 
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Troubles and the US, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombings. But in none of the 
above cases was terrorism a major risk. In apartheid South Africa the paramilitary wing of 
the ANC inflicted a very small number of deaths, and the mortality rate associated with 
terrorism was less than 1 death out of every million. In the UK, even in 1974, the year in 
which the Provisional IRA carried out the most attacks, the mortality rate attributable to 
terrorism was similarly low. Over the whole duration of the Anni di Piombo in Italy, the 
death rate was less than 1 in a million. As for the US, the only year in which the mortality 
rate of terrorism exceeded 1 in a million was the statistical anomaly that was the September 
11th attacks (Johnston, 2013). The US, as a country, has long been relatively devoid of any 
significant threat to life from terrorism. Evidently, the legislative hyperactivity in the 
aftermath of September 11th is not an isolated episode. Indeed, given the examples of 
similar governmental responses adumbrated above it could be argued that the reaction to 
September 11th was quite predictable.  
It might be suggested that governmental response to terrorism reflects not (or not 
only) a genuine assessment of threat, but rather political necessities of remaining in power. 
However, an opinion poll taken nine months after the introduction of the PATRIOT Act 
revealed that a clear majority of the American public (85%) either supported the Act or 
believed it did not go far enough (Gallup, 2002a), as well as approved of the treatment of 
Guantanamo Bay prisoners (Gallup, 2002c). In the UK, analogous measures received 
similarly high levels of support.  
Although terrorism is now the best example of the apparent mismatch between 
objective risk and subjective fear, it is not the only example of a hazard producing legislative 
reactions whose benefits are vastly outweighed by their costs. ‘Common’ crime is another 
case in which civil liberties, money and sometimes justice have been surrendered in 
response. For example, habitual offender laws – known colloquially as ‘three strikes laws’ – 
14 
 
have been introduced by more than half of US states and the US federal government. These 
laws differ in their particulars but they all mandate very long prison sentences for criminals 
that are convicted of three crimes of a certain severity. California passed a law mandating 
that those convicted of two felonies must be incarcerated for a minimum of 25 years on 
commission of a third crime of considerably less severity. This resulted in some sentences 
that attracted almost universal condemnation, one example being the case of Santos Reyes 
who, having previously been convicted of two acquisitive crimes (one of which was 
committed while he was a minor), was imprisoned for a minimum of 26 years for forging a 
driving test. Several Australian states have also adopted habitual offender laws for some 
offences, and New Zealand and the United Kingdom have implemented habitual offender 
laws for some offences with the proviso that exceptions can be made in exceptional 
circumstances. 
As with the response to terrorism, these efforts to curtail crime are expensive. In 
California the average cost of incarcerating one inmate is placed at $47,102 (Legislative 
Analyst’s Office, 2009), and it is estimated that by 2009 habitual offender laws had cost 
California $19.2 billion (California State Auditor, 2010). Worse, it has consistently been 
found that such laws exert little or no positive impact on crime rates (Doob & Webster, 
2003; Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, 1997; Worrall, 2004), and have in some cases been 
associated with increased commission of serious crimes (Kovandzic, Sloan & Vieraitis, 2004; 
Marvell & Moody, 2001). Some researchers have attributed this effect to a perverse 
incentive created for those with two strikes to murder victims and witnesses to reduce the 
likelihood of their being caught. As with responses to terrorism, such laws are not merely 
the product of political pressure; most enjoy widespread public support. In addition to 
being ineffective, the willingness to pay to reduce homicide appears to exceed the VSL for 
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the average hazard considerably. Cohen, Rust, Steen and Tidd (2004) found in a survey 
study that US residents were willing to pay $9.7 million to avert one homicide death. 
Another populist criminal justice initiative is ‘Megan’s Law’, variants of which have 
been implemented in several US States and the UK, and which is currently under 
consideration by the US federal government. Again, there is considerable variation between 
different iterations of Megan’s Law, but they generally provide for registration of convicted 
sex offenders with authorities and make publicly available certain sensitive information 
about them, such as their name, photo, address and details of their crime.  Some territories 
create geographically defined ‘Sex Offender-Free Zones’, which convicted sex offenders are 
prohibited from entering. Megan’s Law boasts large majorities in its support in the US 
(Levenson, Brannon, Fortney & Baker, 2007) and the UK (Market & Opinion Research 
International, 2000), despite being demonstrably ineffective in reducing the commission of 
first sex offences and the rate of sex crime recidivism (Petrosino & Petrosino, 1999; Schram 
& Darling Milloy, 1995; Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro & Veysey, 2008). The financial cost of 
administering such programmes is comparatively modest relative to anti-terrorism and 
habitual offender laws, but the cost to the welfare of released sex offenders is incalculable. 
Levenson and Cotter (2004) found in Florida that a third of the sex offenders in their sample 
had been threatened or harassed by neighbours, 27% lost their job because their employer 
discovered their crime, and 5% had been assaulted on that basis.  
The enactment of Megan’s Law also seems to be a consequence of pervasive 
misunderstanding of the threat posed by sex offenders. Most (68%) of Levenson et al’s 
(2007) participants believed that sex offences were becoming more prevalent when in fact, 
in the state in which the study was conducted, they had been dropping year-on-year for the 
past decade prior to the study (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2014). They 
believed that 58% of boys and 63% of girls are sexually abused by someone they know, 
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figures that are respectively eight times higher and two-and-a-half times higher than 
estimates derived from meta-analyses of adults self-reporting earlier child abuse (Pereda, 
Guilera, Forns & Gómez-Benito, 2009). And they thought that 74% of sex offenders re-
offend, another widely held (Filler, 2002) but erroneous belief. In reality, a meta-analysis 
found that sex offenders are less likely to reoffend than the average criminal, with 13.4% 
reoffending within 4-5 years (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998). 
Capital punishment is yet another measure whose punitiveness is arguably 
disproportionate to the hazard it addresses.  As well as costing several times more to 
administer than life imprisonment (California Commission on the Fair Administration of 
Justice, 2008), by its very nature it carries the risk of terminating the life of a convict who is 
later exonerated and creates a perverse incentive for the courts to refrain from 
posthumously acquitting those condemned even where substantial evidence comes to light 
that undermines the original conviction, for fear of generating public outrage and 
compromising the credibility of the judicial system. Nevertheless, a majority of Americans 
support the death penalty (Gallup, 2014), and one of the key reasons is fear of crime 
(Holbert, Shah & Kwak, 2004; Kell & Vito, 2006; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986). Research 
has also been undertaken in countries that have abolished the death penalty, and it too has 
shown that support for the death penalty is partly driven by concerns about the prevalence 
of crime (Hessing, Keijser & Elffers, 2003; Roberts & Indermaur, 2007) suggesting that 
support for this expensive and arguably iniquitous punishment can be predicted by 
perceptions of pervasive criminality across cultures and even where it is not officially 
sanctioned as a crime-fighting policy. 
Another hazard that tends to attract acute responses is war. Special wartime powers 
are usually introduced when a country is at war, and they frequently compromise rights and 
liberties previously enjoyed by the citizenry (Rehnquist, 2007; Stone, 2003; Tushnet, 2003). 
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Some of these are necessary and proportionate, but others have been controversial. Defence 
Regulation 18B, for example, permitted the indefinite detention of anyone suspected by the 
British government of involvement with the enemy in World War II. This entailed the mass 
internment of large swathes of the British far right (some of whom were Nazi sympathisers) 
but also resulted in large numbers of Jewish refugees being detained on the misguided 
grounds that they originated from Nazi-governed countries and thus may be collaborating 
with them (London, 2001). 
Other emergency powers have produced manifestly unfair results. Shortly after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt authorised blanket internment of a large 
percentage of Japanese Americans who, as a result, lost their liberty for as much as 3 years, 
lost much of their property as they were unable to take it with them into the internment 
camps, and lost future opportunities as their children’s educational needs were met with 
insufficient resources. The decision was taken amid suspicions Japanese Americans may be 
collaborating with Japan. However, those suspicions have been roundly acknowledged to 
have been unfounded – indeed, the government’s Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians (1982) determined that there was no evidence that the Japanese 
contingent was any more guilty of abetting the enemy than any other demographic cross-
section. 
If a rational response to a hazard is one that is proportional to the threat it poses 
and is effective in reducing it, it is clear that individuals and societies have reacted 
irrationally to terrorism, crime, and war. The goal of this thesis is to consider whether these 
hazards (and perhaps others) share some psychological feature that explains why they 
receive more attention than is warranted.  
There are, then, several questions that need to be answered. Firstly, do people, in 
fact, regard hazards as members of distinct categories and, if so, what are those categories 
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based on? Several attempts have been made in the past to categorise hazards (e.g. Starr, 
1969; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein & Roe, 1981; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983), but only 
Johnson and Tversky (1983) explicitly recognised a category for malicious hazards (i.e. 
those hazards that entail a human agent deliberately inflicting a risk on one or more other 
persons), which they referred to as ‘violent acts’. However, their classification process has 
not been replicated (nor has an attempt been made to replicate it) since then. Further, there 
has been (to the best of my knowledge) no research since then that makes predictions 
specific to malicious hazards. 
Second, if it were the case that malicious hazards are perceived as an identifiably 
separate class of hazard, what specific characteristics do malicious hazards have that sets 
them apart, psychologically, from other hazards. All other things being equal, are malicious 
hazards perceived to be more likely than hazards in other categories? If they were, this 
could help to explain why so much energy is spent fighting them. 
Third, if malicious hazards do attract incommensurate reactions, what psychological 
mechanism(s) explain this bias? A popular theory, particularly amongst criminologists, is 
that disproportionate media attention helps to account for the way the public perceives 
malicious hazards (e.g. Dowler, Fleming & Muzzatti, 2006; Heath & Gilbert, 1996; Peelo, 
Francis, Soothill, Pearson & Ackerley, 2004), but this account only pushes back the 
explanation one step. Newsworthy stories are those that editors believe elicit interest; why 
are malicious hazards of this type?  
The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I construct an updated ‘hazard space’ by 
soliciting freely-generated hazards from New Zealand students and then use several data 
reduction techniques to characterise the categories into which the hazards fall and the 
dimensions and features on which the categories differ. Based on these analyses, I confirm 
that terrorism, violent crime, and war, cluster together in the hazard space. 
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In the second part I consider two hypotheses to explain the overestimation of 
malicious hazards: (1) Malicious hazards are more emotionally evocative than other 
categories of hazard; and/or (2) Malicious hazards are seen to be the result of the actions of 
a culpable human agent other than the victim. I present results of two sets of studies that 
manipulate both factors. The results suggest that laboratory manipulated anger is sufficient 
to increase the hazards’ perceived likelihood (regardless of category), but agency is not. 
Finally, in a General Discussion I conclude that whilst it would appear that anger is likely to 
be responsible for overestimation of malicious hazards, limitations to the human agency 
manipulation make the inference that perceptions of human agency are not responsible for 
overestimation unsafe. I discuss those limitations as well as others, I make suggestions for 
how my research might be improved and what research might follow on from it (including 
potential alternative means of manipulating human agency), and I discuss the practical 



























 Chapter 2 – Generation of a 21st century hazard space 
for a New Zealand population 
 
The first goal of the current research, and a prerequisite for an examination of ‘malicious 
hazards’, is the development of a taxonomy of hazards and a psychological ‘hazard space’. 
Hazards have been classified previously, but the categories are typically theoretically, not 
empirically, derived (e.g. Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman & Combs, 1978; Sjöberg, 
1999; Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, Letzel & 
Malmfors, 1989). Notable exceptions to this top-down approach include Johnson & Tversky 
(1983), who asked participants to list an unspecified number of hazards and then extracted 
the 18 modal hazards and McDaniels, Axelrod and Slovic (1995) who ran focus groups 
mainly consisting of environmental experts to compile a taxonomy of ecological hazards. 
However, several factors make these analyses limited for my purposes: 1) McDaniels et al’s 
sample comprised environmental experts and concerned ecological hazards, whereas my 
goal is to generate a representative sample of hazards as understood by a lay population; 2) 
Johnson and Tversky’s stimuli were generated over thirty years ago, and it is likely that the 
popular understanding of hazards has changed since then. Smoking and drinking alcohol, 
for example, have become considerably more widely recognised as serious health threats, 
which might explain why neither was included in Johnson and Tversky’s stimulus list. By 
contrast, nuclear power holds a much lower profile as a hazard than previously as the 
memory of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl meltdowns becomes ever more remote; 3) 
both the previous hazards lists were generated using US populations, and it is likely that 
what is perceived as hazardous varies cross-culturally. Natural hazards may seem 
particularly relevant to New Zealanders, for example, and terrorism less so. This research 
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presents an inviting opportunity to generate a list of hazards using a New Zealand 
population, and better still the same population (university students) that will be recruited 
as participants in most of the studies included in this thesis; and 4) Johnson and Tversky 
relied primarily on two tasks which I would not endorse as exploratory measures of hazard 
similarity. First, in a ‘conditional prediction’ task, participants were asked to imagine they 
learnt that a certain hazard (e.g. terrorism) caused more deaths than they had previously 
believed, and then asked whether they would correspondingly increase their risk estimates 
for a set of other hazards. This presumes that hazards that are psychologically related to 
each other will display co-varying risk perception. Although that assumption is reasonable 
in and of itself, it restricts the dimensions of similarity participants are likely to consider 
when judging hazard similarity because there may be other types of similarity that do not 
imply risk covariation (as an example participants might take the view that cleaning 
products are a similar hazard to drug misuse as both may cause death by introducing toxic 
substances to the body, but clearly the circumstances under which such deaths might arise 
would likely differ dramatically). A second measure of similarity, ‘dimensional evaluation’ 
involved participants rating hazards along several dimensions previously proposed by 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), a task more appropriate for confirmatory purposes than exploratory 
ones as by its nature the task presupposed that the dimensions put to participants for 
evaluation were the only possible candidates. 
Thus, the current study was designed to create an unbiased set of events that New 
Zealanders find hazardous in the 21st century. Participants first freely generated a large set 
of hazards, from which 33 hazard categories were induced and coded. Next, several data 
reduction techniques were used to characterise the dimensions on which the 33 hazards 
varied. The number of 33 was chosen in order to strike a balance between the need to 
derive a relatively comprehensive list of hazards and the imperative not to place excessive 
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demands on participants in later studies who would be asked to judge the similarity 
between hazard pairings (the number of which would increase exponentially with every 




Seventy participants, 61 of whom were female, took part in return for partial course credit 
for psychology papers at the University of Otago. Reflecting an undergraduate population, 
the sample had a mean age of 20.4 and the sample ranged from ages 18-52. 
 
Materials 
Hazards were collected in a questionnaire (Appendix A) created and administered with the 
survey software SurveyMonkey (http://surveymonkey.com). Participants were asked to 
‘name 20 distinct hazards that can potentially cause death’.  Twenty dialog boxes followed 
for participants to list their hazards. Participants were required to fill in every box; if they 
did not, they were prompted to complete any empty boxes before being allowed to proceed.  
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the study online (in a location of their own choosing and in their 
own time), in conjunction with several other, unrelated procedures. After providing 
informed consent, all participants completed a standard demographics questionnaire 
(Appendix B), and then a series of questionnaires including the one relevant to this thesis.  
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After completing all items they were shown a screen thanking them for participation and 
providing a written debriefing on all procedures. 
 
Results 
Participants listed a total of 1,400 hazards, from which I derived 33 hazard categories 
(these are listed in Table 1). Hazards had to conform to the following criteria to be 
categorised: 
 
a) Hazards had to represent a source of risk (i.e. a disfavourable outcome) without being a 
disfavourable outcome themselves. For example, cold snaps would be a hazard according to 
this criterion, but hypothermia would not.  
 
b) Hazards had to be identifiable as the last link in the causal chain before death. For 
example, electricity would be a hazard according to this criterion, but ‘negligence’ would 
not, even though the negligent installation of wiring can result in death.  
 
c) Hazards had to be potentially applicable to all participants. For example, allergies, 
Huntington’s disease, and childbirth were excluded under this criterion. 
 
 Two independent coders classified the responses in terms of 33 categories which 
were decided on after my examination of the responses (taking into account the criteria 
outlined above). Due to an error during transmission of the responses to the coders, 68 of 
the responses were not coded. The coders agreed 82.7% of the time, Kappa = .81 (p < .001), 
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95% CI (.79, .83) – well above the acceptable standard for agreement  (Jarvenpaa, 1999; Li, 
Rao, Ragu-Nathan and Ragu-Nathan, 2005; Stemler and Tsai ,2008). Where coders classified 
responses as compatible with more than one hazard, I resolved the disagreement by making 











Categories Used to Classify Responses 
Avalanche Eating unhealthy food Violent criminals 
Boating Electricity Slippery surfaces 
Cleaning products Extreme sport Smoking 
Cold snaps Extreme weather Team sport 
Crossing the road Fighting Taking drugs 
Cycling Fire Terrorists 
Domestic animals Flying Travelling by train 
Drinking alcohol Heat waves Tsunami 
Driving a car Heights Volcanic eruption 
Swimming Bacteria & Viruses War 
Earthquakes Insects Wild animals 
 
A substantial number of hazards were not classifiable under my criteria. Of these, 
most were illnesses or medical causes of death, although 18 participants listed ‘guns’, 10 
participants listed ‘animals’, and several listed old age and suicide. A limited number were 
hazards in accordance with my criteria, but they were listed by very few participants. 
Overall, the proposed category structure captured most of the hazards that participants 
generated. Table 2 shows frequencies for hazards where there was agreement. 
 Table 2  
 Hazard Frequencies where Coders Agreed 
Hazard Frequency (%) 
Avalanche 1.13 
Boating 0.75 
Cleaning products 0.15 
Cold snaps 1.20 




Domestic animals 0.08 
Drinking alcohol 2.48 
Driving a car 6.16 
Swimming 4.80 
Earthquakes 2.85 
Eating unhealthy food 2.48 
Electricity 2.10 
Extreme sport 0.75 




Heat waves 0.60 
Heights 2.78 
Bacteria & Viruses 2.70 
Insects 0.53 
Violent criminals 5.18 
Slippery surfaces 0.45 
Smoking 1.20 
Team sport 0.08 
Taking drugs 3.38 
Terrorists 0.83 
Travelling by train 0.90 
Tsunami 1.95 
Volcanic eruption 1.05 
War 1.80 





Having created a list of New Zealand students’ perceived hazards, I next used data reduction 
techniques to characterise the dimensions or higher order structures underlying them. 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a type of analysis used to visualise the psychological 
dimensions on which stimuli differ (e.g. Bigand, Vieillard, Madurell, Marozeau & Dacquet, 
2005; Hollins, Faldowski, Rao & Young, 1993; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). MDS transforms 
similarity or dissimilarity judgments3 into a graphical representation, such that those 
similarities map as closely as possible onto distances in (normally Euclidean) space (Borg & 
Groenen, 2005; Kruskal, 1964). The dimensions of that space can then be interpreted by the 
experimenter (Torgerson, 1965),  
MDS has been used in the past to examine hazards and risk. Cooley (1977) asked 
investors working in various professional roles to rate the similarity of 9 different 
investment options and found that their ratings differed principally with respect to the 
variability of the possible outcomes of the investments and the possibility of making a loss. 
Of more relevance in the current context, Vlek and Stallen (1981) asked participants to 
judge similarity between pairs of 26 hazards. The results of their MDS analysis suggested 
that the variation between hazards was best represented by just one dimension, which they 
identified as ‘size of possible accident’ (the number of people affected per event) and 
‘degree of decisional control’ (exercised by those exposed to the hazard), asserting that the 
former correlates inversely with the latter. However, this unidimensional structure can be 
questioned on methodological grounds, as the researchers used a sorting task (rather than 
direct, paired similarity ratings), which required participants first establish a dimension of 
difference, then use it to sort all the remaining stimuli. Furthermore, it is arguable whether 
size of possible accident and degree of decisional control are necessarily inversely related. 
                                                             
3 There is no qualitative difference between similarity and dissimilarity MDS – their formulae are merely mirror 
images of each other. In the case of risk perception it makes more intuitive sense to ask participants for similarity judgements. 
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Indeed, violent criminals, one of the hazards of greatest interest in this thesis, tend to inflict 
damage on a relatively small scale. Individuals, by definition, have no decisional control 
over whether or not they are murdered. It therefore cannot justifiably be claimed that the 
extent of harm and decisional control are always inversely related. 
The most directly relevant MDS examination of risk was conducted more than 30 
years ago by Johnson and Tversky (1984), based on similarity ratings of 17 hazards that 
they had sourced from undergraduates a year earlier (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). The 
analysis revealed two dimensions, which the researchers identified as ‘dread’ (the extent to 
which the hazard elicits a fearful visceral reaction) and 'catastrophic potential’ (the extent 
to which the hazard is likely to claim large numbers of victims when it occurs). As noted 
above, however, Johnson and Tversky’s proximities were partly based on dimension 
evaluation data using evaluations that were imposed top-down on participants rather than 
inferred from data generated by participants. Here, that shortcoming is rectified – 
participants are asked to provide similarity ratings, and then those ratings are used to map 




Sixty-nine participants, drawn from the same population as in Study 1, took part in 
exchange for partial course credit.  
 
Materials  
The experiment was conducted in a large room equipped with 10 PCs, each separated by an 
opaque barrier that extended high enough to ensure the privacy of participants. Stimuli 
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were presented and responses collected via a custom written Javascript program, designed 
to gauge participants’ similarity judgements of hazard pairings. 
 
Procedure  
The study was run as the first of a pair of unrelated procedures. Participants were run in 
groups of between 1 and 10. After giving informed consent, participants received the 
following instructions: 
 
A hazard is defined as a potential source of danger.  In this study we are 
investigating how people perceive and think about a number of hazards that we 
have identified.  You will be presented with many different pairs of hazards. Your 
job is simply to judge how similar each pair of hazards is. Make your judgments on a 
1 to 9 scale, where 1 is the least similar and 9 is the most similar. 
 
There are many pairs to rate, so don't spend a lot of time on any one 
judgement.  There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your 
judgement.  The entire task should take about 45 minutes. 
 
 After signalling their understanding of the instructions with a button press, 
participants rated every possible combination of hazards ([33x32]/2 = 528). The order of 
presentation of hazard pairings was fully randomised. Each pair was presented at opposite 
sides of the screen (screen side was also randomised) above a 9-point Likert scale which 
was set out left to right, anchored at 1 (‘least similar’) and 9 (‘most similar’). Participants 
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recorded their judgements by pressing the key corresponding to their similarity rating, after 
which the next pair appeared immediately. 
Results 
Consistency across raters was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .97), well above the guideline 
standard of acceptability (George & Mallery, 2003), so ratings were aggregated across 
participants to calculate mean similarity scores between each hazard pairing. The mean 
similarities were submitted to analysis using PROXSCAL.  
 
The Stress-1 statistic reflects how well the model accounts for variance. Lower stress values 
are indicative of better fit, and the value considered acceptable is contingent on the number 
of dimensions used to represent similarities. As the number of dimensions increases the 
stress value inevitably decreases, but the stress score needs to decrease sufficiently to 
justify including another dimension. A steep decline was observed as the dimensionality 
was increased from 1 to 3 dimensions, with only marginal improvements after that. 
Consequently, it was determined that a three-dimensional representation is most 
appropriate. The Stress-1 value, .197, is acceptable in accordance with Spence and Ogilvie’s 


































































 Interpretation of stimulus dimensions in MDS is necessarily subjective, and it is 
worth visually inspecting the stimulus plots and speculating about their meaning.  As seen 
in Figure 1, the first (and most subjectively important) dimension features cycling, cleaning 
products and eating unhealthy food at one extreme, and earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic 
eruptions at the other. 
This distinction bears some resemblance to Vlek and Stallen’s (1981) 
harm/controllability dimension, but the presence of violent criminals and electricity close 
to natural disasters, and the distance between team sport and extreme sport (which both 
tend to cause at most one death per event) cast doubt on an interpretation in terms of 
magnitude of harm. More plausible was that the dimension represented controllability of 
hazards, although in that case it would be anomalous that cycling was considered to be 
considerably more controllable than driving a car.  
Alternatively, Dimension 1 might reflect familiarity. A strength of familiarity as an 
explanation is that it would account for cycling being plotted at one extreme and driving, 
train travel and flying being plotted incrementally closer to the other pole. Only a minority 
of first and second year students drive (assuming they are representative of the general 
population of their age group; New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013), the passenger railway 
network of New Zealand is skeletal and geared towards tourism rather than transport and 
New Zealand’s remote location means that at undergraduate age a lot of New Zealanders 
have not flown many times (if at all). The interpretation of familiarity, however, is not 
without its weaknesses. One would not expect undergraduates to be equally familiar with 
taking drugs and drinking alcohol, and it would also be surprising that wild animals were 
not plotted as one of the most unfamiliar hazards.  
On Dimension 2, terrorists, violent criminals and war can be found at one pole and 
insects, domestic animals and cold snaps at the other. Notwithstanding the congregation of 
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all the malicious hazards at one extreme, the proximity assigned to team sport (close to that 
same extreme) argues against an interpretation of malicious intent. Furthermore, the 
proximities of other non-malicious hazards such as eating unhealthy food, drinking alcohol, 
smoking and taking drugs near that pole, and of two of the animal-related hazards at the 
other (with wild animals following very closely behind cold snaps) suggest a more 
parsimonious interpretation in terms of moral significance. Where this interpretation runs 
into difficulties is in explaining the differential proximities of hazards that appear to carry 
no moral implications (e.g., heights versus cold snaps). Also, if it is to be argued that team 
sport carries moral significance as a noble, character- and team-building pursuit, one might 
reasonably expect cycling to win moral approbation as a non-polluting method of transport 
and a form of regular exercise conducive to a healthy lifestyle. But that is a matter of 
subjective interpretation by the participants, and it is plausible that New Zealand’s culture 
sets greater moral store by team co-operation than just exercise in general, and the 
likelihood that the majority of my hazards are morally neutral introduces noise that could 
account for differences in proximity between equally neutral hazards. 
Dimension 3 finds cleaning products, electricity and bacteria and viruses at one 
extreme, and crossing the road, heights and travelling by train at the other. A possible 
difference between these groups relates to fear or vulnerability of victims prior to exposure, 
although travelling by train would be an anomaly. Another possibility is ‘domesticity’ – the 
degree to which the hazard affects victims in the confines of their own home. The proximity 
of cleaning products would be explained satisfactorily by this interpretation, as would those 
of the hazards at the other pole, but the similarity of the proximities of wild animals and 
domestic animals presents a rather glaring weakness. Other candidates include 
‘naturalness’, as natural hazards such as avalanches and wild animals appear opposite 
electricity and cleaning products; and immediacy of death, as poisons (e.g., cleaning 
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products and eating unhealthy food) tend to inflict harm gradually over a longer period than 
heights and crossing the road. 
 
Study 3 
To help with interpreting the dimensions, new participants were recruited to rate the 
hazards on 16 characteristics suggested by previous theory and by informal inspection of 
the MDS plots (see Tables 3 and 4 for operational definitions). 
 
Controllability, Dread, Immediacy, Severity of exposure, Voluntariness: These are all cited by 
Jenkin (2006) as variables along which risk perception might vary in the context of the 
Psychometric Paradigm. 
 
Naturalness: This is another Psychometric Paradigm variable that has been adduced by 
multiple researchers (Rozin; 2006; Siegrist, Stampfli, Kastenholz & Keller, 2008; Slovic, 
1987). 
 
Deadliness, Familiarity, Inherent risk, Intrinsic badness: These are all proposed as variables 
that might explain the proximities of hazards as plotted on dimension 1. 
 
Human involvement, Immorality, Maliciousness, Moral significance, Possibility of gain: These 
are proposed as variables that might be represented by dimension 2. 
Domesticity: This is the variable I believe best describes dimension 3. 
 





Fifty-nine participants, of whom 29 were female, were recruited from a national student job 
centre; all were students at the University of Otago, studying a variety of disciplines. They 
were reimbursed $15 to cover their travel expenses. 
 
Materials 
The same experimental booths were used as in Study 1. These were set up in the same 
manner as in Study 1. The 33 hazards previously generated provided the stimuli for this 
procedure. The task participants completed involved rating those hazards, using a Likert 
scale, on the characteristics enumerated above (this is described in further detail below). 
 
Procedure  
The study was run in conjunction with two other, unrelated procedures. Participants were 
run in groups of up to 3, in individual experimental cubicles containing an iMac workstation 
on which all stimuli were presented and responses collected via custom written Superlab 
software (www.superlab.com). After giving informed consent, participants completed 
several other, unrelated procedures, before being given the following instructions:  
 
‘This is a study of 'hazards'. A hazard is defined as a potential source of danger. 
When the danger actually occurs, that is known as a 'hazard event'.  
 
We are investigating how people perceive and think about a number of hazards 
that we have identified.  You will be presented with a number of these hazards and 
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asked to judge them on various dimensions. 
  
Read the definition of each dimension carefully, but don't spend a lot of time on 
any one judgement. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in 
your judgement.’ 
 
Having read these instructions, participants then clicked through to the next page, 
which provided the definition of the first variable. There was a total of 12 variables 
altogether, and their identities and definitions are listed in Table 3. Participants rated all 33 
hazards in random order on each variable before proceeding to the next variable. The 
variables were presented in one of six different orders (order did not influence results and 
will not be discussed further). One hazard was presented at a time, with the response scale 
below, anchored at 1 and 7. Participants recorded their responses by pressing the keyboard 
key that corresponded with their desired rating.  After rating all hazards on all variables, 
participants completed another study before being thanked and debriefed about all tasks 
they had completed. 
Table 3  
12 Variables Rated by First Cohort 
Variable Definition 
Controllability The extent to which a victim can control 
the severity of consequences due to 
exposure 
Dread The extent to which the effects of exposure 
are dreaded 





Human Involvement The extent to which people are involved in 
the hazard 
Immorality The extent to which the hazard is immoral 
Intrinsic Badness The extent to which the hazard is 
necessarily a negative thing 
Maliciousness The extent to which the hazard is inflicted 
on victims with the intention to harm them 
Moral significance The extent to which the hazard represents 
a moral issue (whether good or bad) 
Naturalness The extent to which a hazard is the 
product of nature rather than man-
made/artificial 
Possibility of gain The extent to which something may be 
gained as a result of exposure to the 
hazard 
Severity of effects The extent to which the consequences of 
exposure are severe 
Voluntariness The extent to which exposure to the 




Ninety-two participants (51 male, 40 female, 1 other) were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, a large community of ‘workers’ who volunteer for simple online tasks in 







The procedure for the second sample was identical to that of the first sample with the 
following exceptions: first, the study was run in isolation over the Internet, with informed 
consent and debriefing conducted online. Second, only four variables were used (see Table 
4) and participants were provided with slightly amended instructions: 
 
This section of the questionnaire concerns the dimension of [variable]. [Variable] is 
here defined as [definition]. As an example, let’s take construction sites. When rating 
the [variable] of construction sites, the question is ‘[exemplar question]’. 
 
The hazard you are being asked to judge will be displayed underneath the definition of 
[variable].’ 
 
Third, participants responded by clicking their mouse on a rating rather than entering 
a number into a response box, and the program permitted participants to change their 
rating before proceeding to the next one.   
Table 4  
4 Variables Rated by Second Cohort 
Variable Definition Exemplar question 
Deadliness The likely number of 
deaths per hazard event 
If an accident occurred on a construction 
site (e.g. falling debris), how many people 
would that accident be likely to kill? 
Domesticity The extent to which the 
hazard affects people 
while they are at home 
Do construction site accidents tend to 
affect people while they are at home? 
Immediacy The extent to which the Do construction site accidents tend to 
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hazard event causes death 
straight away 
cause death straight away? 
Inherent Risk The extent to which 
people potentially exposed 
to the hazard view it as 
inherently risky 
If someone was working on a 
construction site, how much risk would 
they associate with the possibility of an 
accident occurring (e.g. falling debris)? 
 
Results 
Ratings of each hazard on each of the 16 variables were submitted to reliability analyses 
and all were found to be reliable (Table 5). To help interpret the dimensions extracted by 
the MDS analysis, hazard ratings on each variable were averaged across participants and 
then correlated, at the level of the hazard, with their coordinates on the three MDS 
dimensions. These correlations are also shown in Table 5.  
It is apparent from Table 5 that multiple variables correlate significantly with 
dimensions 1 and 2. The variables that correlate most strongly with dimension 1, though, 
are controllability, dread, familiarity, inherent risk, immediacy and severity of exposure. In 
other words, dimension 1 appears to resemble a composite of hazards’ perceived gravity 
and the perceived coping potential. These elements are strongly thematically linked (they 
are intrinsically inversely correlated). Thus dimension 1 could be seen as ‘perceived 
impact’. Dimension 2 is correlated highly with variables of a moral theme – immorality and 
moral significance – consistent with the extreme locations of terrorism, violent criminals 
and war at one pole and insects and domestic animals at the other (non-morally significant) 






Table 5  
Variable Reliability and Intercorrelations 
Variables Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 
Controllability .97 -.91*** -.25 .03 
Deadliness .99 .67*** -.35* -.22 
Domesticity .99 -.01 .07 -.73*** 
Dread .99 .81*** -.23 -.26 
Familiarity .93 -.74*** -.37* -.07 
Human 
Involvement 
.99 -.19 .14 .11 
Immediacy .99 .75*** -.19 .19 
Immorality .99 -.008 -.70*** -.22 
Inherent Risk .99 .72*** -.38* -.17 
Intrinsic 
badness 
.99 .67*** -.33† -.32† 
Maliciousness .98 .39* -.49** -.25 
Moral 
Significance 
.98 -.10 -.74*** .02 
Naturalness .99 .46** .65*** -.07 
Possibility of 
Gain 
.98 .69*** -.08 .27 
Severity of 
Exposure 
.98 .74*** -.33† -.24 
Voluntariness .99 -.10 -.41* .07 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** < .001 
However, because several of the 16 variables were also strongly correlated with 
each other, their ratings were factor analysed. In accordance with Velicer’s (1976) 
Minimum Average Partial procedure, 2 factors were extracted. Factor scores are shown in 
Table 6. These factor scores were then correlated with the dimensions, and the results are 
shown in Table 7. It is evident that the first factor represents variables relating to perceived 
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impact and that the second factor represents moral variables. As expected, the first and 
second factors mapped closely on to the first and second dimensions. The third dimension is 
not explained by either of the factors as domesticity did not load strongly on to either one. 
 
 Table 6  
 Loadings of Variables on to Factors 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 
Controllability -.72 .64 
Deadliness .89 .04 
Domesticity .31 .06 
Dread .99 -.07 
Familiarity -.60 .62 
Human Involvement -.25 -.19 
Immediacy .53 -.23 
Immorality .55 .79 
Inherent Risk .93 .05 
Intrinsic badness .97 .13 
Maliciousness .77 .54 
Moral Significance .44 .86 
Naturalness .28 -.84 
Possibility of Gain -.85 .27 
Severity of Exposure .98 .04 
Voluntariness -.19 .29 
  
  Table 7 
   Correlations of Factor Scores with Dimensions 
Factor MDS 1 MDS 2 MDS 3 
1 .76*** -.30† -.19 
2 -.43** -.78*** -.24 
 † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** < .001 
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In sum, a tentative look at the hazard space modelled by MDS reveals some overlap 
with previous analyses, but also notable differences, such as the possibility of a moral 
dimension. But the distribution of hazards in the space suggests that differences might be 
better represented discretely than continuously. It appears (particularly where the two 
most explanatory dimensions are plotted against each other) that hazards cluster together 
forming constellations of thematically similar hazards. Notably war, terrorism and violent 
criminals are plotted close to each other, but hazards such as earthquakes, tsunami and 
volcanic eruption (i.e. natural disasters) also cluster together as do driving a car, crossing 
the road and swimming (i.e. voluntary hazards) and smoking, taking drugs and drinking 
alcohol (i.e. ‘vice’ hazards).  
Where hazards form discrete groups, a cluster analysis is a preferable type of 
descriptive analysis compared with MDS.  Thus, the factor scores were submitted to a 
hierarchical cluster analysis. Distances between hazards were gauged as squared Euclidean 
distance. The results of the cluster analysis are graphically represented in Figure 2, in a 
‘dendogram’.  
A dendrogram illustrates how closely the items within it are associated. To 
determine the closeness of two hazards, the two horizontal lines associated with the two 
hazards should be traced from left to right (including along vertical lines which allow 
horizontal lines to merge with each other) until a vertical line is reached which is common 
to both hazards. This vertical line will align with a point along the dendrogram’s x-axis 
(which represents the hazard proximities rescaled such that 1 denotes high similarity and 
25 denotes low similarity between hazards). This point defines the closeness of those two 
hazards by comparison with other hazard pairs. As an example, insects and cold snap can be 
connected at (but not before) the vertical line that heat wave, wild animals, extreme 
weather, slippery surfaces and heights hold in common, making their rescaled distance 4.  
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This can be contrasted with the closeness of insects and avalanche, two hazards whose first 
vertical line in common is beyond that shared by insects and cold snaps, also encompassing 
volcanic eruption, tsunami and earthquakes. This vertical line aligns with 9 on the x-axis, 
and hence the rescaled distance between insects and cycling is 9. 
In this way, the hazards are arranged into clusters. Reading the dendrogram from 
right to left, the first vertical lines one encounters have offshoots that represent the most 
broadly applicable clusters. One of these clusters includes drinking alcohol, taking drugs, 
smoking, unhealthy food, fighting, violent criminals, war and terrorists (rescaled proximity 
of 9), and the other cluster is comprised of all the other hazards (rescaled proximity of 17). 
This second cluster sub-divides at the vertical line used in the second example in the 
paragraph above (rescaled proximity of 9), and at the line common to cleaning products, 
domestic animals, cycling, travelling by train, team sport, swimming, crossing the road, 
flying, driving a car, extreme sport, electricity, boating (rescaled proximity of 3). The first 
cluster sub-divides at the line common to violent criminals, war and terrorism (rescaled 
proximity of 1) and the line common to drinking alcohol, taking drugs, smoking, eating 
unhealthy food and fighting (rescaled proximity of 3). In some cases, further subdivisions 
can be made beyond these but, as with factor analysis, refining data into more fragments 
increases the descriptive accuracy of those fragments and reduces their utility. For that 





Figure 2.  Dendrogram illustrating clustering of hazards 
In this dendrogram, the numbers immediately to the right of the hazards should be 
ignored – they only represent the order in which hazards were set out in the data file; the 
order of presentation in this study was randomised, so order is not a factor in this study.  
 
Discussion 
This chapter presents three studies: a hazard generation study, a stimulus similarity 
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judgement study and a variable evaluation study. Replicating previous work in a modern 
and novel context, New Zealanders generated hundreds of hazards, which were then 
reduced to 33 hazard categories. Based on new participants’ paired similarity ratings, MDS 
was used to map their psychological proximity, a process yielding three major dimensions. 
Yet another group of participants rated the hazards on a set of plausible and theoretically-
derived variables, which suggested that the most important dimension could be explained 
by controllability, and was also strongly correlated with a host of other variables that 
collectively represent the degree to which hazards are believed to be both seriously 
destructive and difficult to cope with.  
In this way dimension 1 actually encompasses the characteristics of both Fischhoff 
et al’s (1978) dimensions. Unlike that study, however, the current study suggests that these 
dimensions are not orthogonal. This is perhaps unsurprising, as Fischhoff et al’s dimensions 
themselves had two attributes in common with each other (dread and catastrophic 
potential). The area in which their dimensions differed was that one emphasised familiarity 
and the other focussed on deadliness. The reason that familiarity did not emerge as its own 
factor in the current MDS analysis may be a result of the different types of hazards used in 
the analysis. In particular, in keeping with the most prominent contemporary issues, many 
of their hazards were of a novel technological nature (such as food preservatives, pesticides 
and nuclear power). The relative lack of hazards of this sort from my hazard list is perhaps 
symptomatic of a society in which threats from technological advancements are not feared 
as much as they used to be.  
With respect to MDS dimension 2, I suggested that it represented moral significance. 
The findings of Study 3 corroborate that claim as the largest correlation was with moral 
significance. Immorality and naturalness were also (slightly less) strongly correlated with 
dimension 2. The importance of a moral dimension, which has not been identified in 
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previous MDS analyses of hazard space, may be partly explained by the comparative 
preponderance of overtly moral hazards on my list, which serves to highlight the 
importance of sourcing a relevant, up-to-date taxonomy. There is good reason to suspect 
that moral hazards have become more salient over the years. In 1983 (the year Johnson and 
Tversky sourced their hazards), 32.1% of US adults smoked (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2013). Since then, the percentage of smokers in the developed world in 
general has declined, and by 2011 (the year I sourced my hazards), 19.0% of US adults 
smoked (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012) and the percentage of NZ adult 
smokers was 18% (Ministry of Health, 2012). A drop in alcohol consumption has also been 
observed – in 1983 the US consumed 10.2 litres per capita (Schoenborn, 1986) compared 
with 8.6 litres in 2011. In the same year, NZ consumed 9.5 litres (Statistics New Zealand, 
2012). This decline in these particular types of risky behaviour hints at more pervasive 
awareness of the health risks they entail. In further support of my belief that these 
indulgences have increasingly come to be viewed as health risks, it should be noted that 
research has generally found that those who engage in smoking and drink on a more 
frequent basis (of which there are now proportionally fewer than in 1983) tend to perceive 
them to be less risky (Dillard, Midboe & Klein, McCoy et al, 1992; Weinstein, 1998; 
Weinstein, Marcus & Moser, 2005). The third and final dimension was found to correlate 
highly with domesticity, and none of the other dimensions. 
In sum, the MDS analysis suggests that controllability and moral significance are the 
most heavily weighted aspects of the hazards among my participants. However, I observed 
from the arrangement of the hazards in the Euclidean spaces plotted by MDS that the 
hazards are better seen as members of distinct clusters than locations along continua, and 
so I supplemented the MDS analysis with a cluster analysis based on participants’ ratings on 
the sixteen candidate variables. This analysis identified four clusters of hazards: natural 
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disasters (these will henceforth be referred to as ‘natural’ hazards), hazards that individuals 
or societies voluntarily accept exposure to in exchange for some other perceived benefit 
(these will be referred to as ‘useful’ hazards), hazards that individuals voluntarily accept in 
exchange for a benefit but which are widely perceived to be immoral (these will be referred 
to as ‘immoral’ hazards), and hazards that are deliberately inflicted on unwilling victims 
(these will be called ‘malicious’ hazards). These four clusters were generated by the 
subdivision of two overarching clusters. Reading the dendrogram items from top-to-bottom, 
items from Cycling through Extreme Sport are ‘useful’ hazards, those from Avalanche 
through Extreme Weather are ‘natural’ hazards, those from violent criminals through war 
are ‘malicious’ hazards and those from unhealthy food through taking drugs are ‘immoral’ 
hazards. Examination of the hazard proximities showed that the overarching clusters were 
driven by differences in moral significance and that the subdivision of those clusters was 
driven by controllability. Whereas natural and useful hazards are both defined by low moral 
significance, the former are considered to have relatively low controllability and the latter 
are perceived to be relatively controllable. 
The morally significant cluster also sub-divides into a high controllability cluster 
and a low controllability cluster, with the high controllability cluster including hazards that 
could be interpreted as useful hazards were it not for the apparent likelihood that society 
does not willingly accept them, and tends to take a disapproving view of individuals that 
choose to expose themselves to them. Thus, even though some individuals may perceive 
there to be some social, cathartic or self-gratifying benefit to hazards such as smoking or 
eating unhealthily, they cannot be classified as useful and appear to form their own discrete 
group. They therefore earn their ‘immoral’ label. The low controllability sub-cluster 
comprises hazards that are morally significant and not accepted voluntarily either by 
society or individuals. Exposure to these hazards is inflicted by intentionally acting agents 
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whose purpose is to cause harm. It is these malicious hazards that are of particular interest 
in this thesis. 
It has been argued above that malicious hazards are routinely treated differently to 
other hazards that threaten humanity – that they receive incommensurate media and 
political attention, that more legislation is devoted to, and more money is spent on, 
combating them and somewhat paradoxically more lives are sacrificed in bids to stymie 
them (e.g. Cohen et al, 2004; Lanoie et al,1995). Evidence cited from opinion polling appears 
to suggest that public opinion whole-heartedly supports efforts to quell malicious hazards. 
A possible reason for this could be simply that the public perceives that these are the type of 
hazard that authorities have the most capacity to tackle. However, this argument does not 
stand up to scrutiny. Useful hazards, some of which amount to practical necessities of day-
to-day life, can in many cases be attenuated through regulation. But while some such 
regulation does exist, the policy debate is primarily conducted between politicians and 
academics, and on the occasions when the public’s wider attention is engaged, the public 
sometimes opposes regulation (e.g. legislating for mandatory use of seat belts; Schenck, 
Runyan & Earp, 1985; legislating for minimum pricing for alcohol; Lonsdale, Hardcastle & 
Hagger, 2012) and often fails to take simple precautions on an individual level (Pashby, 
1979; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1978). Furthermore, some research tentatively hints 
at a heightened perception of the threat of these hazards (Johnson, 2009). Opinion polling in 
the US found that the bulk of the public believed crime had risen over the previous 20 years, 
even though official statistics showed that exactly the reverse was true (Yougov, 2014a), 
and the same finding has been obtained in UK polling (Duffy, Wake, Burrows & Bremner, 
2008). This could be explained by a general tendency of people to adopt a pessimistic 
stance, but research exploring other hazards has tended to find that participants err on the 
side of optimism (Leiserowitz, 2006; Yougov, 2014b). If it is true that malicious hazards 
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attract especial pessimism, what exactly is it about malicious hazards that is responsible for 



















Chapter 3 – Risk perception 
Having established the validity of ‘malicious hazards’ as a category, and also that this is the 
same class of hazards to which western countries have routinely overreacted, the 
remainder of the thesis is concerned with why this is the case. One account is that risk 
perception drives policy attitudes, that people support policies intended to avert malicious 
hazards to the extent they believe those policies will prove effective in reducing their 
prevalence. It follows, then, that where people consider malicious hazards to be more 
common, they will perceive greater need to do something about them, and hence support 
risk mitigation. 
As intuitive as this account is, it is not the only one. Another is that the desire to fight 
crime, terrorism or hostile international powers derives from a perceived moral obligation 
– where crime and terrorism are concerned, the moral obligation is to secure a form of 
redress for the victims of criminals or terrorists, to penalise offenders so as to compel them 
to make amends and to deter similar transgressions, to affirm the moral authority of the law 
and to maintain the public’s confidence in its ability to express its collective repudiation of 
miscreants. Apropos war, some may perceive a moral obligation to attack a country acting 
in a way that is contrary to the values they hold, hoping to humiliate or depose its leader 
and assert the moral superiority of their own country’s values. Of course, there is still likely 
to be a limit to how much expense people will be prepared to spare in order to accomplish 
their moral goals, but the point is that support for tougher sentencing for criminals or 
broader surveillance powers to fight terrorism is independent of perceived risk, because it 
is the principle that counts. 
There is indeed support for this explanation. Tyler & Boeckmann (1997) issued 
surveys consisting of individual difference inventories measuring crime-related concerns, 
concerns about social conditions and social values. The crime-related concerns inventory 
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contained items concerned with personal risk perception (e.g. ‘I worry about being robbed 
or assaulted in my own neighbourhood at night’) and items that approximated general risk 
perception (e.g. ‘The crime problem in California is serious’). The social conditions 
inventory addressed concerns about societal decay, a deficit in social cohesion and chaotic 
heterogeneity. Its items were of a distinctly moral character (e.g. ‘There is a lot of agreement 
about what is right and wrong’; ‘With so many different types of people in California it is 
hard to know if others would help you if you were in trouble’) and the social values 
inventory comprised items that tapped fundamental, core social and political attitudes, in 
particular, authoritarianism (e.g. ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn’), dogmatism (e.g. ‘Of all the different philosophies  
which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct’) and liberalism (an 
example of a liberalism question was the extent to which participants would support 
multilingual education). Participants were also questioned about their support for 
California’s three strikes law (discussed in Chapter 1), punitive criminal justice measures 
more generally and support for the abolition of civil rights that criminal suspects benefit 
from. Each of these three dependent variables was then regressed on the three inventories 
measuring beliefs and attitudes. It was found that the factor most predictive of support for 
all three policies was social values. Social values are stable, enduring and internal (Caprara, 
Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione & Barbaranelli, 2006; Rokeach, 1973; Sears & Funk, 1999), 
and any attempt to influence public support for certain policies by correcting risk 
perception would not be expected to have any impact on the portion of support for these 
policies that is accounted for by them. 
Other research has also supported the role of morally driven support in risk 
mitigation policies (Green, Staerklé & Sears, 2006; King & Maruna, 2009; Tyler & Weber, 
1982). However, it is still apparent that concern about crime and its prevalence plays a part 
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- Dowler (2003), Pfeiffer, Windzio & Kleimann (2005) and Roberts & Indermaur (2007) all 
found that beliefs and concerns about crime predict support for punitive policies, and the 
papers previously cited as supporting a greater role for social values nonetheless 
acknowledged that crime-related concerns accounted for a significant minority of the 
variance. Crucially, crime-related concerns are also mutable, as evidenced by studies 
reporting successful efforts to correct health-related risk perception (Kreuter & Stretcher, 
1995; Siero, Kok & Pruyn, 1984), technological risk perception (Arvai, 2003; Bord & 
O’Connor, 1990; Frewer, Howard & Shepherd, 1996) and risk perception of natural hazards 
(Keller, Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; Paton, Smith, Daly & Johnston, 2008). This stands in 
contrast to social and political values, which are relatively permanent (Braithwaite, 1998; 
Johnson, 2001; Lindsay & Knox, 1984) . It may be, therefore, that to influence the resources 
expended on battling relatively uncommon hazards, the most viable method would be to 
target the risk perception mechanism.  
Further supporting this contention, it appears not only to be possible to influence 
people’s risk perception (and in so doing their attitudes towards risk mitigation policies), 
but also to modify people’s risk-related behaviours. It has been shown, for example, that 
interventions that alter risk perception are able to modify vaccination uptake (Chapman & 
Coups, 2006; Madhaven, Rosenbluth, Amonkar, Fernandes & Borker, 2003; Zimmerman et 
al, 2003), cancer and heart disease screening uptake (Ahmad, Cameron & Stewart, 2005; 
Hutchison et al, 1998; Rimer et al, 2002), driving behaviour (Perkins, Linkenbach, Lewis & 
Neighbors, 2010; Rundmo & Iversen, 2004; Wang, Rau & Salvendy, 2015) and smoking 
behaviour (Armitage, Harris. Hepton & Napper, 2008; Borrelli, Hayes, Dunsiger & Fava, 
2010; Smerecnik, Grispen & Quaak, 2011). These, of course, are all examples of risk 
communications that augment participants’ risk perception and thus induce them to take 
evasive or protective action. But risk researchers and policymakers have also succeeded in 
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diminishing risk perception and increasing acceptance of hazards for which the public’s risk 
perception is inflated, such as genetically modified food (Lusk et al, 2004; Steur, Buysse, 
Feng & Gellynck, 2013; Rousu, Huffman, Shogren & Tegene, 2007), water fluoridation 
(Chun, You, Ju & Son, 2015; Mork & Griffin, 2015) and nuclear power plants (Bickerstaff, 
Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, Poortinga & Simmons, 2008; Ieong et al, 2014). Should it emerge that 
malicious hazards are overestimated relative to other hazards, similar approaches to risk 
communication might prove effective for increasing the accuracy of risk perception and 
reducing support for counterproductive spending and policy. 
Before commencing a discussion about risk perception research, it helps first to 
specifically define risk perception, especially as there are now multiple fields of study that 
fall under the overarching category of ‘risk analysis’. These include risk assessment (the 
study of how to objectively quantify risk; Risk assessment, 2015), risk management (how to 
minimise risk and deal with its consequences; Risk management, 2015), risk 
communication (how best to communicate information about risk; Lang, Fewtrell & 
Bartram, 2001), risk-taking behaviour (the study of people's propensity to take risks; 
Trimpop, 1994) and risk preferences (people's attitudes towards taking risks; Pandey, 
2013). ‘Risk perception’, in contrast, is the study of how we subjectively gauge risk (Slovic, 
1987). It could be said, therefore, that risk assessment and risk perception are two sides of 
the same coin, but the former takes an actuarial approach and the latter takes a 
psychological one. 
It may seem that compared to related fields, risk perception is rather theoretical; 
that may be so, but not at the expense of practical application. Knowledge acquired in risk 
perception research facilitates and interacts with other areas. It is an integral component of 
risk communication; measuring risk perception may help to determine whether it is 
necessary to communicate risk information at all. In the 1970s, for example, such research 
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determined that nuclear power was perceived to be highly risky (Fischhoff et al, 1978; 
Otway, Maurer & Thomas, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979). The associated 
public opposition to nuclear power came as a surprise to nuclear experts, who deemed it to 
be in fact relatively safe. Subsequently, researchers theorised about how to communicate 
risk information about nuclear power so as to bridge the gap between professional and lay 
understanding of it (e.g. Keeney & von Winterfeldt, 1986; Van der Pligt & Midden, 1990). 
There is also an important relationship between risk-taking behaviour and risk 
perception. Intuitively, one would assume that those who perceive more risk will probably 
take fewer chances – in a normative risk-return analysis, increasing risk makes a bargain 
less appealing (e.g. Borelli, Hayes, Dunsiger & Fava, 2010; Harris, Jenkins & Glaser, 2006; 
Rundmo & Iversen, 2004). The same can be said of risk perception’s relationship with risk 
preferences (Klos, Weber & Weber, 2005; Soane & Chmiel, 2005; Weber & Millman, 1997). 
In spite of that, there seem to be several caveats. Some research does not find a relationship 
between risk perception and risk-taking behaviour in adolescents (Kern et al, 2014; 
Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003), or even finds that the correlation is reversed (Johnson, McCaul 
& Klein, 2002). Some samples of tourists have also been found not to show the usual 
correlation (Lepp & Gibson, 2008. As Lepp & Gibson’s results suggest, individual differences 
in personality serve as a moderator – those inclined more towards sensation-seeking may 
willingly embrace risks that most would prefer to avoid, or be less sensitive to changes in 
perceived risk (Arria, Caldeira, Vincent, O’Grady & Wish, 2008; Foster, Shenesey & Goff, 
2009; Zuckerman, Ball & Black, 1990). Some have questioned the direction of the putative 
relationship (e.g. Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003). These exceptions notwithstanding, it is 
generally the case that higher risk perception predicts less risk-taking behaviour, although 
further research on the relationship is needed. 
Although the notion of risk perception had been acknowledged previously, in 
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relation to game theory in international relations (Quandt, 1961) and risk taking behaviour 
(Slovic, 1964), the first analysis of factors that control risk perception appears to have been 
authored by Starr (1969). As a starting point, Starr gathered data on the average benefit of 
an array of hazards and the average risk carried by them. The former was determined by 
the average amount of money spent on activities by participants or by the average 
increment to participants’ annual income delivered by hazards. The latter, risk, was taken to 
be equivalent to the number of fatalities per hour of exposure to hazards. These data were 
then plotted against each other, and Starr drew conclusions based on two important 
assumptions. The first was that economical behaviour of participants and hazards is a valid 
proxy for ascertaining risk preferences – implicitly, the more money that is spent on a 
hazard, the higher the level of acceptance that hazard enjoys. The second assumption was 
that fatalities and spending in relation to hazards is sufficiently consistent over time as to 
allow the use of historic records to predict future trends. Of Starr’s conclusions, the most 
relevant to this thesis is that the public was willing to accept a level of risk 1000 times 
greater in exchange for the same benefit where exposure to the hazard was voluntary. 
Whilst this provided a valuable insight into the sort of biases at play where risk 
perception is concerned, Starr’s results must be put into perspective. Both of his 
assumptions were questionable. The notion that benefit can be measured in monetary 
terms is at best reductive, and at worst misleading. We now know that purchasing decisions 
are often made on the basis of flimsy criteria. For example, it has been shown that when 
presented with two identical offers, with the exception that one is presented as having been 
discounted from an earlier reference price, participants are significantly more likely to 
accept the purportedly discounted offer (Urbany, Bearden & Weilbaker, 1988; Lichtenstein, 
Burton & Karson, 1991). Tversky & Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that participants were 
more likely to agree to forego a discount than agree to pay a surcharge, despite the final 
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price being the same. In a similar vein, participants proved to make different decisions in 
two different conditions of the same gambling task based only on the wording of the 
question (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & Dolan, 2006). In its most naked form, this point 
can be illustrated by the gambling behaviour displayed by most gamblers of placing bets on 
long-shots which, despite offering attractive odds, deliver a lower expected value than 
favourites (Snowberg & Wolfers, 2007). 
In each of these instances, it can be argued that to pass judgements on rationality 
based on measurable quantitative factors ignores the role of emotion – in other words, if 
buying the same item for the same price but with a discount from a previous price affords 
the purchaser more positive affect, the decision is in fact rational. This argument has some 
merit (although in some cases purchasers still make purchasing decisions they consciously 
disagree with. Note, for example, that a large number of smokers voice the desire to stop; 
Boyle et al, 2000; Siahpush, Yong, Borland, Reid & Hammond, 2009), but in this instance it 
misses the point. If Urbany et al’s participants had been presented with the two 
quantitatively identical offers side by side, any positive affect they may have derived from 
achieving a saving would have been erased by the knowledge that in the reference price 
offer the initial price was too high in the first place. And this highlights the real deficiency in 
Starr’s reasoning, and indeed a well-documented cause of market failure in general – that 
individuals are frequently uninformed about relevant aspects of consumer decisions they 
take, and that as a result their decisions are not necessarily optimal (Cason & Gangadharan, 
2002; Eggers & Fischhoff, 2004; Giannakas, 2002). In fact, even if consumers were privy to 
all relevant information, depending on the complexity of the decision, there is a good chance 
they would not be able to optimally utilise it (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
Starr’s second assumption about the temporal stability of risk perception over time 
might also be questionable, because it appears that preferences can change quite 
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substantially in the course of a relatively short period. In the decade following publication of 
Starr’s (1969) paper, revenue from air travel in the US nearly doubled (United States 
Department of Transportation, n.d.) and UK passenger numbers more than doubled 
(Department for Transport, 2013). A similar seismic change can be observed in smoking 
habits, where nearly half the number of cigarettes were available for sale in the UK in 2006 
than in 1996 (Health & Social Care Information Centre, 2012). Indeed, smoking also 
provides a good example of the inadequacies of Starr's market-reliant paradigm – the 
number of cigarettes available for sale decreased in the decade preceding 2006, (i.e. the 
number of smokers dropped) and following a decade of steadily escalating public health 
decisions to restrict the practice and marketing of smoking and educate the public about the 
dangers resulting from it, the number of people who attributed aggravated risk of 
developing a variety of medical conditions to smoking increased (Lader, 2007). However, 
over the same period the inflation-adjusted cost of cigarettes has increased substantially 
(Tobacco Manufacturers' Association, 2014) leading Starr's reasoning to yield the 
conclusion that the public's acceptance of the risk posed by smoking in 2006 was greater 
than in 1996 (because the amount spent per smoker has increased). This flies in the face of 
evidence that suggests the public is more aware of the risks of smoking and less accepting of 
them (e.g. Cummings & Proctor, 2014; Lader, 2007). 
Even if it were not for these weaknesses in Starr’s assumptions, his methodology by 
its very nature was limiting as it only permitted meaningful comparisons where voluntary 
hazards are concerned. Involuntary hazards generally have no benefits at all, but to say that 
society therefore considers them all to be equally unacceptable is unhelpful – in reality, the 
public may wish to spend more money, or take more of some other type of evasive action, to 
stave off the risk of some involuntary hazards than others. 
The next notable attempt at a comprehensive framework to explain risk perception 
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came from Fischhoff et al. (1978), who argued that a stated preferences approach, in which 
participants were asked to express their attitudes towards risk, was preferable to revealed 
preferences. Furthermore, stated preferences address some of the shortcomings of the 
revealed preferences approach (i.e. allowing for subjective measures of social benefit that 
are not only monetary and not making epistemological presumptions about the nature of 
risk perception). In the Fischhoff et al. (1978) study, separate participant groups were 
asked to rate the societal benefits and perceived risk of the same set of hazards (e.g. 
Contraceptives, Nuclear Power, Police work). All participants were also asked to rate the 
acceptability of the current level of risk (it was made clear to participants that rating a 
hazard as unacceptably risky implied that more money needed to be spent on, or more 
restrictions applied to, the hazard in question) and rated hazards on 9 dimensions 
hypothesised to account for risk perception. 
Several findings emerged. Acceptability of current level of risk was measured by 
way of a ‘risk adjustment factor’, where an adjustment factor of 1 indicated the current risk 
was acceptable, lower than 1 denoted that even if the current risk were higher it would still 
be acceptable and higher meant that the current risk levels needed to be reduced. The 
results illustrated that almost all hazards were deemed to present excessive risk. This 
revelation thoroughly undermines the premise central to the revealed preferences 
approach, which simply assumes that a society’s interactions with hazards reflect an 
optimised equilibrium. 
Further challenging the revealed preferences approach, Fischhoff et al. (1978) 
observed an inverse correlation between perceived risk and perceived benefit, suggesting 
that their participants did not appreciate the existence of a trade-off between risk and 
return (Bali & Peng, 2006; Brandt & Kang, 2004; Ludvigson & Ng, 2007). This also conflicts 
with attempts to understand risk perception in rational economic terms. Instead, Slovic and 
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colleagues introduce the notion of ‘affect heuristics’ (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2007), which stipulates that instead of giving proportional 
weight to pros and cons when evaluating targets, people tend instead to form a global 
impression of the targets, either by retrieving previously formed evaluations or by 
retrieving related memories and the affective connotations attached to them (Epstein, 
1994), and then rendering affect-congruent judgements. Although the affect heuristic had 
not been named at the time, Slovic et al, 2007 argued that it is the mechanism behind the 
long-established Halo Effect (Thorndike, 1920). In terms of risk perception, this means that 
when asked to render judgements participants will retrieve the most accessible information 
about the hazard from memory and if any of that information is affectively resonant (e.g. 
‘Vaccinations save millions of lives’ or ‘Food preservatives do no-one any good’) an 
impression of the hazard will be formed which will then be used to inform judgements 
about all aspects of it. 
As mentioned previously Fischhoff et al. (1978) gathered ratings on Likert scales for 
9 dimensions which had been hypothesised either by the authors or in previous literature 
to control perception of risk. Recall that their factor analysis revealed that the 9 dimensions 
loaded on to 2 factors: one was severity of exposure and the other included most of the 
other dimensions, but especially familiarity and controllability. This finding was used at the 
time to explain the public furore about nuclear power (which frustrated policy makers at 
the time who deemed it relatively innocuous), and Slovic (2002) has since used the same 
paradigm to explain the recent consternation terrorism has evoked. Slovic (2004) drew an 
explicit parallel between the two, arguing that terrorism ‘hits all the same risk perception 
hot buttons’ (p.15) as nuclear power, though it is not clear that this parallel is warranted. 
Although they may appear to possess comparable catastrophic potential and be similarly 
uncontrollable, nuclear power was a genuinely new and poorly understood hazard in 1978 
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– the world’s first nuclear plant was opened in 1954, and nuclear power only started to 
gather serious momentum in the 1980s – whereas terrorism has been around in various 
forms for thousands of years (see Chapter 1). 
Despite some weaknesses in their two-factor model’s ability to explain the last 
decade’s hyperactive concern about terrorism, Slovic et al’s (1978) work, which they 
termed the ‘Psychometric Paradigm’ contributed a lot to our understanding of risk 
perception. It highlighted where the public’s perspective is normatively rational and where 
it appears not to be. In doing so it also highlighted that it cannot be assumed that the public 
has optimised the balance between risk and benefit and introduced the dimension 
evaluation methodology. Perhaps most importantly, it began to address the role affect plays, 
though in a very limited way. The two factors in their two-factor model comprise a blend of 
informational, cognitive and affective content. The implication, though, is that the affective 
component of the factors is a response to cognitive appraisals. Furthermore, there is really 
only one emotion incorporated into the model – fear. It is of course helpful to know that 
certain hazards are regarded as more terrifying than others, but it would also be interesting 
to know whether other emotions affect risk perception too, and similarly whether affect 
only influences risk perception when the source of the arousal was the hazard itself or 
whether affect exerts a more general, pervasive influence on risk perception. 
Both these lines of enquiry were taken up by Johnson & Tversky (1983), who 
examined the causal role of affect by inducing negative mood by informing participants, via 
newspaper-style stories, about a death arising from one of three different causes – 
leukaemia, fire or homicide. A control group read news stories about neutral subjects. 
Participants then went on to indicate their level of anxiety towards a pre-determined range 
of hazards, including the hazards referenced in the stories, and give risk estimations about 
them. The results revealed, to the authors’ surprise, that experimental participants 
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expressed higher levels of anxiety towards, and gave higher risk estimates for all hazards, 
irrespective of similarity to the subject of the death story initially read. This suggests that 
the affective disposition of hazards themselves only represents part of the picture and that 
emotion does not simply impact upon risk perception as a component of the same 
mechanism through which beliefs about hazards do. Indeed, Johnson & Tversky’s (1984) 
conditional prediction task, in which participants were informed that the frequency of one 
hazard was higher than they had previously believed and then given the chance to adjust 
their estimates of the frequency of other hazards, demonstrated the context-specific 
operation of receiving information about a hazard, which is here contrasted with the global 
effect of being affectively primed by a hazard. 
Although the primary purpose of the stories was to induce depressive affect, one 
cannot be certain whether the effect of augmenting risk perception was caused by 
depressive affect or anxious affect, as these emotions covary (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Siemer, 2001; Siemer, Mauss & Gross, 2007), and the results from the anxiety scale confirm 
that participants were experiencing anxiety after reading the stories. It is also not clear 
whether affect was responsible for the effect; there remains the possibility that reading the 
stories caused participants to form the belief that the world is a generally more dangerous 
place than they had previously thought, and that their subsequent risk estimates were 
driven by this cognitive extrapolation and not by affect. However, both of these qualms 
were addressed by a follow-up experiment in which the authors presented a news story 
recounting the sad, but not dangerous, situation of a young man. This story was presented 
alongside the crime story from the earlier study. Results indicated that both stories 
increased risk estimates in equal measure, and that, again, the similarity of the hazard being 
estimated did not impact upon the effect of the mood induction. A final experiment 
including a happiness manipulation illustrated that happiness and depressive mood exerted 
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opposite effects on risk perception, pointing towards a mood congruency effect. 
Notwithstanding the consistency of Johnson & Tversky's (1983) ability to amplify 
risk perception by inducing negative affect, closer inspection of their data reveals that their 
effect was largely carried by non-malicious hazards. If anything, the results suggest that risk 
perception of malicious hazards specifically is more influenced by the informational 
significance of the stories than by mood, relative to other types of hazard. As well as giving 
support to the view that malicious hazards are treated differently, this indicates either that 
their risk judgements are not heavily driven by affect, at least not by depressive affect. The 
finding that those experiencing negative affect made generally more pessimistic judgements 
was observed more recently by Gasper & Clore (2000), but again the wording of the 
negative mood induction was intended to induce sad mood, and none of the hazards 
estimated post-induction were malicious. 
Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards (1993) took the important step of distinguishing 
between negatively valenced emotions, inducing both anger and sadness. Their research, 
though, was focussed on the interpretation of the causes of hazards after the fact rather 
than the likelihood of their occurring. DeSteno, Petty, Wegener & Rucker (2000), however, 
proposed a framework that could satisfactorily explain Johnson & Tversky’s (1983) results. 
Having noted Keltner et al.’s finding that anger-induced participants were more likely to 
construe hazards as having been caused by other people’s misdeeds, DeSteno et al.  
reasoned that by extension anger-induced participants would perceive hazards caused by 
others’ misdeeds as more likely. Their results did indeed show that angry participants 
believed angering events were more likely relative to sad events when compared with 
sadness-induced participants, and proposed two possible mechanisms: ‘ease-of-retrieval’ 
and ‘emotion-as-information’. The first posits that when we are in an affective state, events 
that are affectively congruent with that state become more easily accessible. This was 
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probed by prompting participants with a series of day-to-day angering events and asking 
them to press a button when they were able to recall an instance of a given event occurring 
(either to themselves or to others). No significant differences between anger- and sadness-
induced participants emerged. The second mechanism, emotion-as-information, suggests 
instead that when affectively aroused, we use the biases associated with our specific 
emotional state to inform our perceptions of the world. This explanation was probed using 
Likert scales, on which participants conveyed their agreement with statements about what 
emotions they felt the world gave rise to. This time, anger-induced participants were 
significantly more likely to find the world an angering place than sad participants, 
supporting the emotion-as-information hypothesis. This is important, because if emotion 
imposed its effect on risk perception via enhanced recall of mood congruent events, it is 
unlikely that anger could have the opposite effect of reducing risk perception. But the 
inference that the world is an angry place is just one type of information that can be drawn 
from anger, leaving open the possibility that if people use anger to inform their judgement 
under other circumstances, it might influence risk perception differently. 
Lerner & Keltner (2001) obtained further evidence of the differential effects of 
negative emotions. Drawing on Smith & Ellsworth’s (1985) insights, Lerner and Keltner 
proposed that the specific effects of emotions depend on the cognitive appraisals associated 
with them. Cognitive appraisals are evaluations made by perceivers about their 
environment along various theoretically defined dimensions: in Lerner and Keltner’s case, 
pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, self-other 
responsibility/control and situational control. Different combinations of evaluations, it is 
suggested, produce different emotions. As an example, consider a long wait in a waiting 
room, containing no reading materials or other form of stimulation, for a doctor’s 
appointment. Such a situation would be appraised as low in pleasantness, low in attentional 
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activity and low in anticipated effort, theoretically producing boredom. But if the situation is 
changed so that the obstacle to seeing the doctor is not a passive wait, but instead a series of 
long and difficult forms to fill in, the pleasantness of the situation would probably still be 
low, but it would command a higher level of attentional activity and anticipated effort, 
producing frustration. Similarly, whilst both fear and anger are appraised as unpleasant, 
Ellsworth & Smith (1988) found that the former is characterised by uncertainty and 
situational control whereas anger is distinguished by certainty and individual control (i.e. 
the belief that the perceiver is in control of the situation). 
DeSteno et al. (2000) had already demonstrated that the idiosyncratic effects of 
emotions on risk perception extend beyond differences in valence, and Lerner & Keltner 
(2001) expanded on the mechanism behind them. They suggested that not only do 
appraisals of situations determine which specific emotion will be elicited, but they will also 
continue to influence cognition and colour the way subsequent situations are perceived 
even when the subsequent situations are immaterial to the initial source of the appraisals. 
These latent effects of appraisals have been dubbed ‘appraisal tendencies’ (p.147). The 
notion is essentially a refinement of the emotion-as-information hypothesis, as it extends 
the information derived from affect beyond a general inference that the world is prone to 
eliciting the emotion being experienced, to an inference that the appraisals that elicited the 
emotion more generally hold true. As regards anger and fear, their contrary appraisals 
along the certainty and individual control dimensions were theorised to lead to different 
risk preferences – angry people ought to be inclined towards risk-seeking preferences as 
they should feel fortified by beliefs about their control over the situation and the situation’s 
certainty, while fearful people ought to be inclined in the opposite direction.  
These predictions were tested using Tversky & Kahneman’s (1981) ‘Asian Disease 
Problem’, in which participants are presented with a moral dilemma that forces them to 
67 
 
choose between two alternative programmes to combat a hypothetical pandemic. One 
programme is deemed risky, as it incorporates an element of random chance that 
determines either the total success or total failure of the treatment. The other programme is 
deemed certain – there is no element of chance because the treatment guarantees that a 
certain number of people will be cured and a certain number will die. Rather than 
experimentally manipulating fear and anger, the authors required participants to fill in 
questionnaires from which their dispositional tendencies towards fear and anger were 
gauged. Regression analyses confirmed that, as expected, higher anger scores predicted 
risk-seeking and higher fear-scores predicted risk-aversion.  
Risk preferences are not necessarily the same as risk perception, and the effect 
could have been carried by the appraisals of control that affect preferences without 
impacting upon perception, but a further study by Lerner & Keltner (2001) revealed that 
anger was predictive of more optimistic risk perceptions in relation to a set of positive and 
negative life events and fear was predictive of pessimism. That study also assessed 
dispositional happiness of participants and found that happiness was predictive of 
optimism to much the same extent as anger. This is notable as anger and happiness share 
the cognitive appraisal of high certainty and individual control but differ with respect to 
valence. These findings imply that valence is not the critical factor in predicting risk 
perception in this context. Foreseeing that findings based on pre-existing individual 
differences are vulnerable to the usual criticisms about causality (e.g. chronically angry 
people may be exposed to fewer threats than fearful people), Lerner & Keltner 
experimentally manipulated mood, asking participants to write down several things that 
evoked the target emotion in them, and also to describe in some detail the one that they 
found most evocative. Once again, results showed effects in opposite directions depending 
on whether participants were in the fear or anger condition. 
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The findings of DeSteno et al. (2000) and Lerner & Keltner (2001) complement each 
other, although they present somewhat conflicting interpretations of the emotion-as-
information hypothesis. DeSteno et al. propose that the only information an emotion 
supplies is that the world is prone to causing that self-same emotion, whereas Lerner & 
Keltner claim that information also takes the form of extrapolations based on what 
appraisals first elicited the emotion. In addition, both may be limited, for the present 
purposes by their lack of attention to deadly hazards. Perhaps prosaic life events are more 
prone to affective influence because participants are better able to empathise with the 
victim involved, or more able to imagine them affecting themselves. It also must be noted 
that neither of the studies included a control condition, so it cannot be known whether the 
observed effects are accounted for by fear, by anger or by both. 
Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff (2003) addressed most of these issues in a study 
that was, coincidentally, the first to specifically theorise about and empirically test risk 
perception in relation to terrorism. Their study was conducted at two time points, each 
separated by about two months. The first time point (T1) was on 20th September 2001, nine 
days after the infamous terrorist attacks in New York, so the whole study was carried out at 
an opportune moment to gauge the impact of emotional reactions to them. At T1, 
participants were simply issued with scales intended to measure dispositional levels of 
anxiety and vengefulness (these were respectively assumed to be proxies for fear and 
anger). At T2, participants were randomly assigned to receive an anger or a fear mood 
induction. In these inductions, they were specifically asked to focus on the characteristics of 
the recent terrorist atrocities that evoked the target emotion, and write them down. 
Following that, to reinforce the induction, they were also presented with a photo and played 
an audio track that had previously proved successful in eliciting anger or fear. Participants 
then completed the risk perception exercise. This included three scales, one concerning 
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predictions about the fortunes of the US where terrorism is concerned, one inquiring into 
the probability that the average American will be the victim of terrorism or take 
precautionary measures against it, and one inquiring whether the participant himself would 
be such a victim. Finally, as a manipulation check, participants reported how angry and 
fearful they had felt during the erstwhile mood inductions. 
The results revealed that participants in the fear condition generated significantly 
higher scores on all of these scales. This substantiates Lerner & Keltner’s (2001) results, but 
arguably conflicts with DeSteno et al.’s (2000), because of the latters’ contention that angry 
participants are prone to perceiving greater risk. In the case of this study, almost all of the 
items did concern angering hazards, yet they received lower ratings under angry affect than 
fearful affect. Although the authors claimed that anger and fear were independently 
responsible for their respective effects, the evidence for this conclusion (based on the null 
effect of covarying the mood manipulation check data), was weak so it is best to see Lerner 
et al.’s (2003) results as indicative and not definitive. 
There is also the further complication that while all the scales were orientated 
towards risk perception in relation to terrorism, the first scale asked for predictions about 
the US’s efficacy in waging the war on terror, and thus confidence in one’s country and 
beliefs about the threats it faces were conflated.  Evidence now exists suggesting that anger 
can inflate people’s self-belief (Gambetti & Giusberti, 2014; Hemenover & Zhang, 2004; Lee, 
Park & Lee, 2012). It would seem unjustified to assume that the same mechanism that 
amplifies optimism about one’s own prospects of success when engaging in active 
confrontation also minimises perceptions of the threat from the enemy’s active 
confrontations. The other two scales were also composite measures, this time comprising 
items that measured risk perception along with items that measured risk preferences (half 
of each). Although those constructs do tend to correlate, multiple examples can, and have, 
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been cited of where they diverge. In addition, it has been noted that, rather unsurprisingly, 
anger is related to more risky behaviour (Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson, 2004; Gambetti & 
Giusberti, 2009; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999) while fear has been linked to generally more 
cautious behaviour (Morman, 2000; Witte, Berkowitz, Cameron & KcKeon, 1998; Yaoshan, 
Wei & Yongjuan, 2011). In further support of the theoretical and functional distinction 
between risk perception and risk preferences, Rader, May & Goodrum (2007) found that 
although risk perception is highly predictive of fear of crime, it is not directly predictive of 
defensive or avoidance behaviours, whereas fear of crime is, a position endorsed by Miceli, 
Sotgiu & Settanni (2008) too (but see Gerrard, Gibbons & Bushman, 1996; McCusker, 
Stoddard, Zapka, Zorn & Mayer, 1989). The most apposite conclusion to draw is that the 
relationship between risk perception and risk preferences is complex, and assumptions that 
they are one and the same thing are unwarranted. 
Other research has since been carried out in the vein of Lerner & Keltner's (2001) 
appraisal-tendency framework (ATF). Foo (2011), for example, applied the ATF to 
investment decisions, using the same induction procedure as Lerner & Keltner (2001). 
However, in Foo's study four emotions were induced – happiness, anger, fear and hope. The 
authors hypothesised that hope would have a similar effect to fear because the two share 
appraisals of low certainty and high situational control with fear. Mood indeed had an effect, 
but surprisingly the differences were due to the hope condition, in which participants 
perceived more risk than in the anger and happiness conditions. Fear-induced participants 
also perceived more risk than participants in those conditions, but the effect did not reach 
significance. Nonetheless, the research largely vindicated Lerner & Keltner (2001). It found 
that anger and happiness result in similar risk perception, and the effect of hope seems to 
corroborate their more sophisticated version of the emotion-as-information hypothesis. 
DeSteno et al's (2000) contention that information conferred by emotion manifests itself as 
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a bias towards seeing the world as congruent with that emotion does not accord with the 
finding that hope-induced participants perceive more risk; if the world was a hopeful place, 
one would expect people to perceive a greater likelihood of success. Note, though, that even 
if this study had found a significant effect of anger, the lack of a control group would render 
the difference hard to interpret. 
Another innovative study was run by Shavit, Shahrabani, Benzion & Rosenboim 
(2013). Theirs was a natural experiment conducted in the wake of a forest fire in Israel. 
National media coverage had portrayed the authorities’ response to the fire as being inept, 
and it was thus suspected that the issue had aroused considerable anger amongst Israelis. 
Data were collected only one week after the forest fire, so the authors also hypothesised 
that those close to the area where it took place would still be experiencing heightened fear. 
Thus two pseudo-experimental groups were formed – those who lived close to the fire and 
those who lived far away. Emotion self-reports revealed that those closer to the fire were 
more afraid of it than those further away, although both groups reported similar levels of 
anger. The ensuing risk perception questionnaire contained questions about six hazards, 
one of which was about fires and two of which were malicious hazards. Participants nearer 
to the fire, as predicted, did show higher risk perception, and not only in relation to fires. 
This is not remotely surprising; since participants in both groups were experiencing anger 
in similar measure, the observed effect of location was reflective of the cumulative effect of 
anger and fear, and does not give any clues about the influence of anger on that effect. 
However, further analyses revealed that fear and anger were both significantly positively 
correlated with most of the items on the risk questionnaire (including the two malicious 
hazards), albeit fear more so. Although it is not possible to infer causation from this finding, 
it does contradict Lerner & Keltner’s study, which used very similar dependent variables. 
Shavit et al’s correlational finding suggests that Lerner et al’s (2003) results may have 
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merely reflected the differential effect sizes of anger and fear rather than a qualitative 
difference between them. If it is the case that what Shavit et al. (2013) observed was a 
cumulative effect, that would add more weight to the importance of researching perception 
of malicious hazards which, much like the forest fires in Israel, may give rise to fearful and 
angry affect. 
So far, much of the uncertainty about what role anger plays in risk perception 
surrounds the endemic lack of studies including a control group, or any other way of 
ascertaining what drives the difference between anger and fear. There does appear, though, 
to be one published study that did feature control participants. Lu, Xie & Zhang (2013) 
induced emotion by asking participants to read narratives in which a driving-related 
situation was portrayed either in an angering or a frightening way. In the neutral condition, 
participants read a pallid passage of text about the university’s library. Subsequently 
participants answered a risk perception questionnaire comprising three questions about 
the perceived likelihood of accidents caused by running a red light, speeding, and drink 
driving (it was not specified whether they were fatal or not). The hazards were therefore 
not malicious as such, but all involved recklessness and an attitude of indifference towards 
the welfare of others, and so they might reasonably be seen as quasi-malicious. As 
predicted, anger-induced participants perceived significantly less risk than neutral 
participants, who perceived significantly less risk than fear-induced participants. Lu et al.’s 
(2013) study therefore represents the strongest evidence yet in favour of the ATF as an 
explanation of risk perception and against DeSteno et al’s (2000) version of the emotion-as-
information hypothesis. Nonetheless, being the only paper that satisfactorily demonstrates 
an optimism-biasing effect of angry affect compared with neutral affect, Lu et al. requires 
replication.  
Taking the corpus of research as a whole, the effect of manipulating emotion on non-
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malicious hazards seems to be consistent. Johnson & Tversky (1983) demonstrated that sad 
participants perceived more risk of such hazards than happy participants, an effect that has 
since been replicated by Drače & Ric (2012), Gasper & Clore (2000) and DeSteno et al. 
(2000). By contrast, the effect of emotion on perception of malicious hazards is more 
enigmatic, hindered by the failure of research to include control conditions. The only paper 
that convincingly makes the case that anger lowers risk perception is Lu et al’s (2013), and 
other research appears to conflict with their results, most notably DeSteno et al. (2000) but 
also Shavit et al. (2013).  
The picture is also somewhat inconsistent with regard to the relative effects of other 
emotions. When fear has been compared with any other emotion (with the exception of 
hope), it has produced inflated risk perception (Lerner et al, 2003; Shavit et al, 2013). We 
also have evidence from DeSteno et al. (2000) that anger gives rise to higher risk perception 
of malicious hazards than sadness. Together, the findings could point to an emotion 
hierarchy with regard to risk perception, with fear at the apex, followed by anger, and with 
sadness producing the most optimistic risk perception. This hypothesis would in fact 
comport with the ATF – anger and fear both comprise appraisals of high anticipated effort, 
high perceived obstacles and low pleasantness. This combination of appraisals is suggestive 
of a threat, so, in keeping with the emotion-as-information hypothesis, higher risk 
perception ought to result. Another appraisal potentially weighing in on risk perception is 
human agency, high levels of which are associated with anger, heightening risk perception 
of malicious hazards in particular. But increased feelings of control bestowed by anger may 
serve to counterbalance the effect caused by the other appraisals, partially offsetting it. 
Sadness, on the other hand, entails attributions of less anticipated effort than the other two 
emotions, which suggests that a threat is absent or no longer relevant. DeSteno’s (2000) 
simplified version of the emotion-as-information hypothesis also explains this hierarchy 
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satisfactorily, but research such as Foo’s (2011) and Lu et al.’s (2013) seems to argue 
against it. Either way, Lerner & Keltner’s (2001) description of the ATF states explicitly that 
anger ought to lower risk perception, not merely relative to fear but in absolute terms. 
But neither Lerner et al. (2003) nor DeSteno et al. (2000) are able to explain the 
phenomenon of heightened risk perception of malicious hazards in a real world context – 
Lerner et al. cannot because they conclude that anger reduces risk perception, and DeSteno 
et al’s (2000) mood congruency effect would be equally applicable to hazards affectively 
characterised by emotions other than anger (e.g. if tornados were a saddening hazard, it is 
expected that thinking about tornados and judging their risk would be a saddening 
experience – thus the perceived risk of tornados would be inflated). In fact, from an affective 
standpoint, risk perception of malicious hazards is best explained by the alternative 
interpretation of the ATF outlined above. Malicious hazards may be angering and anger 
appraisals tend to invoke a threat, which ought to augment risk perception relative to non-
angering hazards. 
The discussion thus far has focused on affective influences on risk perception of 
malicious hazards. But it would be constructive also to consider the literature from a 
cognitive perspective. Regrettably (and ironically, given the cognitive origins of the field) 
such research is rather more scarce. Examples of cognitive approaches to risk perception 
include: Fischhoff et al’s (1978), psychometric paradigm (and similarly, Brun, 1992), 
Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) application of Prospect Theory; Tversky & Kahneman’s 
(1983) use of the representativeness heuristic; Folkes’s (1988) use of the availability 
heuristic; and Sjöberg’s (2000), extension of the psychometric paradigm (to 25  
dimensions). These approaches are all cognitive in the sense that they invoke target beliefs 
or globally applicable processing biases to explain risk perception. The psychometric 
paradigm, for example, offers severity of exposure and familiarity to account for the 
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perception of terrorism and war, whereas prospect theory might explain risk perception of 
those hazards in terms of the non-linearity of probability weighting, causing the over-
weighting of normatively small probabilities. The representativeness heuristic hints that 
malicious hazards may appear more likely because terrorism, homicide and war seem like 
more plausible ways of dying than travelling in trains or extreme weather. The availability 
heuristic points to hysterical news coverage of malicious hazards as a factor (Frost, Frank & 
Maibach, 1997; Lawrence & Mueller, 2003; Marsh, 1991), although, as I argued previously, 
this explanation is philosophically dubious because of the circular logic it employs. 
 Although no cognitive account has yet provided a comprehensive or satisfying 
account of risk perception, some research has provided intriguing clues. Belief in a just 
world (BJW; Lerner, 1970), for example, is a cognitive bias in which people are inclined to 
assume that others (and sometimes themselves) receive outcomes that correspond with 
their moral worthiness. As such, it has been used to explain derogation of impoverished 
people and victims of rape and domestic violence (Carmody & Washington, 2001; Montada, 
1998; Reichle, Schneider & Montada, 1998). In a nutshell, the plight of innocent victims is 
hypothesised to threaten the worldview of people who endorse BJW, and the resulting 
conflict is resolved by altering beliefs about these victims by attributing responsibility for 
their circumstances to them. Although BJW has obvious undesirable, anti-social 
implications, numerous studies have found that those who endorse it benefited from more 
positive psychological outcomes (Dzuka & Dalbert, 2007; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Tomaka & 
Blascovich, 1994), sometimes even when they themselves have endured the adverse 
circumstances (Otto, Boos, Dalbert, Schöps & Hoyer, 2006; Wu et al, 2011; Xie, Liu & Gan, 
2010). 
Lambert, Burroughs & Nguyen's (1999) research investigated individual differences 
in BJW and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and how they relate to risk perception. 
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People high in RWA are a particularly relevant contingent where risk perception is 
concerned, as RWA is a set of beliefs characterised by strict, inflexible values that place a 
heavy emphasis on adherence to the moral standards and behaviour endorsed by the 
dominant group in society (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford, 1950). The 
corollary of these beliefs is a suspicion towards those who deviate from endorsed norms, 
who are accordingly seen as a threat. The fear that the sense of security afforded by 
conformity might be compromised causes right-wing authoritarians to view the world as a 
dangerous place, so they tend to perceive higher levels of risk than people lower on this 
trait (Altemeyer, 1988). In Lambert et al's study, participants’ RWA was gauged using 
Altemeyer's RWA scale, and then divided into low authoritarians and high authoritarians. 
BJW was also ascertained, using Dalbert, Montada & Schmitt's (1987) BJW scale.  Two 
months later, participants were asked both about the likelihood of hazards affecting them, 
and the likelihood of the hazards affecting others. Results indicated that among those 
participants classified as high in RWA, BJW was negatively correlated with risk perception. 
The researchers concluded that for individuals high in RWA, BJW has a buffering effect - it is 
used as a coping device to help such people reconcile their belief that there are deplorable 
people in the world with their need to feel safe and secure.  
Concerns about causality aside, what is particularly interesting is that there was 
little difference between self and other risk estimates. It seems from these results that those 
high in RWA and BJW do not only use the latter to mitigate concern for their own safety, 
they also use it to minimise the threats others face. This may be because those high in RWA 
derive their sense of security in part from feeling as though they are members of a safe 
society, and that harm suffered by others vicariously poses a threat to them (as a portent of 
societal breakdown), or it may be because people high in BJW believe exposure to hazards  
is controllable and so when presented with a questionnaire that requests likelihood 
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estimates in percentage terms they return low percentage estimates because they do not 
construe victimhood as a matter of random chance.  
But is there reason to believe this effect would be amplified where malicious 
hazards are concerned? None of Lambert et al.'s (1999) hazards were malicious, but given 
the tendency of right-wing authoritarians to dislike and distrust certain segments of society 
that they deem degenerate and dangerous, and given Lambert et al's finding that BJW is a 
particularly important predictor of risk perception when RWA is high, there is good reason 
to suspect that they would judge malicious hazards particularly likely.  
There is another insight to draw from Lambert et al’s research. Most hazards afford 
two general attributions when they result in injury or death: 'it was the fault of the 
deceased' and 'it was the fault of external circumstances'). Malicious hazards, however, 
afford a third: 'it was the fault of someone else'. The availability of a third option may reduce 
the likelihood of blaming the victim, either because more potential causes dilute the 
confidence in any individual one (the ‘discounting’ principle; Kelley, 1972), or, more 
interestingly, because people might find causal explanations involving a deliberate 
perpetrator more satisfying. 
In fact, the attribution literature offers good reason to suspect they are more 
satisfying. This notion can be traced back to Heider (1958), who conjectured that perceivers 
aim to establish personal causality because it confers greatest capacity to predict what will 
happen in the future (perhaps because whereas it is a helpful heuristic to assume that 
people’s dispositions and resultant actions will likely be consistent over time, random 
environmental vagaries offer no such insight). Jones & Davis (1965) agreed that 
intentionality is a crucial part of the attribution process, and argued that when attempting 
to make attributions, the first question perceivers consider is whether an intentional act 
was involved. In a well-known test of this hypothesis, Jones & Harris (1967) asked 
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participants to read out essays in favour of or opposing Fidel Castro to other participants, 
who were informed that the substance of the essay was not chosen by the readers but 
rather by a coin toss. In spite of knowing that the readers’ personal opinions could not have 
influenced which essay they read, readers of pro-Castro essays were still rated as more pro-
Castro than readers of anti-Castro essays. This was an early substantiation of Heider’s 
thesis, and the predilection to make internal, or ‘correspondent’ attributions over external 
attributions.  
Subsequent research probed what factors predict correspondent inferences, 
frequently in the context of hazards. Several studies confirm that when the consequences of 
a hazardous event are described in more severe terms (Schroeder & Linder, 1976; Shaver, 
1970; Ugwuegbu & Hendrick, 1984) and when the valence of the consequences is negative, 
correspondent inferences were more likely (Kanekar & Pinto, 1991; Shaw & Skolnick, 
1971). Other research has found that perceivers will render defensive attributions such that 
when they perceive themselves as more similar to a potentially culpable individual they will 
attribute less responsibility to them (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Shaver, 1970; Shaw & 
McMartin, 1977); and when the outcome of an event is mutable internal attributions are 
more likely (Williams, Lees-Haley & Price, 1996). All of these potentially illuminate the sort 
of hazards for which personal responsibility is likely to be imputed, and it would appear 
that all malicious hazards are just that sort.  
Indeed, some evidence suggests that ambiguously attributable adverse incidents are 
more likely to be attributed to personal factors than situational ones. Morris, Moore & Sim 
(1999) recounted to their participants a vignette about a lawnmower factory where 
construction practices had recently changed so that lawnmowers no longer arrived at 
workstations with predictable regularity. As a consequence, employees sometimes found 
themselves adopting the risky practice of working on two lawnmowers simultaneously. 
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Eventually, participants were told, this resulted in an accident in which a lawnmower fell, 
causing damage to expensive instruments and lost productivity to the company. The 
scenario was specifically designed so that an environmental factor (the ergonomics of the 
production line set-up) was subjectively more causal than an internal factor (the negligence 
of the employees). In spite of that, when asked to generate counterfactuals (i.e. scenarios in 
which the accident would not have happened), two separate samples of participants 
preferred counterfactuals in which the workers had behaved differently to counterfactuals 
where the production line had been configured less dangerously. These findings 
supplement the previously adduced evidence that people are likely to be held personally 
culpable for their actions, and that they tend to identify human factors as the causes of 
negative events to a greater extent than they ought to.  
A justifiable criticism of Morris et al. (1999) is that the human factor in the vignette 
appears to be the proximal cause (i.e. the last component of the causal chain prior to the 
accident), and other counterfactual research has found that people are more inclined to 
mutate the proximal cause (Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & 
Gunasegaram, 1990; Segura, Fernandez-Berrocal & Byrne, 2002). Thus temporal sequence 
and human agency are confounded. McClure, Hilton & Sutton (2007), however, utilised a 
between-subjects design where in one condition human agency was the proximal cause of a 
fire and in the other condition it was the distal cause. Three vignettes were presented to 
participants, and there were two versions of each vignette. In one version the distal cause 
was a voluntary action (e.g. a youth deliberately setting fire to a shrub) and the proximal 
cause was an environmental fluke (e.g. a piece of glass focusing the sun, causing a shrub to 
catch fire), and in the other version these were reversed. At the end of the vignettes 
participants were told that an adverse consequence occurred, and they were then asked to 
rate the importance of the distal and proximal causes, the voluntariness of each cause (as a 
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manipulation check), the ‘goodness’ of each cause as an explanation, the social 
preventability of each cause, and the increase in probability of the adverse consequence as a 
result of the distal and proximal causes.  The results revealed that voluntary causes were 
rated as more important, explanatory, preventable and more accountable for augmenting 
the likelihood of hazards, and perceived voluntariness and social preventability mediated 
the effects. The effects on explanatory goodness and probability are particularly relevant in 
the current context, as both could potentially account for higher risk estimates for malicious 
hazards – if people see intentional acts as better explanations of adverse consequences in 
retrospect, they may also find them easier to envisage as causes of death in general.  
It is also possible that, if people believe in retrospect that intentional acts played a 
greater part in increasing the probability of a mishap, they are likely to think that, all else 
being equal, more deaths result from intentional acts. The statement that adverse 
consequences are more likely to be explained by intentional acts can be thought of as a 
conditional. It does not logically follow that intentional acts are more likely to cause adverse 
consequences than unintentional acts – an alternative interpretation would be that there 
are simply more intentional acts in total than unintentional acts. However, research has 
tended to show that conditional statements are often interpreted as biconditional 
statements. In the Wason Selection Task (Wason, 1966; WST), participants were presented 
with 2 cards showing letters (‘A’ and ‘D’) and 2 cards showing numbers (‘4’ and ‘7’), told 
that all cards show a letter on one side and a number on the other side, and asked to test the 
rule that ‘if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side’ 
(Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970; p. 135) by turning over probative cards. It was found that 
participants most frequently chose either ‘A’ alone, or ‘A’ and ‘4’, when in fact the only 
probative cards are ‘A’ and ‘7’. Wason inferred from this that participants were fallaciously 
attempting to confirm the rule instead of falsifying it.  
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Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002), however, pointed out that instead of participants 
misapplying logic to test the rule, they may have actually misinterpreted the rule. If the rule 
had instead been ‘if, and only if, a card has a vowel on one side, does it have an even number 
on the other side’, then turning over ‘4’ would have tested the rule. Wagner-Egger (2007) 
investigated this possibility by presenting participants with the classic WST and a modified 
version (counterbalanced). In the modified version, instead of telling participants the rule 
and then asking them to choose which cards to turn over to test it, the experimenter showed 
the cards to participants individually and asked each time to indicate whether it was 
possible to discern from the visible side of the card what was on the other side. In this way 
it was possible to ascertain whether participants were making biconditional inferences 
from the rule, and the results showed that participants did tend to interpret the WST rule 
biconditionally, and that biconditional interpretation was strongly associated with 
selections of the ‘A’ and ‘4’ cards. This finding reflects those of Cummins, Lubard, Alksnis & 
Rist (1991), Sherman, McMullen & Gavanski (1992) and Valiña, Seone, Ferraces & Martin 
(1999), all of whom found that under some circumstances participants were prone to 
interpreting conditional statements as biconditionals. It is thus reasonable to posit that the 
belief that adverse consequences have intentional antecedents may lead to the inference 
that intentional acts are likely to cause adverse consequences. 
A bias towards intentional accounts of malicious hazards could be cognitive or 
motivational (McClure et al. favoured the latter). From a motivational perspective, for 
instance, Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder & Elliot (1998) suggested that people tend to employ 
self-serving biases, attributing failure in a task to others’ dispositional weaknesses as a 
means of comparative self-enhancement. Applying that principle to McClure et al’s (2007) 
findings, participants were offered a clearly identifiable individual to derogate, so according 
to Sedikides et al. it is to be expected that they would take that opportunity. On the other 
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hand, in studies like Johnson & Tversky’s (1983), there was no identifiable individual to 
blame, just an opportunity to judge that people (including the participant themselves) are 
globally untrustworthy. Jellison & Green (1981) offered a similar rationale for the 
correspondence bias, arguing that internal attributions ‘allow [people] to block others’ 
attempts to escape from responsibility and allow [people] to justify punishments and 
retribution’ (p.648), as did Heider (1958), who claimed that people make internal 
attributions to gain a sense of control over their environment.  
There are also cognitive factors in the correspondence bias. Gilbert, Pelham & Krull 
(1988) ran a study similar to Jones & Harris (1967) in which participants were instructed to 
write and then read out a pro- or anti-abortion speech to other participants, who then rated 
their attitudes to abortion. However, half of the participants had been instructed, prior to 
hearing the speech, that afterwards they would be asked to write a speech of their own, thus 
placing them under cognitive load.  It emerged that whether or not participants were under 
cognitive load, there was an effect of the content of the essay on perceived actual opinions 
of the readers (as in Jones & Harris). But there was also a significant interaction between 
essay content and cognitive load, such that those participants placed under cognitive load 
displayed an accentuated correspondence bias. The researchers concluded that when 
making attributions, participants initially gravitated towards more internal attributions but 
then, when sufficiently motivated, adjusted that attribution if cognitive resources permit. 
Thus, it may be that perceivers favour human causes and either fail to sufficiently adjust 
them or are not motivated to adjust them. In both cases, participants asked to determine 
how many deaths are caused by human causes versus situational causes would be expected 
to exaggerate the former. 
Pennington & Hastie (1992) offer another reason why perceivers might be biased 
toward agentic explanations of malicious hazards: such explanations might provide a more 
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coherent and easily processed storyline. The researchers presented participants with 
substantively identical evidence in the case of a defendant charged with a hit-and-run 
offence. Evidence from 4 witnesses (3 whose evidence pointed towards a certain verdict, 1 
whose evidence dissented) about 4 evidential issues was presented, but in the ‘story’ 
condition the witnesses appeared once each and addressed the 4 evidential issues prior to 
the next witness taking the stand and doing the same. In the ‘issue’ condition, the issues 
were addressed sequentially, so that each witness appeared four separate times and the 
story was disjointed. They found that in the story condition, participants were more likely 
to render a verdict consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, indicating that they 
found story-framed evidence more persuasive. Reeder (2009) also recognised the 
connection between dispositional inferences and the narrative satisfaction of a story: ‘A 
good story, of course, implies a goal or motive behind the events’ (p.4). It is likely that 
explaining ambiguous consequences in terms of intentional actions offers more insight into 
goals or motives than circumstantial vagaries would. If the observation that people prefer to 
explain adverse consequences with satisfying stories extends to abstract or anticipated 
adverse consequences, this would also serve to augment risk perception of malicious 
hazards. 
 In summary, this chapter offers two types of explanation for why risk perception of 
malicious hazards might be uniquely amplified. The affective explanation posits that 
malicious hazards are particularly angering, and anger biases perceivers towards inferences 
consistent with the appraisals associated with that emotion. The appraisals most relevant to 
risk perception are those of low pleasantness (a hazard is dangerous and danger is 
unpleasant), high perceived obstacles (hazards are an obstacle to the perceiver’s goal of 
safety) and high anticipated effort (a hazard constitutes a good reason to expend effort to 
avoid it). These appraisals lead perceivers to the inference that a threat is present, and 
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hence their perceived risk of malicious hazards increases. The cognitive account, on the 
other hand, holds that malicious hazards are perceived to be disproportionately likely due 
to a cognitive or motivational bias in favour of using human agency to account for adverse 
consequences (or indeed consequences in general). Malicious hazards are particularly likely 
to be interpreted as explicable in terms of human agency (because they are, by definition, 
caused by human perpetrators). Alternatively, or supplementarily, human agency accounts 
are inherently more cognitively fluent, and therefore subjectively more likely. Research on 
conditional statements suggests that people are prone to confusing them for biconditionals, 
thus the finding that people tend to attribute negative events to human agency indicates 
they may also believe that intentional acts are particularly likely to result in negative 
















Chapter 4 – Emotion and risk perception 
 
There are two largely separate research traditions (affective and cognitive) both of which 
could have a bearing on risk perception of malicious hazards. As regards affect, a substantial 
body of research has already investigated its influence on risk perception, occasionally 
including that of malicious hazards. The research, though, is inconclusive. One of the core 
predictions of the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF), that sadness and anger ought to 
have opposing effects, has not been satisfactorily demonstrated. It does appear that for non-
malicious hazards sadness results in more pessimistic risk perception – this much was 
demonstrated by DeSteno et al. (2000) and Drače & Ric (2012) – but it is not clear that the 
same effect applies to malicious hazards, or that angry participants display lower risk 
perception relative to controls. The purpose of the studies in this chapter was to test the 
effects of anger and sadness on malicious and non-malicious hazard perception. I predicted 
that due to the cognitive appraisals associated with anger, anger-induced participants 
would display higher risk perception than participants in a neutral emotional state, and 
that, in line with the emotion-as-information hypothesis, this effect would be particularly 
marked for malicious hazards.  
 Furthermore, to the extent that malicious hazards are particularly angering in 
themselves, an external anger manipulation may be particularly influential. There is reason 
to believe that they are: unlike most hazards, malicious hazards involve the deliberate 
actions of someone intending to harm someone else. In the vast majority of cases, this 
would be construed as unfair (even in war, civilian fatalities are typically seen as unfair), a 
recognised psychological precursor to anger (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). To verify 
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this assumption, a pre-test was conducted to examine the degree to which the four 






One-hundred-and-twenty-two University of Otago students took part in exchange for NZ$10 
to cover their travel expenses. Demographic data were not collected. 
 
Design 
There was 1 within-subjects factor, which was hazard category (natural, useful, immoral, 
malicious). The dependent variable was anger rating, which was measured on a Likert scale. 
 
Materials 
 The study was run in a block with studies from two other researchers. My study entailed an 
anger questionnaire, which participants were given pens to fill in. The other researchers 
used a mixture of computer tasks and pen and paper tasks, but their studies took place later 
in the procedure than mine and will hence not be further discussed. 
 
Procedure 
The study was run in conjunction with two other, unrelated procedures. Participants were 
run in individual light and sound-attenuated experimental cubicles, on paper. After 
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providing informed consent, they were given written instructions, which first defined a 
hazard as ‘a potentially threatening event.’ They were directed to a list of hazards below and 
asked to ‘imagine, in each case, that you have learned that the hazard has caused someone’s 
death.’ They were asked to rate how angry this knowledge would make them using a seven 
point scale anchored at 1 (Not angry at all) and 7 (Very angry). 
 The list contained all 33 hazards in alphabetical order, with response scales next to 
each one. Participants rated them at their own pace and contacted the experimenter upon 
completion. After taking part in the other studies, they were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Hazard ratings were averaged within each category to form four scores per participant, 
which were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity 
suggested the assumption of sphericity had been violated χ2(5) = .37, p < .001, so the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. The ANOVA was significant F(2.17, 262.43) = 
152.49, p < .001. Post-hoc tests with Fisher’s LSD further probed the differences between 
each level of the independent variable, and revealed a significant difference between 
malicious (M = 6.17, SD = 1.28) and immoral (M = 5.14, SD = 1.48) hazards (p < .001), 
between immoral and useful (M = 4.30, SD = 1.11) hazards (p < .001), and between useful 
and natural hazards (M = 3.60, SD = 1.34) hazards (p < .001). 
 
Discussion 
The results confirm that malicious hazards are more angering than other hazard categories. 
They also validate the distinct hazard categories, all of which significantly differed from 
each other in how angering their constituent hazards were rated. It is also notable that the 
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hazards of primary interest to this thesis, as well as attracting large amounts of spending 
and public attention, are also the most angering.  
 Having validated the assumption that malicious hazards are at least believed to be 
more angering than other types of hazard, the next step was to test whether anger increases 
risk perception independent of the hazard itself, and whether malicious hazards in 
particular are judged to be particularly likely when the perceiver is angry. An experiment 
testing these hypotheses required the induction of emotion, and thus necessitated a choice 
as to which mood induction procedure (MIP) to use.  The MIPs that have been most 
prevalent in prior risk perception research involve imagination, pictures, and stories 
intended to elicit the target emotion(s). Picture and story MIPs have the particular 
disadvantage of often being culturally and temporally specific. The picture MIP used by 
Lerner et al. (2003), for example, depicted jubilant celebrations of the September 11th 
attacks in Arab world countries which, whilst undoubtedly angering to most participants, 
probably would not retain the same potency in New Zealand 11 years later. DeSteno et al. 
(2000) gave participants magazine stories detailing anti-American protests in Iraq – again, 
not as applicable to a New Zealand sample. Notice also that a problem both these examples 
suffer from is that they overtly relate to a particular type of hazard, thus potentially 
confounding affective and informational priming for some rated hazards but not others. The 
imagination MIP, in contrast, has the advantage of allowing participants to decide for 
themselves what sort of stimulus angers or saddens them and then uses that stimulus to 
help realise the targeted affective state. It elegantly customises the stimulus for each 
participant. 
I elected to use a specific type of imagination MIP, the autobiographical MIP (Erber 
& Erber, 1994; Forgas, Laham & Vargas, 2005; Lanys, 2014), in which participants are asked 
to recall a life event that evoked the target emotion. The benefit this has over the
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imagination MIP is that most participants probably will not have experienced events that 
resemble the list hazards, so the chances of informational content (as opposed to affect) 
during priming exerting an influence on risk perception later on ought to be mitigated.  
Another challenge in designing the study is that there is no universally accepted 
measure of risk perception. Fischhoff et al's (1978) seminal paper used a ranking task in 
which participants selected the least risky hazard and then assigned ratios to the other 
hazards relating to how risky they were in comparison. Johnson & Tversky's (1983) gave 
participants a reference hazard, told them how many Americans died because of it, and then 
asked them to estimate how many people died because of the other hazards. Lerner & 
Keltner (2001), Fischhoff et al. (2003) and Lu et al. (2013) all used Likert-type scales and 
Foo (2011) used a semantic differentials scale. For simplicity, I opted for the Likert scales; 
consistent with Preston & Colman (2000), and the predominant psychometric orthodoxy 
(Allen & Seaman, 2007; Preston & Colman, 2000; Weng, 2004), it was determined that 7-





 Seventy female and 32 male participants took part in return for NZ$15 travel 
reimbursement. The experiment was open to students and those who graduated within the 
last year, but the majority of those who applied were students and the sample therefore 
reflects that demographic cross-section; the mean age was 22.5 with a range of 17-49. 





State mood was rated on a series of 7-point Likert scales, always in the order anger, 
sadness, disgust, happiness, fear and surprise (Appendix C). Participants were asked to 
‘indicate the extent to which you are experiencing the following emotions at this moment, 
where 1 is “very slightly or not at all” and 7 is “extremely” ‘ (emphasis in original). These six 
emotions were chosen on the grounds that they are the six ‘basic’ emotions proposed in 
Ekman’s (1992) influential paper. A risk questionnaire was used to gauge risk perception in 
which all 33 list hazards were presented to participants who then rated their likelihood of 




The experiment was run in a classroom with three rows of unseparated desks. After giving 
informed consent, participants completed a mood measure before being instructed to ‘try to 
recall one specific life event during which you have felt angry, wronged, outraged, or 
violated, and write about it in as much as detail as you can.’  The sadness MIP instead asked 
for an event in which the participant felt ‘lonely, sad, rejected, or hurt’. In a third, control 
condition, participants were asked to recall ‘what you did yesterday’. 
Participants wrote at their own pace and, when finished, were given a second mood 
scale, followed by the risk questionnaire, and then a third mood scale.  The study was run in 
conjunction with another, unrelated procedure (order counterbalanced). 
 
Results 
Mood ratings were analysed in a mood condition (anger, sadness, control) x self-reported 
emotion (anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, fear, surprise) x time (T1, T2, T3) mixed 
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models ANOVA, with the last two factors treated as repeated measures.). The ANOVA 
showed a significant three-way interaction F(13.25, 562.99) = 7.479, p < .001. Separate two-
way ANOVAs with condition and self-reported emotion as factors were run using data from 
each time point, and these showed that at T1 condition and self-reported emotion did not 
interact F(5.87, 284.76) = 1.427, p > .1, at T2 they did interact F(6.70, 288.19) = 5.812, p < 
.001 and at T3 they did not F(6.75, 333.89) = 1.604, p > .1. Further ANOVAs were run using 
mean self-report emotion scores at T2 for each item individually. The anger ANOVA was 
significant F(2, 89) = 11.78, p < .001.  Post-hoc tests with Tukey’s HSD revealed significant 
differences in anger between the anger and sadness conditions (p = .003) and the anger and 
neutral conditions (p < .001). The sadness ANOVA was significant F(2, 89) = 9.12, p < .001, 
and post-hoc tests showed a significant difference between anger and neutral (p = .003) and 
sadness and neutral (p < .001). The disgust ANOVA was also significant F(2, 89) = 11.83, p < 
.001, and post-hoc tests found differences between the anger and sadness conditions (p = 
.002) and the anger and neutral conditions (p < .001). None of the other ANOVAs were 







Figure 3. Self-reported emotion by condition at T2 (immediately following the MIP) in Study 4 
 
Mean risk scores were calculated by averaging participants’ risk ratings within the 
malicious and non-malicious categories. In this and future analyses reported in this thesis, 
wherever the means of a dependent risk perception measure were compared and the factor 
of interest was manipulated between subjects, the Shapiro-Wilk test was run on each cell to 
ascertain whether data significantly deviated from normality. Unless stated otherwise the 
Shapiro-Wilk statistic was not significant (p > .05). In the present study, Shapiro-Wilk was 
significant for the neutral condition (p = 0.009), indicating that assumptions of normality 
relied on by parametric tests were violated. Consequently, the mean risk scores calculated 
were rank transformed in accordance with Conover and Iman (1981) prior to submission to 
a condition by hazard type (malicious, non-malicious) ANOVA, where the latter was a 
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repeated measures factor. There were no significant effects, however. Means appear in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Mean risk ratings by condition and hazard type in Study 4 
 
The data were probed further by correlating risk ratings with self-reported emotion 
at T1. If one accepts that trait emotion is highly correlated with state emotion at a given 
time point (a proposition to which extensive evidence lends support, and across several 
different types of affect; e.g. Deffenbacher et al, 1996; Koray et al, 2003; Watson & Clark, 
1999), correlational analysis of fear, happiness and anger at T1 with mean risk ratings could 
be seen as a crude replication of Lerner & Keltner (2001), who found that the latter was 
negatively correlated with risk perception but the former was positively correlated. 




Table 8  
Spearman’s Rank Correlations between T1 Self-report Emotion Ratings and Risk Ratings for 
Malicious and Non-malicious Hazards 
T1 affect Non-malicious Malicious  Mean 
Anger .15 -.003 .13 
Sadness .17† .10 .17† 
Disgust .21* .07 .200* 
Happiness -.200* -.04 -.19† 
Fear .23* -.020 .20* 
Surprise .28* .08 .26* 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** < .001 
It is shown that where the correlation between fear and mean risk ratings was 
significant and the correlation between happiness and mean risk ratings was marginally 
significant, the correlation between anger and mean risk ratings was not. Indeed, not only 
did the anger correlation fail to reach significance, it did not even trend in the direction 
observed by Lerner & Keltner (2001). 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to test the hypotheses that anger increases risk perception 
and that emotion and hazard type interact. The results obtained in this study show that 
there was no effect of emotion induction on risk perception, and self-reported emotion at 
T2 suggests that the emotion manipulations did work. Notwithstanding that, by the end of 
the experiment, at T3 there were no longer differences in emotion across experimental 
conditions, placing the efficacy of the manipulation in some doubt. 
Although only one other study used a similar MIP in the context of risk perception 
research (Gasper & Clore, 2000), other researchers (e.g. Erber & Erber, 1994; Forgas et al, 
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2005) have successfully utilised it to induce emotion in other situations, albeit rarely to 
induce anger. In the present study the anger MIP was more effective at inducing sadness in 
the long term than anger (and almost equally effective in the short term), so it is plausible 
that the autobiographical MIP is simply a poor instrument for anger induction. But why 
would it be less effective for anger than other emotions?  
One possible reason is that recalled events in one’s own life will inevitably be in the 
past – and if asked to single out one event that was especially angering, there is a good 
chance it will be some distance in the past. But there is a difference between an event that 
made someone angry, and an event that is still capable of making them angry. Caruso (2010) 
found that participants were less angry about a seemingly unfair action perpetrated by a 
corporation that they were told happened last month than one they were told was due to 
happen in a month. This is consistent with Levine & Pizarro’s (2004) observation that 
whereas anger helps people to stay focused on achieving a goal that has been obstructed 
and affirm their ire against those they hold responsible for obstructing it, sadness ‘is 
experienced when people believe that goal failure is irrevocable’ (p. 543). This has obvious 
relevance to recalling angering events. If a person was angry a year ago when she received a 
parking ticket that she thought was unfair, but after exhausting her appeals she eventually 
had to acquiesce and pay the fine, there is scant chance of her getting her money back now, 
so she won’t be able to experience anger as intensely as she did at the time.  
A more general problem with the autobiographical MIP, especially in the present 
study, is its requirement that participants impart profound, private information. Although 
all manifestations of the autobiographical MIP implicitly demand participants’ confidence in 
the experimenter, in this version the participants’ belief that their stories would be read by 
a stranger was made more salient by the fact they were surrounded by other strangers (the 
participants) and they could actually see the stranger (the experimenter) who was going to 
96 
 
read their accounts. Despite efforts to assure participants of the confidentiality they would 
be afforded, the possibility that participants did not feel sufficiently secure to record their 
most heartfelt recollections, and thus chose to write down less evocative memories instead, 
cannot be dismissed. This is especially true in light of participants’ answers in informal 
post-experimental interviews, where a sizeable minority reported feeling somewhat 
inhibited. 
Another possible limitation of the present study is the dependent measure. Likert 
scales were chosen because of their ease of use and prevalence in previous studies 
(Fischhoff et al, 2003; Foo, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lu et al, 2013), but all those 
previous studies used much shorter questionnaires. A concern is that with a 33-item 
questionnaire with no subscales, participants might treat the questionnaire as a ranking 
exercise, with the outcome that rather than rendering risk judgements in an absolute sense, 
participants rate hazards’ riskiness relative to other hazards on the questionnaire.  
A more fundamental problem may have been the wording of the dependent 
measure. Participants were asked to ‘rate the likelihood of the following hazards’, but that 
wording left considerable scope for interpretation. If asked to rate the likelihood of an 
avalanche, does that mean the likelihood of an avalanche happening to the participant, or 
does it just mean an avalanche in general? And over what time frame? Today? In the next 
year? Furthermore, when applied to certain hazards, the wording resulted in questions such 
as ‘rate the likelihood of boating’, leaving uncertainty as to whether the experimenter 
wanted to know the likelihood of someone going boating or the likelihood of a boating-
related hazard occurring.  
 An alternative method of measuring risk was provided by Johnson & Tversky 
(1983), discussed above. They told participants that in the United States every year 50,000 
people die due to motor vehicle accidents, and asked them to estimate how people died 
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each year in the United States due to the other hazards on their list. This approach has 
definite advantages over the approach previously applied. The phrasing of the question 
eliminates much of the ambiguity of the wording in the current study. Requiring estimates 
of the actual number of deaths also brings a sort of ecological validity to the measure, 
framing the question as one that has a (relatively) objective answer. A concern, however, is 
that ratings within a specific timeframe will be subject to year-to-year variability. An even 
more promising paradigm was utilised by DeSteno et al. (2000), who presented participants 
with denominators for each of their hazards and then asked them to supply the numerator 
(e.g., ‘Of the 40,000 people who commute to work in downtown Columbus, how many will 
be late for a meeting today because they are stuck in traffic?’). Although the hazards used by 
DeSteno et al. tended not to be fatal, it is easy to see how their questions could be adapted to 
apply to the current paradigm.  
 Study 5 was designed to address these methodological limitations. A new dependent 
measure was used, deaths per 1,000,000 people over a lifetime.  Not only is 1,000,000 
people a more suitable denominator for extremely improbable hazards but the number is 
also consistent with the micromort (μmt), a unit introduced by Howard (1980) and 
promulgated as a standardised, accessible way of communicating measured risk to lay 
audiences to help them make informed decisions about which risks to expose themselves to. 
A micromort is defined as a one-in-a-million chance of death, and can be expressed in 
multiple contexts. The risk for car accidents, for example, has been expressed as μmt/year 
(Howard, 1989) and μmt/mile (Spiegelhalter, 2009), the risk associated with general 
anaesthetics has been conveyed as μmt/anaesthetic procedure (Turnbull, 2011), the risk of 
death from air pollution in New York or Boston has been cited in μmt/days spent in one of 
those cities (Roebuck, 2012) and the risk from smoking has been expressed in 
μmt/cigarette (Walker et al, 2014).  
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 Study 5 also used a different, presumably more powerful manipulation of emotion. 
The autobiographical MIP, used in Study 4, can be thought of as highly participant-directed 
because participants are free to activate stimuli that will induce the target emotion 
(Gerrards-Hesse & Spies, 1994).  The advantage of this type of MIP (and the reason the 
autobiographical MIP was chosen in the first place) is that participants are likely to know 
better than the experimenter what will make them angry or sad. However, knowing what 
will make them angry does not guarantee that they will select an angering event to recall. In 
fact given that people seek to maintain positive affective states and avert negative ones (e.g. 
Erber & Tesser, 1992; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Zeelenberg, 1999), they may 
intentionally select a less angering event to avoid the unpleasant arousal. In addition, as 
noted above, recalling angering events that can no longer be remedied may not induce 
anger as it is usually understood. 
 ‘Guided’ MIPs avoid some of these concerns. There are, according to Gerrards-Hesse 
& Spies (1994), three types of guided stimulus generation MIPs – the Music, Film/Story and 
Velten MIPs, all accompanied by explicit instructions to try to experience the target 
emotion. Of these, the Velten procedure is most suitable for my purposes.  
 Emmett Velten (1968) designed and introduced the Velten MIP. It was originally 
intended for therapeutic use, and it relies on two factors to induce emotion. Firstly, like 
certain versions of the Music and Film/Story MIPs it relies on participants’ complicity in 
inducing a mood state. Secondly, it presents a sequence of statements that are evocative of 
the target emotion (e.g. ‘I’m not very alert; I feel listless and vaguely sad’; ‘I know good and 
well that I can achieve the goals I set’). Participants read these and attempt to engage with 
and experience the feelings they conjure up.  Velten MIP has seen extensive use. It has also 
been found to be an effective MIP. Larsen & Sinnett (1991) ran a meta-analysis of studies 
employing the Velten MIP – they aggregated effect sizes derived from the elated and 
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depressive versions of it and found the resulting effect size to be large (d = .76). In a later 
meta-analysis, Westermann, Spies, Stahl & Hesse (1996) reported that not only was the 
Velten MIP by far the most frequently used but that it was also successful inducing both 
elated and depressive effect, and particularly effective with depressive mood (d = 1.21). 
 Velten himself did not develop an MIP for anger, but Engebretson, Sirota, Niaura, 
Edwards & Brown (1999) compiled a series of 50 statements with angry connotations, in 
the same style as Velten (1968), and presented them to participants, along with the original 
depressive Velten MIP, in counterbalanced order. Both versions proved capable of eliciting 
the target moods, and a comparison between the two showed that the anger version 
produced even larger changes in the target emotion than the depressed version and boasted 
a large effect size (d = .76). Both versions also benefited from good specificity – most of the 
emotions that data were collected on but that were not the target emotion showed no 
appreciable change from the pre-induction baseline.  
 It is true that the Velten MIP is vulnerable to experimenter demand, perhaps more 
so than autobiographical MIPs. Evidently though, this is a criticism that Velten (1968) 
anticipated, by including a ‘demand characteristics conditions’ in which participants were 
instructed to ‘remember to act… elated/depressed’ (p. 475). Participants in these conditions 
did not report corresponding emotions to the same extent as those in standard 
experimental conditions, suggesting that even if participants were motivated to confirm the 
hypotheses they would be unaware of how to do this.  The question of demand 
characteristics was also addressed by Larsen & Sinnett’s (1991) meta-analysis. As well as 
reporting the overall effect size of the Velten MIP, the authors also divided the data 
according to whether participants were furnished with an honest account of the experiment 
(as in the original Velten MIP) or whether a deceptive cover story was used, and whether 
self-report or behavioural measures were employed to measure affect. Although effect sizes 
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were larger in conditions favouring experimenter demand (i.e. with no cover story and 
using emotion self-reports), the researchers found medium effect sizes in all four conditions 
(d >= .5).  
 Study 5, then, was intended to be a conceptual replication of Study 4. The means of 
manipulating mood were changed from the autobiographical MIP to the Velten MIP and the 
dependent measure changed from a series of Likert scales that participants used to answer 
a very vague and variously interpretable question to a standardised frequency estimation 
task in which participants answered a very specific question. There was also a further 
change to the experiment – having decided to gather data using a specifically framed 
question, I wanted to enhance the specificity of the question by identifying a geographical 
area for participants to make their estimations about. As a consequence, two questionnaires 
were administered: one where participants estimated deaths out of a million in New 
Zealand and one where they estimated deaths out of a million in the world. Geographical 
area is relevant because personal risk is usually estimated to be significantly lower than risk 
to people in general (i.e. ‘general risk’; Sjöberg, 2003), and simultaneously more accurate 
(as general risk tends to be overestimated; Rothman, Klein & Weinstein, 1996). 
Manipulating geographical area acts as a proxy for personal versus general risk as it 












95 participants took part in return for partial course credit for psychology papers at the 
University of Otago, of which 65 were female and the remainder were male. Reflecting an 
undergraduate population, the sample had a mean age of 20.2 and ranged from ages 17-41. 
 
Design 
 This experiment featured one between-subjects factor with three levels. Participants were 
assigned to groups such that a roughly equal sample took part in each condition, anger (N = 
31), sadness (N = 32) and control (N = 32). The dependent variables were state affect and 
risk frequency estimates. 
 
Materials 
The experiment was conducted in individual experimental booths. Participants were 
supplied with pens to complete the written components of the study, which included a 
demographics questionnaire (asking the same questions as in Study 1), the self-report state 
emotion questionnaire adapted from Tiedens (2001) which was issued three times, the 
world and New Zealand versions of the frequency estimation questionnaire (see Appendix 
D) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). 
The MCSDS contained questions intended to gauge participants’ inclination towards giving 
socially desirable answers such as ‘I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake’ 
and (reverse-coded) and ‘I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me’ (other 
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items are enumerated in Appendix E) to which participants answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  The 
Velten MIPs and the neutral procedure were run on Apple Macintosh computers. 
 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants completed the demographics questionnaire and 
the first self-report emotion questionnaire. Participants were told that they would be 
reading a series of sentences, and that in each case they should ‘imagine what the sentence 
is saying’ and (in the anger and sadness conditions) ‘try as much as possible to get into the 
mood suggested by the sentence.’ In the neutral condition the last phrase was replace by ‘to 
try as much as possible to understand the sentence.’ 
After reading these instructions participants were presented with statements 
appropriate to their experimental condition. The sadness and neutral condtions utilised the 
same statements as in Velten’s (1968) original paper, whereas the anger condition used 
Engebretson et al’s (1999) stimuli.  The anger, sadness and neutral conditions consisted of 
50, 58 and 60 statements respectively. Statements were always presented in the same 
order, and participants were required to spend a minimum of 20 seconds reading each 
statement before proceeding to the next one. After 20 seconds had elapsed a message 
appeared beneath the current statement informing participants that they could now 
proceed by clicking their mouse on a ‘continue’ button.  
Once all statements had been presented and the self-report emotion questionnaire 
completed, participants contacted the experimenter who presented them with the New 
Zealand and world versions of the frequency estimation questionnaire, in counterbalanced 
order. In both cases, participants were asked, ‘Out of every 1,000,000 deaths in New 
Zealand [the world] how many are attributable to the following causes? Your answers need 
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NOT add up to 1,000,000.’ Participants wrote their estimates next to each of the 33 hazard 
types. 
  




State mood ratings were analysed in a mood condition (anger, sadness, control) x self-
report emotion (anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, fear, surprise) x time (T1, T2, T3) mixed 
model ANCOVA, with the last two factors treated as repeated measures and MCSDS score as 
a covariate. The ANCOVA showed a significant three-way interaction F(15.19, 675.99) = 
4.88, p > .001. Separate two-way ANCOVAs with condition and self-report emotion as factors 
were run using data from each time point, and these showed that at T1 condition and self-
report emotion did not interact F(7.70, 342.70) = .822, p > .1, at T2 they did interact F(7.11, 
319.94) = 5.159, p < .001 and at T3 they did not interact F(7.48, 336.79) = 1.369, p > .1. 
Separate ANOVAs tested for differences in self-reported emotion at T2. The anger ANOVA 
was significant F(2, 94) = 9.82, p < .001 and post-hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD revealed a 
significant difference between the anger and sadness conditions (p = .001) and the anger 
and neutral conditions (p = .001). The sadness ANOVA was significant F(2, 94) = 5.49, p = 
.006 and this was accounted for by a significant difference between the sadness and neutral 
conditions (p = .006) and a marginally significant difference between the anger and neutral 
conditions (p = .052). The disgust ANOVA was also significant F(2, 94) = 6.94, p = .002, and 
post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the anger and neutral conditions (p 
= .003) and the sadness and neutral conditions (p = .010). None of the other ANOVAs 




Figure 5. Self-reported emotion by condition at T2 (immediately following the MIP) in Study 5 
 
New Zealand and World risk estimates were highly correlated with each other, r 
(95) = .79, p < .001, so responses were averaged to form a single estimate for each hazard, 
which was log-transformed (after recoding all estimates below 1, to 1) before analysis. A 2-
way ANOVA with mood condition (anger, sadness, neutral) as a between-subjects factor and 
hazard type (malicious/non-malicious) as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant 
main effect of hazard type such that non-malicious hazards were perceived to have 
significantly higher frequencies than malicious hazards F(1, 92) = 30.728, p < .001 and a 
marginally significant effect of condition F(2, 92) = 2.874, p = .062. The main effect of 
condition was further explored by subjecting the data to Fisher’s LSD. This showed a 
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significant difference between the anger and neutral conditions (p = .029) and a marginally 
significant difference between the anger and sadness conditions (p = .059). Means are 
shown in Figure 6. There was no interaction. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean log-transformed frequency estimates by condition and hazard type in Study 5 
 
The self-report emotion questionnaire was also issued to participants after 
completion of the frequency estimation questionnaire to investigate a potential bi-
directional relationship between emotion and risk perception. Although there was a 
correlation between risk estimates and T3 anger rs(94) = .306, p = .003, that finding could 
easily be explained away as a byproduct of covariation between T2 anger and T3 anger. 
Consequently the correlation was run again with T2 anger partialled out, and the result was 
that risk estimates and T3 anger were no longer significantly correlated rs(91) = .078, p > .1. 
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This could be interpreted as evidence that the mere act of rating hazards as risky is not in 
itself sufficient to elicit anger, but from another perspective it could be argued that using T2 
anger as the baseline is misleading as the risk estimation task may have elicited anger but 
the resultant anger increase could have been offset by decay of the anger aroused by the 
Velten MIP. To resolve the uncertainty, the partial correlation was run again but this time 
only data from the neutral condition was submitted. Once again the test was not significant 




To begin with, the Velten MIP appears to have largely accomplished its aim. Although it did 
not succeed in independently eliciting anger (without accompanying sadness), this does not 
particularly matter – sadness was induced in roughly equal measure in the anger and 
sadness conditions, so an observed effect in the anger condition implies an effect of anger 
over and above whatever effect sadness might have. The performance of the Velten MIP was 
also superior to that of the autobiographical MIP for other reasons. Firstly, disgust was no 
longer inimically confounded with emotion induction, which gives confidence in the effect of 
anger on risk perception. Secondly, although the experimental MIPs resulted in general 
decreases in happiness they did so comparably, whereas previously the sadness condition 
had resulted in larger decreases in happiness potentially exposing results to an alternative 
explanation. Finally, the anger manipulation (at least) seems to have elicited more enduring 
anger. The results show that after completion of the frequency estimation task anger-
induced participants still reported more anger than neutral participants (although the 
difference no longer reached significance). 
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 The headline finding of this experiment was that anger increased risk perception 
relative to neutral. Furthermore, anger exerted the same effect irrespective of the affective 
disposition of the hazard. The emotion effect, however, runs contrary to almost all recent 
literature, and in particular findings reported by DeSteno et al. (2000) and Lerner et al. 
(2003). One potentially important point of difference between the current studies and 
Lerner et al’s (2003), who found that anger did not enhance risk perception (relative to 
fear), is the nature of the MIP. Participants in that study were asked to record aspects of the 
September 11th attacks that made them angry versus fearful. It is not hard to imagine how 
the content of the aspects recalled might have differed. There is a wide array of potentially 
angering factors – these could include the temerity of foreign terrorists hijacking US aircraft 
and crashing them into totemic American landmarks, the sense that airport security had 
failed to detect and forestall the attacks and feelings of indignation that there exist people in 
the world who so hate the country Americans love. Fear-inducing factors, on the other hand, 
necessarily entail inferences about the ominous significance of the attacks – thoughts about 
whether national icons that projected national pride could be protected against capricious 
attacks, or whether Americans could ever truly feel safe again in aeroplanes, in foreign 
countries or on their own soil. For this reason, the informational content of the MIP could 
have impacted upon risk perception, independent of emotion. This possibility is further 
supported by the fact that the risk perception questions were predominantly concerned 
with terrorism and not other hazards.  
Furthermore, Lerner et al’s (2003) risk perception measures were quite different to 
those used in the current study. As well as being dominated by terrorism-related themes, 
they also explicitly required that participants judge future risk. In other words, their 
dependent measures could be seen as risk prediction measures. Unlike MIPs that require 
appraisals of the past, Lerner et al’s MIP, carried out in the aftermath of the September 11th 
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attacks, may have led to situational appraisals of high effort and high personal control. They 
were then asked questions pertaining indirectly to the US’s ability to successfully combat 
the terrorist threat it faced. In that context, it is unsurprising that participants estimated 
risk more optimistically – given their cognitive appraisals, they may have even thought it 
unpatriotic not to.  In fact, the reported negative correlations between trait anger and risk 
perception was really a correlation between vengefulness and risk perception. The authors 
used the Desire for Vengeance scale and desire for revenge, by its very nature, entails a 
general tendency to take action to redress a perceived injustice. Again, it is to be expected 
that those who are inclined towards revenge are more likely to believe they will succeed in 
getting it, and low risk predictions can be seen as a proxy for success in exacting revenge. By 
contrast with Lerner et al’s risk prediction measure, the current measure did not assign any 
temporal frame to the risk question, leaving it in more abstract terms. This may have 
removed or attenuated the element of participants’ perceived ability to deal with risk and 
thus changed how anger impacted on risk perception. 
DeSteno et al. (2000) induced anger via a story MIP – participants were presented 
with an article detailing an angering event – and although their finding that saddening 
hazards were perceived to be less risky by angry participants than sad ones is consistent 
with Lerner’s results, their finding that angering hazards are seen as more risky by angry 
participants is not.  
It may, however, be possible to reconcile DeSteno et al’s and Lerner et al’s (2003) 
findings – the risk questions DeSteno et al. asked required participants to predict the risk 
posed to other people and not themselves. Angry people appraise that an adverse event has 
occurred and that they are equipped to overcome the setback – thus anger brings with it 
feelings of empowerment, which ought to reduce the sense of self-vulnerability. But 
personal empowerment does not necessarily generalise to feelings of empowerment on 
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behalf of other people. It may be noted that in Lerner et al. anger exerted a similar effect on 
personal and general risk estimates, but this may have been caused by differences between 
Lerner et al’s and DeSteno et al’s general risk measure. The latter asked questions such as 
‘of the 2,000,000 people in the US who will buy a used car this year, how many will 
intentionally be sold a ‘lemon’ by a dishonest car dealer?’’ – the wording was abstract and 
detached. This contrasts with Lerner et al’s questions about general risk, which took the 
form ‘What is the probability that the average American will be hurt in a terror attack 
within the next 12 months?’. The key difference is that DeSteno et al’s general risk questions 
specified a large sample of people that participants were not necessarily a member of and 
were not likely to identify with, whereas Lerner et al. called on participants to imagine the 
average American and give a percentage likelihood of suffering from hazards. Many 
participants are likely to have thought of themselves as average Americans, and at the time 
their study was run Americans were freshly galvanised by the September 11th attacks 
resulting in a heightened sense of national unity (Li & Brewer, 2004). Under the conditions 
Americans’ identities as individuals and Americans were likely fused to a considerable 
extent, potentially obscuring any interaction between hazard proximity and induced anger.   
However, while DeSteno et al.’s (2000) and Lerner et al’s (2003) results are not 
mutually incompatible, it is difficult to make sense of the current results in the context of 
DeSteno et al’s. The MIPs are conceptually similar and both studies required abstract risk 
estimates to be made using natural frequencies. One important difference was that DeSteno 
et al. mainly gathered risk predictions and the present study did not specify a time frame. 
Although the forward temporal orientation of DeSteno et al’s wording could serve as an 
explanation for why estimates for sad hazards were lower in angry participants (if feelings 
of empowerment did in fact generalise to other people in society) in their study but not 
mine, this argument ought to apply equally to angering hazards (this was how I accounted 
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for the discrepancy between Lerner et al’s results and mine). Of course, DeSteno et al. used 
an emotion-as-information account to explain why anger and sadness produced opposing 
effects depending on the affective disposition of the hazard, but this is also not reconcilable 
with my data, which show no hint of an interaction between emotion condition and affective 
disposition of hazard. 
There are, however, two areas where the present study also differed from DeSteno 
et al. (2000). One area was the type of hazard used. The current study used ‘deadly’ hazards 
(which was the basis on which they were originally generated by participants), whereas 
DeSteno et al’s hazards were chiefly mundane inconveniences that participants could well 
have been exposed to previously themselves, or at the very least could easily envisage 
themselves falling victim to. This could provide participants with a frame of affective 
reference – remembering how they felt when they were sold a defective used car, for 
example – that enabled participants to put their induced emotion to instructive use. The 
emotion-as-information hypothesis holds that angry/sad people, when asked about the 
likelihood of an angering/saddening event, think to themselves ‘this is exactly the sort of 
thing that would happen’. No-one has ever previously experienced death, and nor can death 
be readily imagined as there are no authoritative accounts of what it is like. This may limit 
the informational capacity of emotion. 
The other difference between my study and DeSteno et al’s (2000) is the length and 
form of the risk measure. In the current study, the measure consisted of a list of hazards 
conveyed in the smallest possible number of words needed to identify them. DeSteno et al. 
presented participants with only eight hazards – four saddening and four angering – and 
they were each described using full sentences. Some hazards, such as the used car hazard 
above, used words intended to emphasise the affective disposition of the hazard, such as 
‘intentionally’. In this way it could be argued that DeSteno et al’s paradigm made affective 
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disposition more salient – participants were encouraged to take more time 
processing the hazards when contrasted with my paradigm where they were simply handed 
a list of 33 hazards. 
The prior research that my results best resemble is probably Johnson & Tversky 
(1983). The authors used a very similar dependent measure to mine (17 list hazards were 
presented and participants were asked to estimate their natural frequencies), and their 
measure more closely resembled a measure of general risk than personal risk.  Further, 
although Lerner and Keltner (2001) argued that Johnson and Tversky (and other 
researchers) overlooked the nuances that other dimensions of cognitive appraisal beyond 
valence bring to emotion differentiation, the latter did in fact use stories likely to arouse 
emotions similar in valence but distinct on other dimensions. For example, in their third 
experiment, the authors presented one group of participants with the street crime story 
from their earlier studies and another group with a story that was sad, but unrelated to risk. 
The results showed that the angering and sad stories achieved almost identical increases in 
risk estimates. Although it was not their intention, they had inadvertently provided 
evidence that anger augments risk perception. However, their findings are somewhat 
questionable because hazard-related MIP content and affective MIP content were 
confounded (this is symptomatic of the fact that they were not researching differences 
between anger and sadness induction). 
Despite employing comparable methodologies and obtaining similar findings 
apropos anger, Johnson & Tversky’s (1983) findings with respect to sadness differed from 
the current results. First, it should be noted that Johnson & Tversky’s angering story 
generally augmented risk considerably more than the sad stories that had been utilised. 
Second, it is possible that sadness was not responsible for the effect of the sad story. Again, 
reflecting Johnson & Tversky’s conflation of negatively-valenced emotions, the  
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manipulation check only measured general negativity of affect. It is also stated in their 
paper that the sad stories they used were intended to elicit anxiety. Anxiety and fear closely 
resemble each other, and it is already understood that fear augments risk perception. Thus 
the lack of specificity inherent in story MIPs is compounded by the fact that their data offer 
no means for anxiety to be controlled for statistically. For this reason, I advocate the present 
study as a more definitive comparison of sadness-induced participants’ risk perception with 
neutral participants’. 
In summary, my findings suggest that when anger is induced with an effective MIP 
suitable to the task, it has the effect of increasing participants’ risk perception irrespective 
of the affective significance of the hazard they are judging. This effect cannot be dismissed 
as a by-product of demand characteristics. By contrast, when sadness is induced, no effect 
on risk perception is observed. These findings can be used to explain the apparent 
overestimation of malicious hazards that drives societies to commit vast resources to 
tackling them as malicious hazards are angering. When people hear about deaths caused by 
malicious hazards they are likely to experience anger arousal, and when forming views as to 
what policies should be adopted to mitigate against malicious hazards, participants may 
either be angry in the moment or may retrieve beliefs about the nature of malicious hazards 
that were formed under angry affect. As a result, they perceive greater risk and support 
more expensive risk mitigation strategies. 
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Chapter 5 – Perception of agency and risk perception 
 
The previous chapter examined the impact of anger on risk perception, providing evidence  
that the relationship is more complex than previously supposed: anger can, at least in some 
conditions, increase rather than decrease risk perception. In principle, this provides one 
mechanism by which malicious hazards attract incommensurate concern and resources: 
this is the class of events most likely to create anger.  
However, the possibility that anger drives risk perception does not rule out other 
mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 4, malicious hazards are distinct in another way: they 
are also the hazards most likely to involve human agents. Perceptions of human agency may 
give rise to higher risk perception because people tend to attribute negative events to 
human causes (due to attribution bias), and tend also to assume reverse causality (i.e. that 
human causes are particularly likely to lead to negative events compared with situational 
causes).  
From a cognitive evolutionary standpoint, one account of attribution bias has it that 
the bias exists because for the entirety of mankind’s history, people have had to make 
decisions about which other people they wish to accept as allies (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). 
Accepting an ally has always entailed adopting a trusting attitude towards them, and 
inevitably those who benefit from the trust of another are in a stronger position to inflict 
damage on them than those they are wary of. As people, we have of course always required 
the companionship of others to survive and prosper, but whereas selecting one bad ally can 
potentially be fatal, it is unlikely that any good ally is likely to be required to save our lives. 
When determining whether or not someone’s actions reflect their stable disposition, the 
costs of a false negative are potentially higher than the costs of a false positive. It is easy to 
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see how this applies to detecting whether a death was caused by a malicious agent or 
another factor – we have an adaptive reason to be inclined towards ascribing deaths to 
intentionally acting agents ‘just in case’ – so that we can act to prevent that agent from 
harming us. This appears to hinge on there being an identifiable agent, but it may also be 
that when judging risk perceivers take the precaution of overestimating malicious hazards 
because of the same mechanism that helps us avoid unwise social alliances.  
Then there are the motivational accounts of correspondence bias. One of these is 
that we are intrinsically motivated to achieve a sense of control over our world and how we 
interact with it (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). This invokes the same mechanism as Lerner’s 
(1970) Just World phenomenon, depicting cognition as a motivated tool to satisfy primitive 
needs. Making dispositional attributions enables us to predict (accurately or inaccurately) 
the future actions of an actor that situational attributions do not allow. Hence, if someone’s 
actions led to someone else’s death, we can infer that because of their dangerous disposition 
they may also cause our death, and act accordingly. It is doubtful, however, whether this 
reasoning would cohere when we are trying to explain an ambiguously caused fatality 
rather than the reasons behind someone’s actions. If we do not know whether or not 
anyone’s actions caused the fatality, the resolution derived from surmising that they did (i.e. 
making a dispositional attribution) can only be to adopt a more guarded attitude towards 
everyone. This is much less practicable than being wary of one individual. As a consequence 
this motivational explanation probably would not predict augmented risk perception of 
malicious hazards (unless one ascribes ambiguously caused deaths to a hazard strongly 
associated with a certain group in society – an example might be terrorism – in which case 
making the dispositional attribution could result in heightened suspicion of that group). 
Another motivational account of attribution bias is that attributions are motivated 
by self-interest. According to this account, we are particularly inclined to make dispositional 
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attributions when appraising others’ negative behaviour (Snyder, Stephan & Rosenfield, 
1976). We do this because by derogating others, we comparatively elevate ourselves. So 
upon discovering that someone’s actions led to someone else’s death, we are motivated to 
cite their personal failings as the reason why that happened and on discovering that 
someone else died due to an unknown cause we are inclined to search for someone to 
derogate which may mean blaming them for the death. Furthermore, even without having a 
specific death to explain, it may serve our self-enhancement motivation well to believe that 
deaths, when they do occur, are caused by other people of less worth than ourselves. 
People may also be motivated to make dispositional attributions to justify meting 
out punishment (Jellison & Green, 1981). Goldberg, Lerner & Tetlock (1999) induced anger 
by showing participants a video in which the negligence of an antagonist ends up harming 
an innocent person. The repercussions of the antagonist’s actions were manipulated such 
that they were either punished for their transgressions, not punished, or whether or not 
justice was served was left deliberately ambiguous. All three manipulations left participants 
feeling equally angry, but participants in the condition where the antagonist was not 
punished then went on to exhibit significantly more punitive attitudes to antagonists in a 
series of unrelated vignettes than participants who saw justice dispensed satisfactorily to 
the initial miscreant. This research suggests that when an injustice is perceived to have 
occurred, punishment fulfils some sort of cathartic function, and because the enactment of 
punishment is accounted for by more than the misdeeds of the person being punished, it 
would be reasonable to infer that when the cause of an untimely (i.e. unjust) death is being 
diagnosed, people actively search for someone to punish as a means of channelling their 
indignance about the death. This could also explain overestimation of malicious hazards – 
whilst all untimely deaths may be in some way unjust, people may foresee that only ones 
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deliberately caused by someone are punishable, and hence a motivation to overestimate the 
proportion of punishable deaths may exist. 
Finally, it appears that dispositional attributions are simply easier to make – Gilbert 
et al. (1988) found that, whereas participants under no cognitive load were sometimes able 
to make situational inferences, those under cognitive load almost always resorted to 
dispositional attributions. In a similar vein, Pennington & Hastie (1992) found that mock 
jurors found stories attributing observations to human actions easier to understand and 
explanatorily more satisfying. It could also be possible, therefore, that people find it easier 
to envisage the consequences of deliberate human actions than situational factors. 
In practice, evidence exists to support all of these explanations for attribution bias, 
even though some appear to be mutually contradictory. For example, although Snyder et al’s 
(1976) data corroborated the view that attributions are self-serving, Augoustinos (1990) 
found that dispositional attributions were preferred regardless of whether the actor 
succeeded or failed. In spite of Haselton & Nettle’s (2006) argument that there are 
evolutionary benefits to making dispositional attributions and Gilbert et al’s (1988) 
demonstration that we find it easier to make them, some researchers have advocated an 
exception to the bias where deception is involved (e.g. Andrews, 2001), and some studies 
show that when a deception motive exists, the correspondence bias disappears (e.g. Fein, 
1996); others cite the correspondence bias as one of the reasons why people find it so 
difficult to detect deception (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2003), arguing that we are so used to assuming 
that others’ behaviour corresponds with their true motives and beliefs that we frequently 
apply the heuristic in situations where this is not the case. 
There are, then, a variety of reasons why attribution biases exist, and the literature 
showing that conditionals are often mistaken for biconditionals suggests that the biases 
may also apply in reverse. If people are biased to see hazards as caused by agents, they may 
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well be biased to see agentic (i.e., malicious) hazards as more likely than nonagentic ones.  If 
so, then perceivers should judge hazards (whether malicious or not) as more likely to occur 
when they are primed to think of them in terms of agentic causes. 
Priming was introduced to psychology by Meyer & Schvaneveldt (1971), who 
showed that, when presented with pairs of real or invented words next to each other and 
asked to declare whether the words were both real, participants were able to respond 
correctly faster when the real words were semantically linked to each other. This was 
interpreted as evidence that reading a word cognitively activates related words, and that 
when participants read the related words they are therefore able to confirm more quickly 
that they are indeed words.  
Priming tasks involving words have shown that memory works by encoding 
meaning rather than recording exact samples of stimuli and then impartially retrieving 
them when required (e.g. Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Thapar & McDermott, 2001), but 
for a priming paradigm to be useful in manipulating hazard attributability the priming effect 
will need to extend beyond semantics and impact on beliefs and judgement as well. In a 
classic study, Srull & Wyer (1979) had an experimenter ask participants to choose which 3 
words out of a set of 4 words could be arranged to form a sentence. The sets of words were 
orchestrated such that only one typw of sentence could be formed and that sentence, 
dependent on condition, carried an affective subtext or was affectively neutral. Where 
affective undertones were present, the sentences connoted hostility or kindness (examples 
given were ‘leg, break, arm, his’ and ‘the, hug, boy, kiss’), also depending on the condition. 
Then later on, in an ostensibly unconnected task, participants read a passage in which the 
narrator related, in journal form, his interactions with an acquaintance called Donald who 
behaved in an ambiguously hostile or kind way. They then went on to rate their overall 
impression of Donald along 6 dimensions, 3 of which were related to hostility and 3 were a 
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function of kindness, and to judge how hostile or kind the behaviours Donald exhibited in 
the narrative were. It emerged that participants in the affectively connotative conditions 
were more likely to credit Donald with the primed affective characteristic than control 
participants and more likely to perceive his actions as congruous with that characteristic. 
Particularly relevant to the current questions, Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards (1993) 
primed participants to think in terms of situational or agentic causes.  The authors tested 
the hypothesis that anger and sadness differentially affect social perception such that the 
former leads to agentic attributions of negative events, whereas the latter leads to 
situational attributions of negative events. After finding some initial support for this 
hypothesis, they set out to show that it was the emotional arousal itself, and not the 
constituent cognitive appraisals it entails, that was responsible for their earlier effect. They 
did this by having participants read a priming story and imagine the events happening to 
them. The story took the form of a diary entry written in the second person, and it described 
relatively prosaic, non-emotionally involved events that might occur in the life of a 
university student. In one condition the events were depicted as the outcome of human 
impetus (e.g. ‘You wake up at 6.53 a.m.’; ‘You wander into the shower… and rid yourself of 
yesterday’s heat and humidity’); in the other they were the result of situational influences 
(e.g. ‘The early morning light wakes you up at 6.53 a.m.’; ‘the water streaming full blast over 
your body sweeps away yesterday’s heat and humidity’). Participants then estimated the 
likelihood of 13 (mainly non-fatal) events (about half of which were positive and half 
negative), all of which were accompanied by causal explanations either imputing human 
agency (e.g. ‘You miss an important flight because you had a bad cab driver’) or situational 
factors (e.g. ‘You are injured in an accident due to icy roads’). In keeping with their 
hypothesis that affect drives differing probability estimation of differently caused hazards, 




Although Keltner et al.’s study casts doubt on the attributional explanation of malicious 
hazards, there are several reasons to remain skeptical of their results. One of those is that 
the stories were rather pallid, presumably due to the authors’ stated intention to keep them 
affectively neutral, and colourless prose is unlikely to engage readers (Hidi, 2001). 
Furthermore, the prime was very subtle, and the researchers gathered no data that could 
attest to whether priming had actually been achieved. We do know from the pilot study that, 
when asked, participants were able to recall whether the events had been described in 
terms of human or situational causality, but there is no way of knowing whether 
participants were sufficiently engaged by the story to establish a general association 
between events occurring and people making them occur. The authors also did not 
distinguish between first person causality and third party causality, with the effect that 
many of the events in the human causality story were actions initiated by the protagonist 
(who the participants imagined to be themselves) but all of the items on the probability 
estimation task involved a third party either helping or harming the participants. The 
association between me getting out of bed and someone else causing me to miss a flight is 
tenuous at best. 
Finally, Keltner et al.’s procedure could have been strengthened by not merely 
priming a type of causal attribution generally, but also by creating an association between 
causality and the events being estimated. In order for priming to be effective in influencing 
judgement, primed attributes must be relatively more accessible than alternative attributes 
at the time judgements are rendered (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). The literature reveals that 
presenting stimuli that were earlier featured in a priming phase facilitates access to stimuli 
the priming phase had associated them with. In a study of verbal priming effects, Graf & 
Schacter (1985) taught participants associations between pairs of words by inviting them to 
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form sentences involving both of the words. At the conclusion of this learning phase, 
participants were presented with one of two dependent measures (contingent on the group 
they had been randomly assigned to). There was an explicit measure where participants 
were given a word stem derived from a previously studied word, and asked to complete the 
word stem so as to form that word. Presented alongside the word stem was a cue word that 
had either previously been paired with the target word or had not (a within-subjects 
factor). More pertinent to my proposed research, there was an implicit measure where cue 
words and word stems were presented as in the explicit measure, only participants were 
not told that the task intended to test memory – instead they were asked to complete the 
stem with the first word that came to mind, and that the cue word might help them think of 
a stem completion. Irrespective of which dependent measure was used, the outcome was 
the same: when a stem completion was cued with a word it had previously been paired 
with, participants were more likely to complete the stem to form a previously studied word. 
The significance of this is that priming is not confined to pre-existing associations in the 
mind of the perceiver, activated in the case of Meyer & Schvaneveldt (1971) and Roediger & 
McDermott (1995) by proximity in semantic networks – rather it can exert a contextual 
effect. In Graf & Schacter, the mere act of placing words in sentences may have helped 
participants to encode them (as in Craik & Tulving, 1975), but on top of that effect a context-
specific facilitation effect was in evidence. Whereas Meyer & Schvaneveldt tapped an 
existing association between ‘bread’ and ‘butter’, Graf & Schacter forged a new one between 
‘shirt’ and ‘window’. 
Analogously, to explore whether the perception that an agent (other than the victim 
themselves) is in some way responsible for an adverse outcome, has an effect on risk 
perception, Study 6 manipulated the tendency to attribute hazards to agentic causes. 
Drawing on Keltner et al’s (1993) use of a story to prime agency, I composed two scenarios 
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for each of the natural and useful hazards in my list4. In all cases one of the scenarios was 
framed so as to lead participants to attribute responsibility to a negligent agent whose 
actions supposedly caused the death of one or more victims. The other scenarios absolved 
all potential human parties of responsibility, and attributed the death(s) to bad luck. Like 
Keltner et al, I aimed to make the content of the scenarios emotionally bland (to avoid 
confounding agentic perceptions with affect) and, both as a manipulation check and as a 
valuable source of data to later correlate with risk estimates, participants were asked to 
judge where the responsibility for the fatalities described in the scenarios lay. As an 
improvement on Keltner et al’s design, these judgements were requested immediately after 
every scenario. If agentic hazards are seen as more likely, then participants primed to 
associate list hazards with human agency should display higher risk perception than those 





110 undergraduate students participated in the study, of which 76 were female. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 39, and the mean age was 20.1. 
 
Materials 
Mood and risk estimates were measured using the same questionnaires described in Study 
5, except that only items pertaining to hazards described in the scenarios were included. 
                                                             
4 There was no scenario for cleaning products as it proved difficult to write a convincing story that did not implicate 
the manufacturer of the product 
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Agency was primed by varying the content of hazard scenarios. The following exemplar 
illustrates how the content differed between the human agency and the situational factors 
conditions: 
 
 On 12th June 1998, on a beach in Miami, United States, a swimmer drowned after 
finding the tide too strong to swim against. The swimmer attempted to attract the 
attention of the lifeguards, but apparently they weren’t paying attention/The 
swimmer attracted the attention of the lifeguards, but they weren’t able to rescue the 
swimmer in time. 
The full battery of scenarios can be found in Appendix F. 
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of up to 10 in a large experimental room, at individual 
desks. After giving informed consent, participants were given a questionnaire packet 
containing a demographics form, one of the two versions of the scenarios task, and a second 
emotion questionnaire. Immediately beneath each scenario, participants were asked, ‘To 
what extent do you feel the deceased were responsible for their fate?’ Participants 
responded on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (not very responsible) and 7 (very 
responsible).  
After reading and rating all 24 scenarios, and rating their mood a second time, they 
completed both the New Zealand and World versions of the frequency estimation 
questionnaire (order counterbalanced).  






Self-report emotion ratings were analysed in a priming condition (human agency, 
situational factors) x self-report emotion (anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, fear, surprise) 
x time (T1, T2, T3) mixed model ANOVA, with the last two factors treated as repeated 
measures. The ANOVA showed a significant three-way interaction F(15.57, 379.95) = 4.06, p 
< .001. Separate two-way ANOVAs with condition and mood item as factors were run using 
data from each time point, and these showed that at T1 condition and mood did not interact 
F(3.99, 405.51) = 1.03, p > .1, at T2 they did interact F(16.04, 535.34) = 3.15, p = .024 and at 
T3 there was also an interaction F(21.84, 416.93) = 5.45, p = .002. Six t-tests compared self-
reported emotion at T2 for each item. The happiness t-test was significant t(105) = 2.00, p = 
.048 and the disgust t-test was marginally significant t(105) = 1.91, p = .059. Emotion at T2 





Figure 7. Self-reported emotion by condition at T2 (immediately following the scenarios priming 
task) in Study 6 
 
The other important manipulation check was on participants’ interpretation of the 
scenarios. After reading each one, participants assigned a value to how blameworthy the 
deceased themselves were. The assumption behind this manipulation check was that the 
more culpable participants believed other people were for the fatalities, the less blame they 
would attach to the victims. Consequently it was anticipated that in the situational factors 
condition participants would hold the deceased to be significantly more responsible for 
their own deaths. This was tested by averaging the 24 deceased fault ratings delivered by 
each participant across hazards, leaving only one fault rating per participant. An 
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independent samples t-test with condition as the factor confirmed that fault ratings in the 
human agency condition were significantly lower than in the situational factors condition 
t(108) = -4.31, p < .001. 
Risk perception was analysed as in Study 5. New Zealand and world risk estimates 
were highly correlated, and the correlation was significant rs(111) = .76, p < .001. Log-
transformed estimates were averaged across the 24 hazards, leaving one data point per 
version of the frequency estimation questionnaire, per participant. Order differences were 
investigated with a t-test, which proved non-significant t(109) = -.60, p > .1. Estimates were 
also collapsed across context and order. 
The main hypothesis that priming would affect risk perception was tested by 
submitting risk estimates to a one-way ANCOVA with the condition as the factor and T2 self-
reported emotion as a covariate (to control for undesired changes in mood caused by the 
priming manipulation). It proved non-significant F(1, 107) = .79, p > .1. Means are shown in 
Figure 8. 
As a test of the relationship between attribution and risk perception, independent of 
experimental condition, two measures were correlated. The correlation was not significant, 





Figure 8. Mean log-transformed frequency estimates by condition in Study 6 
 
Discussion 
Differences in self-reported emotion at T2 were noted – these were an unintended 
byproduct of the priming manipulation. However, T2 emotion was controlled for when the 
main hypothesis was tested, justifying the claim that the reported null effect was not caused 
by the confounding of priming and affect. 
In spite of the changes made to Keltner et al’s (1993) rather more subtle procedure, 
there was no effect of attribution priming on risk perception. Although the manipulation 
check confirmed differences in attributions about the scenarios, there is no way to be 
certain that the same attributional tendencies generalised to the target hazards. However, it 
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is hard to conceive of a more explicit and unambiguous procedure for causing that link to be 
made. Of course, the argument can be made that the explicitness of the procedure was what 
prevented it from working (due to participants’ awareness of the source of the association 
and resultant effortful correction), but Keltner et al’s procedure gave participants little 
chance to decipher the hypothesis, and also failed to obtain any effect of priming. 
Furthermore, correlating responsibility ratings with risk estimates revealed no 
relationship, though there are some notable limitations with this analysis. In practice, three 
attributions were possible about each scenario event: the victim caused their own suffering; 
someone else caused the victim’s suffering; or nobody caused the victim’s suffering (i.e., it 
was situationally caused). Thus, the proxy for the agency manipulation, the victim’s 
responsibility for an event, does not distinguish between other agency and situational 
causes. Another possibility is that a true negative correlation between responsibility and 
risk estimates was masked by a positive correlation between victim blaming and general 
risk perception, perhaps because those who have had direct or indirect contact with people 
who have suffered misfortunes develop a rehearsed tendency to blame them for it. This 
would be consistent with Gracia & Tomás’s (2014) finding that those exposed to intimate 
partner violence against women are more likely to deem women partially responsible for it. 
The lack of specificity offered by the manipulation check represents an area where the 
present study could be improved. 
Another interesting nuance unaddressed by this study is whether agency 
perceptions interact with emotion. Even if there is no effect of agency when affect is neutral, 
anger might facilitate agency perception, or vice versa. Whether or not such an interaction 
occurs hinges on the reason why Study 5’s anger induction produced the effect it did. If the 
state of being angry simply causes people to perceive that the world is a more dangerous 
place due to the cognitive appraisals accompanying anger, there is no particular reason to 
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expect an interaction with agency perception. On the other hand, if the emotion-as-
information account holds, an interaction is to be expected; adverse events caused by other 
people are (presumably) more angering than the average adverse event. A similar 
mechanism would be that anger arousal causes people to selectively attend to those aspects 
of hazards that are most angering (e.g. human agency) and then uses those to reinforce the 
rationale behind their affect, propagating and amplifying anger effects.  
To explore these possibilities, I replicated Study 6 in the context of an anger 
manipulation. If anger facilitates the perception of agency (and in turn, risk), then risk 





A total of 128 participants took part in exchange for partial course credit, of which 85 were 
female. They were sourced from the Psychology Department participant pool, and were 
thus all 100- and 200-level psychology undergraduate students. Ages ranged from 18-30, 
and the mean age was 22.0 years. 
 
Materials 
The study was conducted in individual experimental booths equipped with a writing desk 
and a computer workstation. Materials included a demographics questionnaire, the self-
report emotion questionnaire, a modified version of the scenarios task in which participants 
were asked to attribute responsibility to ‘The deceased’, ‘Other person(s)/organization(s)’ 
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and ‘Bad luck/the circumstances’ using percentages (instead of rating the deceased’s 
responsibility on a Likert scale; see Appendix F) and both versions of the risk frequency 
estimation questionnaire. The modified version of the scenarios task gave every causal 
factor equal exposure, was less subject to experimenter demand, and did not assume that 
lower other person causality ratings necessarily imply higher bad luck causality (or vice 
versa). Mood was manipulated via the anger and neutral versions of the Velten MIP, 
described in Study 5.  
 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were given the demographics form and the first 
self-report emotion questionnaire, followed by the Velten MIP, a second emotion 
questionnaire, the scenarios task, a third emotion questionnaire, the New Zealand and 
World versions of the hazard estimations (counterbalanced), and, finally, a fourth emotion 
questionnaire. All participants were then thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
State mood ratings were analysed in a priming condition (human agency, situational 
factors) x mood condition (anger, neutral) x time (T1, T2, T3, T4) x self-reported emotion 
(anger, sadness disgust, happiness, fear surprise) ANOVA, with the last two treated as 
within-subjects factors. There were main effects of time F(2.36, 1079.78) = 15.00, p < .001, 
mood F(2.91, 1079.78) = 56.98, p < .001 and self-reported emotion F(1, 118) = 5.8, p = .018, 
2-way interactions between self-reported emotion and time F(2.36, 1079.78) = 6.16, p = 
.001 and between self-reported emotion and mood F(2.91, 1079.89) = 5.528, p = .001 and a 




  Mood was further investigated by submitting scores at T2 and T3 to separate t-tests 
(with emotion as the factor) for each item. The T2 t-tests for anger t(110.58) = 4.67, p < 
.001, sadness t(95.21) = 6.39, p < .001 and disgust t(83.07) = 4.62, p < .001 were significant, 
and the fear t(104.47) = 1.92, p = .058 and surprise t(122) = -1.97, p =. 051 t-tests were 
marginally significant. The T3 t-tests for anger t(118.16) = 2.71, p = .008, sadness t(125) = 
2.33, p = .022 and disgust t(114.60) = 2.32, p = .022 were also significant. Self-reported 
emotion scores at T2 and T3 are shown in Figures 9 and 10 respectively. 
 
 




Figure 10. Self-reported emotion by condition at T3 (immediately following scenarios 
priming task) in Study 7 
 
Responsibility ratings, aggregated across all 24 hazards, were analysed in an attribution 
(others/circumstances) x priming condition ANOVA. A significant interaction emerged F(1, 
126) = 191.268, p < .001 in the expected configuration, confirming that the content of the 
scenarios had been construed as hoped.  
New Zealand and world risk estimates were found to be highly correlated rs(128) = 
.78, so data were collapsed across geographical context. Risk estimates were then subjected 
to natural logarithmic transformation and submitted to a two-way ANOVA with priming and 
emotion as factors; there were no significant effects. Means are shown in Figure 11. 
Correlations were also run between risk estimates and attributions of responsibility 
to the deceased, others and bad luck. There was no correlation between risk estimates and 
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deceased responsibility rs(128) = -.072, p > .1 but there was a significant positive correlation 
with other responsibility rs(128) = .17, p = .049 and a significant negative correlation with 
bad luck attributions rs(128) = -.18, p = .045. 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean log-transformed frequency estimates by condition in Study 7 
 
Discussion 
There are several observations to be made from this study. Most crucially, there was no 
interaction between agency priming and emotion induction, thus providing no support for 
the hypothesis that anger might facilitate the perception of agency. As in Study 6, there was 
also no main effect of priming on risk perception, providing stronger evidence against the 
hypothesised role of agency as an account of malicious hazards’ overestimation. 
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Although the priming manipulation had no effect, there was a significant (albeit 
weak) correlation between risk perception and attribution to other agents and to situational 
factors. This could be interpreted as evidence that propensity to attribute events to human 
factors and propensity to perceive high risk are related, or that they covary, independent of 
the effects of the priming manipulation. At the very least the results represent an 
endorsement of the more precise means of measuring attributions employed in this study 
compared with Study 6. 
Aside from the lack of an effect of priming, the null effect of emotion on risk 
perception raises questions about the conclusions of Study 5. However, there are also 
methodological reasons to question the comparability of the two studies. Jeon, Yim & 
Walker (2011), in another study entailing a mood induction, observed that participants’ 
self-reports of anger collected immediately after the MIP were nearly twice as high as self-
reports of anger gathered after a 24-minute experimental procedure (involving a relatively 
neutral driving task). In the present study, the scenario rating task (which, on the evidence 
of Study 6 is also relatively affectively neutral) lasted approximately 15 minutes on average, 
giving the anger earlier elicited plenty of time to decay prior to the risk estimation task. 
Empirically, it is also apparent from the self-reports that anger levels had declined by T3. 
Although a significant difference in anger remained between the two conditions, the effect 
size was considerably lower at T3 than T2 (η2 = .055 v. η2 = .152), and the effect size of 
anger on risk perception in Study 5 was fairly small already (η2 = .07). It is therefore 
conceivable that the residual anger experienced after the scenarios task was not enough to 
generate a significant effect of anger on risk perception. Note as well that despite the failure 






To better estimate the size of the Velten mood effects, I conducted a meta-analysis of 
Studies 5 and 7, along with an additional study, run for a different purpose, with similar 
independent and dependent variables.  The additional study involved 32 undergraduate 
participants from the same population as Studies 5 and 7 (23 female, age range 18-53, mean 
21.97). Like those studies, the new study included angry and neutral conditions, after which 
participants answered the hazard frequency questionnaire, with no geographical locality 
specified. The only difference was that normative data for one hazard (driving) was 
provided as a reference point (as in Johnson & Tversky, 1983).   
 
 Statistical methods 
Effect sizes were calculated for each included study (in the case of Study 7 two effect sizes 
were calculated, one for participants in the human agency condition and another for 
participants in the situational factors condition). All studies used the same dependent 
measure, which collected continuous data, hence Cohen’s d was computed by subtracting 
the neutral condition means from the anger condition means and then dividing the resulting 
value by the pooled standard deviation. This was done for each experiment, meaning a total 
of four d statistics were calculated. To reflect that the studies were not comprised of 
identically sized samples and their data possessed differential variability, weights were 
applied to the effect sizes. Upper and lower 95% confidence intervals were computed for 
each effect, and from these an effect size for the meta-analysis was calculated. The meta-
analysis was run using fixed and random effects models, but because heterogeneity was 




Results and discussion 
Data important to the way the meta-analysis results were computed are displayed in Table 
9. Difference in means refers to the outcome of subtracting the mean of the neutral group 
from that of the anger group, the pooled SD refers to the standard deviation after data were 
collapsed across the two conditions and the confidence intervals by study show 
(unsurprisingly) that the only study whose data permit the inference that anger augmented 
risk perception with 95% confidence was Study 7, where frequency estimation immediately 
followed mood induction. The weighted effect size was d = .32. 
 
Table 9 
Data Used to Compute Meta-analysis Confidence Intervals 

















64 0.59 2.37 27.5% 0.25 -0.60, 1.77 0.36 
Unreported 
Study 
32 0.56 2.43 13.0% 0.23 -1.20, 2.31 0.52 
 
Figure 12 is a forest plot where the four effects are represented individually by the 
horizontal lines and collectively by the horizontally orientated diamond. The extremes of 
the lines represent the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval, and the 
square in the middle of it depicts the difference in means. The size of the square is 
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determined by the weightings of the studies, the most influential study (Study 5) being 
given the largest square. The x-axis is labelled ‘LNMicromorts’ which means the mean 
natural log of the number of micromorts per million. The diamond represents the estimated 
effect size, and the horizontal ends of the diamond represent the lower and upper limits of 
the CI. The mean weighted difference in means was 0.72 (which is also the thickest part of 
the diamond). The confidence intervals generated by the meta-analysis were 0.12 (lower 
limit) and 1.33 (upper limit). The meta-analysis also returned a z-value of 2.33, and a p-
value of 0.020. It therefore supported the hypothesis that anger increases risk perception 
relative to neutral. The weighted effect size was 0.32 which, according to Cohen’s (1988) 
guidelines, is a small effect. However, effect size magnitudes are only sensibly seen in the 
context of similar research. The two studies that elucidated the theory behind affect as a 
factor in risk perception also found small effect sizes. DeSteno et al’s (2000) interaction 
between induced mood (anger, sadness) and affective disposition of hazard (angering, 
saddening) had an effect size of d = 0.23. Fischhoff et al’s (2003) effect of fear over anger on 
risk perception was also d = 0.23. In this context, the effect size observed across my affective 
experiments is in line with expectations in this field of research.  
It should be noted that effect sizes differed considerably between the four samples. 
This is because the studies are not interchangeable, being run in accordance with different 
procedures. Specifically Studies 7 and 9 entailed an appreciable time delay between the end 
of the MIP and the administration of the frequency estimation questionnaire. This may 
explain why their effect sizes are lower. It cannot defensibly be claimed, on the basis of this 
meta-analysis, that an anger effect is observable even with a delay between induction and 
risk perception measurement because the meta-analysis’s overall finding that an effect of 
anger exists is carried largely by Study 5 (which entailed no such delay). However, the 
findings argue against the notion that Study 5’s results were a type 1 error as, after the 
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inclusion of the other samples the confidence interval becomes more indicative of a genuine 
effect of anger on risk perception. In summary, this meta-analysis allows confidence in 
asserting that anger increases risk perception, at least when the former is manipulated and 
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Figure 12. Forest plot showing confidence intervals in meta-analysis of four pairs of 
participant samples who had either been induced with angry or neutral mood  
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Chapter 6 – General discussion 
 
Many western societies appear to have a fixation with certain types of hazard – particularly 
those involving violent acts. These hazards are characterised by the disproportionate 
amount of money governments are prepared to spend to prevent deaths caused by them, 
the amount of legislation passed purporting to combat them (and in particular the tendency 
of that legislation to remove rights previously enjoyed by citizens so as to better protect 
them from malicious hazards) and the apparently high levels of popular support such 
spending and legislation can lay claim to (e.g. Gallup 2002a; Gallup 2002c). Ironically, these 
same hazards do not constitute particularly serious threats when account is taken of the 
relatively small number of people that are normatively subject to them. Not only that, but 
there are also considerable losses incurred by attending particularly keenly to these 
hazards. The concession of civil liberties could be considered a loss a priori, but it also leads 
to other undesirable consequences such as stoking resentment in sectors of the population 
disproportionately affected by having their (formerly enjoyed) rights infringed and 
fomenting societal divisions and the social problems associated with them. It is also linked 
with the expenditure of public finances to combat malicious hazards, which manifests itself 
in other ways as well (such as the establishment of new government departments whose 
purpose it is to stave off malicious threats). The loss incurred by this expenditure is that it 
diverts public funds from other areas where they might otherwise be put to better use.  The 
purpose of this thesis was to explore the nature of these hazards and to test possible 
mechanisms accounting for the disproportionate attention they receive. 
As a first step, in Chapter 2, I generated a reasonably exhaustive list of hazards 
based on those commonly listed by participants as potential causes of death. By sourcing 
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my stimulus list from the population from which future experimental samples would be 
drawn, I optimised the likelihood the hazards were both understood by, and relevant to, 
future participants. From participants’ free responses, I derived 33 hazard types, which 
were further subjected to several dimension reduction techniques. Multidimensional 
scaling suggested that participants thought of hazards along three dimensions, and that the 
two most important ones were described by familiarity and moral significance; the hazards 
of particular interest – terrorism, violent crime, and war – clustered together in a space 
representative of high moral significance and low controllability.  
To gather convergent evidence for this interpretation, I subjected the 33 types of 
hazards to a cluster analysis based on ratings of independent participants on a range of 
hazard characteristics.  The cluster analysis sorted the hazards into two overarching 
clusters, one made up of hazards high in moral significance and the other made up of 
hazards low in moral significance, and then refined those two overarching clusters into two 
sub-clusters each, defined by their controllability. The results validated my inferences about 
the meanings of the dimensions of the MDS and supported the existence of four distinct 
clusters of hazards, each characterised by different permutations of controllability and 
moral significance. I termed the cluster of hazards characterised by high moral significance 
and low controllability – which include the very hazards individuals and governments 
appear to fear so distinctively – ‘malicious hazards’. This category of hazards has tended not 
to figure in previous research on risk perception. Johnson & Tversky (1983) did include all 
three of the hazards that comprise my malicious hazards category, and identified them as 
members of a distinct cluster, but they did so for the purpose of designing informationally 
similar/dissimilar MIPs, and did not theorise specifically about differential effects of affect 
on them. The finding reported in this thesis, that malicious hazards are seen as both morally 
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significant and uncontrollable (by contrast with other hazards) has also not been uncovered 
previously. 
Having made the case that malicious hazards make up an identifiable category of 
hazards I considered, in Chapter 3, what aspects of malicious hazards might explain the 
amount of legislative time and public finances they attract. I considered two mechanisms 
through which these factors could exert their effect on public interest in malicious hazards. 
One of those was that attempts to tackle malicious hazards are motivated by non-
consequentialist morality – specifically that some people are inclined towards the belief that 
where an individual or organization intentionally inflicts harm against people a moral duty 
exists to secure retribution against them. I acknowledged the likely importance of symbolic 
moral imperatives in predicting support for the manner of policies and public spending 
adumbrated in the introduction, but expressed the concern that research linking 
authoritarian and dogmatic personality types and social values to support for 
counterproductive policies and spending would be largely descriptive in nature because 
personality and social values are constructs which are notably stable traits. It was noted, on 
the other hand, that risk perception is more malleable and furthermore that its influence on 
support for policies related to malicious hazards is sufficiently important as to justify 
research into what factors influence it.  
I then considered two factors that malicious hazards appear to share, which could 
account for inflated estimates of the likelihood: the degree of anger malicious hazards tend 
to arouse; and the cognitive understanding that a malicious human agent is responsible for 
exposure to the hazard.  
On this subject, I brought up Fischhoff et al’s (1978) pioneering Psychometric 
Paradigm which sought to explain risk perception in terms of attributes people generally 
attach to hazards. Much as I did in Study 3, they suggested a (different but overlapping) 
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range of attributes that hazards might have to participants, and found that those loaded on 
to two factors: severity of exposure and familiarity. They further suggested that hazards 
that were high on the former and low on the latter were particularly likely to inspire high 
risk perception, and later Slovic (2004) attempted to explain the phenomenon of overly 
pessimistic risk perception of terrorism by claiming that terrorism was both highly 
unfamiliar and very severe in the event of exposure. I did not find that explanation wholly 
convincing since people are not particularly unfamiliar with terrorism – it has occurred 
often throughout history and is a frequent and high-profile subject of news bulletins. I 
acknowledged the contribution the Psychometric Paradigm has made to risk perception 
research, but criticised its relative neglect of affect as a factor in risk perception. It is also 
worth drawing attention to the fact that the outcome of my hazard pairing similarity and 
dimension evaluation tasks was that participants differentiated hazards along a different 
dimension to Fischhoff et al’s (moral significance replaced familiarity), and that this was 
most likely symptomatic of my use of different hazards to those authors (Fischhoff et al’s 
hazard list was dominated by useful hazards, with a few immoral hazards and no natural or 
malicious hazards). 
A number of researchers have taken an interest in affect as a predictor of risk 
perception. Johnson & Tversky (1983), for example, found that depressive affect increases 
risk perception and positive affect decreases it, although it was not clear whether their 
results generalise to malicious hazards. DeSteno et al. (2000) and Lerner et al. (2003) are 
particularly relevant, the former proposing that incidental affect influences risk perception 
to the extent that it is congruent with the type of affect associated with the hazard being 
judged, and the latter proposing that anger reduces risk perception irrespective of the 
affective disposition of the hazard. Again, though, the applicability of these analyses to 
malicious hazards is not clear. Furthermore, Lerner et al’s study included no control 
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condition, so the only hypothesis tested in the form of a true experiment was that angry 
participants perceive less risk than fearful participants which, given the nature of fear, is 
scarcely surprising.  
I then continued to consider evidence of how cognition, and agency in particular, 
might affect risk perception, and pointed to the long-established preference observers seem 
to have for attributing other people’s actions dispositionally (Jones & Harris, 1967). I 
queried whether the principle that there is a preference to explain behaviour dispositionally 
might be extended to events whose cause is unknown and answered that it can be, citing 
Morris et al’s (1999) finding that an ambiguously caused workplace accident was blamed on 
human error with greater frequency than it was attributed to environmental factors and 
McClure et al. (2007), who found that when offered an environmental cause or a human 
cause to explain an adverse event, participants favoured the human cause as an explanation. 
I also cited evidence that people are prone towards generalising conditional arguments to 
biconditional arguments (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Wagner-Egger, 2007), and argued 
that for that reason, as well as deeming ambiguously caused events to be more likely to 
have been caused by human factors, people might also believe that events caused by human 
factors are more likely to happen  
 The remainder of the thesis tested each of these hypotheses in turn.  Four studies 
(including one not reported in detail) tested the effects of anger on risk perception, and 
although not all simple effects were strong or statistically significant, a meta-analysis 
indicated that they were real: anger, compared to neutral affect, appears to increase the 
perceived likelihood of hazards, malicious or not. Because malicious hazards are themselves 
anger inducing, this finding can partially explain why they are judged as more likely to 
occur, and ultimately why individuals and institutions are particularly disposed to tackle 
them. 
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This finding however, appears to contradict both Lerner’s and DeSteno’s results, 
cited above.  Both studies, though, differ in important ways from the studies reported here. 
In Lerner’s case: 1) participants were judging future risk, which anger appraisals may have 
caused them to judge differently to time non-specific risk, 2) the study was conducted 
shortly after the September 11th attacks on the US, a time that Americans believed called for 
public displays of unity and fortitude creating a motivation to estimate the risk of terrorism 
optimistically, and 3) the mood induction was informationally relevant to the risk 
perception questions, and could have later infused their answers distorting the true effect of 
anger. In DeSteno’s case 1) stimuli involved no fatal hazards, and therefore participants 
would have had no affective, experiential frame of reference to relate to them; and 2) risk 
questions were presented as short vignettes, which may have encouraged participants to 
focus more on the characteristics specific to the hazards they were being asked about. In 
spite of these disparities between my research and Lerner et al’s and DeSteno et al’s, I 
believe my procedure made a better controlled attempt to isolate the effects of anger on 
perception of deadly hazards because my MIP was distinctly unrelated to risk (hence there 
was no risk of stimuli from the MIP influencing risk perception via a mechanism other than 
affect), my dependent measure was relatively affectively neutral and unlike DeSteno et al. 
and Lerner et al. I included a control condition. My results pointed to a predominant effect 
of anger augmenting risk perception. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I considered the alternative (not mutually exclusive) possibility 
that the agentic nature of malicious hazards can account for the biased perception of them. 
Two studies manipulated agency beliefs directly, by framing the hazards in such a way as to 
imply that those deaths arose through human agency or situational factors. Neither study, 
however, showed any evidence of an agency effect, and I concluded that agency beliefs are 
not a significant factor in the overestimation of malicious hazards. 
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A possible limitation of the conclusions is that, although the manipulation of agency 
was based on previous research, and despite participants’ manipulation-consistent 
attributions of the scenarios, it is possible that participants failed to generalise those 
attributions to the more abstract hazard stimuli.  
Keltner et al. (1993) are the only other researchers to have manipulated agency to 
study likelihood judgements, but there are other manipulations used in different research 
contexts. Recently, for example, Roberts, Bennett, Elliott & Hayes (2015) taught participants 
movement sequence patterns, which participants would later have to reproduce and 
recognise, informing half of their participants that the movement sequence patterns were 
generated by humans, and the other half that they were computer generated. Participants’ 
reproduction success was roughly equivalent across conditions, but their recognition 
differed. Participants were shown the patterns they had been taught earlier as well as new 
ones and they were asked to state the confidence with which they believed the pattern to be 
‘old’. All participants were more likely to claim confidence in recognising old patterns than 
new ones, and, as predicted, those informed the original patterns were generated by 
computers were more confident in their recognition of old patterns than those told they 
were generated by human agents, suggesting that participants under the apprehension that 
the patterns they learnt were computer generated engaged in more top down, explicit 
processing relative to the more implicit sensorimotor processing preferred by participants 
who learnt purportedly agentically generated patterns (because implicitly encoded 
memories are less likely to be available for deliberate retrieval; Schott, Richardson-Klavehn, 
Heinze & Düzel, 2002; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Conceivably, a similar manipulation could be 
used to study risk perception, even though it seems, on its face, less easily generalised to 
hazard judgments than the procedure used here. 
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Winterich, Han & Lerner (2010) utilised a task similar to the scenarios paradigm I 
used. They asked participants to memorise vignettes, adapted from Keltner et al. (1993), 
depicting negative events. For half of the participants, the events were described as though 
caused by a human agent (e.g. ‘You break your leg while skiing when another skier cuts you 
off’) and for the other as though caused by situational factors (e.g. ‘ While skiing, icy slopes 
cause you to break your leg’). All participants then viewed an anger-inducing film clip, 
before reading two vignettes in which the negligent behaviour of an employee resulted in 
others incurring harm. Participants primed by human agency reported greater anger and 
recommended more severe punishments against the workers in the vignettes. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear in this study how agency operated on punishment judgments, 
and in particular the role of anger. The authors proposed that the impact of the situational 
factors prime was to ‘blunt’ the anger elicited by the mood induction – that is, participants 
in that group were less affected by the MIP and subsequently less punitive in their 
judgements. An alternative explanation is that the human agency and situational factors 
primes elicited different amounts of anger themselves, and that the self-reported anger of 
human agency condition participants after the mood induction was an additive or 
multiplicative effect of the human agency prime and the anger induction. Indeed, a post-test 
reported in one of the notes showed that when angry affect was measured immediately 
after presentation of the priming task it was higher when the human agency version had 
been presented than when the situational factors version had been.  
Finally, Baumeister, Masicampo & DeWall (2009) attempted to manipulate 
participants’ beliefs in free will versus determinism. Although these concepts do not map on 
precisely to human agency and situational factors respectively (a human agent’s deliberate 
actions could reasonably be interpreted as deterministically motivated), they have a clear 
relationship with internal and external attributions. Participants were presented with a 
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series of statements that endorsed free will as a valid explanation for why people act (e.g. 
‘Avoiding temptation requires that I exert free will’), statements that instead supported 
determinism (e.g. ‘Ultimately we are biological computers – designed by evolution, built 
through genetics, and programmed by the environment) or neutral statements. Consistent 
with the authors’ expectations that deterministic beliefs would be inconsistent with pro-
social behaviour, participants primed with determinism displayed a lower propensity 
towards helping behaviour than controls and participants primed with free will (who did 
not significantly differ). There is a problem though, which is that Baumeister et al’s 
participants appeared to internalise the free will and determinism statements from the 
manipulation and apply them to themselves, altering their behaviour (in the case of the 
determinism condition) to take account of their primed beliefs, behaving in a less 
accountable way when primed with determinism. In risk perception research such as mine 
there is a danger in this context that participants may infer that if they themselves felt less 
accountable for their actions under determinism then others would as well, and as a 
consequence they might suppose that if moral accountability is understood to be illusory 
others would be more likely to commit malicious acts. The belief that actions generally are 
explained by deterministic influences on actors and that negative events, when they occur, 
cannot sensibly be attributed to actors at all are not equivalent – the implication of the first 
belief is that malicious acts are either equally likely or more likely to occur, whereas the 
implication of the other is the reverse. Similarly, discrepant universal beliefs about 
accountability were not a hypothesised part of the mechanism I postulated through which 
agency beliefs might influence risk perception. In other words, by using Baumeister et al’s 
prime there is a likelihood that universal accountability beliefs will be confounded with 
agency beliefs. However, it may be possible to adapt the manipulation used by Baumeister 
et al. such that rather than having a free will/deterministic flavour the priming sentences 
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are replaced with ones that speak to human agency or situational factor beliefs (e.g. ‘When 
things happen, most of the time their cause can be traced back to human actions’ or 
alternatively ‘When things happen, most of the time it turns out that factors outside of 
anyone’s control caused them’). As stated earlier, this would also have the benefit of 
following a similar format to my affect manipulation, so it is a direction worth considering 
for future research. 
The manipulation of mood in the current studies, while more successful in terms of 
generating interpretable results, also warrants discussion. Velten (1968) reported that his 
mood manipulation, used in the current studies, appeared to induce affect even after 
accounting for demand characteristics, Larsen & Sinnett’s (1991) meta-analysis of this 
procedure also showed that although there was a larger effect size when self-report 
measures were used and where no deception was employed to conceal the intent of the 
MIP, the Velten manipulation was still effective and valid when these conditions were 
altered. Notwithstanding this evidence, the Velten procedure is still vulnerable to criticism. 
It is possible, for example, that participants were able to distinguish the nuances of anger 
and sadness and infer that whilst the former was the sort of emotion that ought to increase 
risk perception the latter was not. Relatedly, although Larsen & Sinnett (1991) showed that 
even without the potential for demand characteristics the Velten MIP was effective, it was 
nonetheless less effective, and perhaps differential effectiveness of the manipulation, rather 
than differential effects of emotion, could account for differences between anger and 
sadness in the current studies.  
Both of these criticisms could, in future research, be answered either by employing 
behavioural or physiological measures of affective arousal or by using a cover story to 
dissociate the mood induction phase from the risk perception measure. Unfortunately, to 
my knowledge, no valid behavioural anger measurements exist. Measures of aggression are 
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available, such as the ‘hot sauce’ paradigm (Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg & McGregor, 
1999) in which participants administer a potent hot sauce to a (fictional) co-participant, or 
the ‘point subtraction’ paradigm (Cherek, 1981) in which participants press a button to 
deduct earnings from a (fictional) participant in another room. However, measures such as 
these would run the risk of interfering with the anger manipulation due to their complexity 
and duration. 
Alternatively, more potent deception might be used to safeguard against demand 
characteristics. For example, Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, Borkovec & Cumbleton (1994) gave 
participants the impression that they would be taking part in two different studies run by 
two separate researchers. The first study was due to involve a task requiring participants to 
allocate reward payments to two different workers (this was the authors’ implicit measure 
of elation/depression) as well as an explicit emotion self-report questionnaire, and the 
second study was supposed to assess the effectiveness of the Velten MIP. However, the 
researcher running the first study would always claim, just before it was about to start, that 
they needed to make an urgent phone call, asking the researcher responsible for the second 
study to run theirs first. Sinclair et al. found that despite (presumably) believing that the 
two phases of the procedure were theoretically distinct, the mood induction still worked. It 
is easy to see how their procedure could be adapted to risk perception research, although it 
is not certain that a modified version of the anger procedure would be equally capable of 
eliciting anger in the absence of demand characteristics. 
A third limitation concerns the primary dependent measure, which is of 
questionable sensitivity.  Although frequency judgments varied with emotional state, they 
did not vary by hazard type, time of measurement, or context (global versus New Zealand). 
For example, given our understanding of anger as a galvanising, empowering emotion, it is 
surprising that anger was just as likely to increase personal risk (i.e., in New Zealand) as to 
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increase general risk. Several aspects of the measure are suspect. For example, when 
contrasted with other risk perception measures its items are more brief, more densely 
packed, more affectively detached, and more numerous. Taken together, this could 
conceivably cause participants to expend less cognitive effort adjusting to the nuances of 
the different hazards. One possible solution would be to utilise a much shorter list of 
hazards (no more than seven or eight, as in DeSteno et al, 2000) described in somewhat 
more detail. For example instead of merely listing ‘Earthquakes’, items might read ‘Every 
year a certain number of people die because of earthquakes (due to the shock of the 
earthquake or because of falling debris or entrapment in collapsed buildings). This ought to 
focus participants’ attention more closely on the content of the question. 
Returning to the issues at the outset of this thesis, the reader may question what 
implications, if any, the current results have for bringing the ‘solutions’ for malicious 
hazards back into line with their true risk. Establishing that anger augments risk perception 
of malicious hazards does not necessarily warrant that it has any effect on attitudes or 
behaviour. Evidence from Dowler (2003), Pfeiffer et al. (2005) and Roberts & Indermaur 
(2007) suggests that greater risk perception of crime predicts policy attitudes, but such 
data cannot establish a causal effect. Causal effect could be established by administering a 
crime attitudes scale immediately following the risk perception task – this would offer the 
advantage of allowing researchers to test for a mediating effect of risk perception and anger 
on attitudes. As far as the scale is concerned, scales from the studies cited above could be 
used, but ideally a scale would not only address punitive attitudes but also support for civil 
liberties and allocation of public money to mitigating crime (and other hazards). 
Another means of improving on my findings would be by using a behavioural 
measure to validate them. However, it must be stressed that it is difficult to predict exactly 
what sort of behaviour to expect from someone whose risk perception is augmented due to 
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state anger. This is because the appraisals associated with anger tend to invoke personal 
invulnerability. As a consequence, behavioural measures that gauge protective behaviours 
(such as giving participants the chance to choose whether or not to leave their personal 
belongings in an unlocked room) might not be sensitive to changes in risk perception. 
Alternatively, there are measures of aggression against other participants (real or fictional) 
believed to have transgressed in some way. There is an important disadvantage to this type 
of task though, which is that it is already understood that anger causes people to adopt 
more punitive attitudes (Ask & Pina, 2011; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Lerner et al, 1998) and it 
cannot be assumed that anger exerts its effect on punitiveness through risk perception. In 
order to fully test this, it would be necessary to develop a means of inducing anger for a 
sufficiently long period to administer the behavioural measure and the risk perception 
measure. 
I argued, in the introduction, that overreaction to malicious hazards is societally 
costly. My research, as described in this thesis, makes the case that they are overestimated 
relative to other hazards, that they are angering, and that anger leads to increased risk 
perception (and therefore greater overestimation). Greater overestimation, in turn, is 
hypothesised to predict public support for expensive risk mitigation strategies. 
I mentioned at the start of Chapter 3 that an alternative explanation, not empirically 
addressed by this thesis, is that the typical human reaction to the threat of malicious 
hazards is driven by moral accountability rather than risk perception – in other words, that 
reducing the potential for malicious hazard events to occur and ensuring that retribution is 
meted out against those who cause such events is a form of altruistic punishment (see De 
Quervain et al, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Marlowe et al, 2008). This has been elucidated 
most vividly in the past by researchers’ use of the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, 
participants are assigned an arbitrary amount of some currency or other, and they are then 
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invited to offer a proportion of that endowment to a second participant. Both players are 
aware of the rules, which state that the offeror is only allowed to keep his or her assignment 
if the other participant accepts whatever offer they decide to make (if the offer is rejected 
both players leave with nothing). This paradigm, therefore, allows researchers to gauge the 
minimum amount the offeror must offer in order to secure the offeree’s acceptance. 
Although multiple factors influence this threshold, it is generally found that offers below 
20% of the total amount are likely to be rejected (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995) – 
even though on the face of it, by rejecting the offer, the offeree leaves themselves worse off. 
Thus it is shown that people are willing to incur costs to punish what they see as deviant, or 
unfair, behaviour. 
It must be recognized that in a democracy, should people knowingly and willingly 
assign a higher dollar value to lives lost to malicious activity than lives lost in other ways, 
societies have every right to react more stridently against malicious hazards than other 
hazards. However, this is not a question that is usually posed in the public forum of political 
discourse, and as such there is no way of knowing whether people make the connection 
between high expenditure on malicious hazard prevention and lower relative expenditure 
on other, potentially more dangerous hazards. Furthermore, given the distinctly moral 
justification behind incurring costs in order to exact altruistic punishment against rule-
breakers, there must surely also be a moral case against incurring those costs, as to do so 
presumably means expending less in order to prevent potentially more deaths from another 
cause. Indeed, the argument could be made that failing to act in a way that is likely to 
minimise human suffering overall will inevitably result in avoidable, and thus unfair, deaths.  
 Finally, it is shown in this research that anger, the typical affective reaction to 
malicious hazards, does augment risk perception. That appears to suggest that whatever 
decisions voting publics make about risk mitigation, those decisions are probably not fully 
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and accurately informed. Research cited earlier in this thesis (Dowler, 2003; Pfeiffer et al, 
2005; Roberts & Indermaur ,2007) showed that beliefs about crime do in fact influence 
support for policies designed to mitigate against it. From this perspective, if it is accepted 
that by reducing risk perception, attitudes that perpetuate overreaction to the threat of 
malicious hazards can also be reduced, the next step is to ask how my findings can be 
applied in practice to bring about that change. 
One way is in the communication of risk information. Risk information is 
communicated by politicians, governmental departments and agencies, news outlets and 
companies with an interest in security. To communicate information related to malicious 
hazards responsibly, disseminating parties need to convey it in a way that is less likely to 
elicit anger. Although my thesis does not address how that might be done, previous 
literature offers some insight. One can, for example, compare countries such as the UK and 
the US, where penal policy is heavily influenced by public opinion (Lappi‐Seppälä, 2007; 
Robers & De Keijser, 2014; Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur & Hough, 2002), with countries 
where the judicial system is relatively insulated from political influence like the Nordic 
countries (Green, 2012; Lappi‐Seppälä, 2007; Pratt, 2008). Where policy and sentencing 
decisions are more influenced by popular sentiment, regimes tend to be harsher but no 
more effective at reducing crime levels (Green, 2014). At the same time, there appears to be 
an association between heavy popular influence and communication of risk information in a 
certain way. Although a similar amount of news coverage is devoted to crime in the UK and 
Finland, for example, the way the news is related differs dramatically (Curran, Salovaara-
Moring, Coen & Iyengar, 2010). In the UK, crime reporting focuses on culprits, crime victims 
and sensationalised violence whereas in Finland it takes on a more criminological tone, 
addressing the causes and societal implications of crime. The former method of 
communicating crime news entails much more angering stimuli. Indeed it is substantively 
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comparable to the video anger manipulation introduced by Gross & Levenson (1995) in 
which a bully brutalises an innocent victim, and the crime story used by Johnson & Tversky 
(1983). Note, as well, the proclivity of British newspapers to report the punitive reactions of 
crime victims (e.g. Clench & West, 2008; Warren & Bates, 2012). Such reports may have the 
effect of normalising anger as a response to the threat of criminal behaviour. They stand in 
stark contrast to the almost phlegmatic reactions of survivors, and victims’ relatives, of 
Anders Breivik’s atrocity in Norway (Lewis, 2012; Lewis & Lyall, 2012). Where people are 
encouraged to view crime through an angering prism, that anger appears to catalyse 
political activity and incentivise politicians to prosecute ill-advised policy. 
As elected representatives, however, it is not necessarily the sole purpose of 
politicians to echo the populist sentiments of their electors – rather they may use their 
positions of influence to advocate for policies that serve the broader, overarching goals of 
society (i.e. spending public money wisely and enacting policies that are shown to reduce 
harm). In countries with more punitive cultures though, they often foment and promote 
anger as a reaction to crime. A prime example would be former Home Secretary Michael 
Howard’s claims that ‘the silent majority has become the angry majority’ and that ‘prison 
works’ (Brown, 1993) or Bill Clinton’s statement ,‘no wonder Americans are fed up with a 
system that lets too many career criminals get out of jail free’ (Richter, 1995). In Norway, by 
contrast, law and order is not contested as a general election issue and politicians seldom 
make statements related to criminal justice policy (Green, 2007). De Castella & McGarty 
(2011) analysed the content of George Bush and Tony Blair’s speeches on the subject of 
terrorism from 2001-2003 and found that 12% of the former’s, and 26% of the latter’s, 
consisted of angering remarks (defined as characterised by attributions of blame). Again, 
this can be contrasted with Jens Stoltenberg’s declaration in the wake of Breivik’s act of 
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terrorism that: ‘our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity… we 
will answer hatred with love’ (Orange, 2012). 
Government departments such as ministries of justice and government agencies like 
the police also communicate risk information. This is usually communicated in the form of 
advice to take various precautions. Such precautions may or may not be warranted by the 
circumstances but more worrying is when departments and agencies resort to angering 
rhetoric. Examples of this are the Police Executive Research Forum’s claims that ‘for a 
growing number of cities across the United States, violent crime is accelerating at an 
alarming pace’ and that ‘FBI statistics reflect the largest single year percent increase in 
violent crime in 14 years’ (Rosen, 2006; p. 1), both made in spite of the fact that for 12 of the 
past 14 years violent crime had fallen and that over the entire course of the past 14 years it 
had dropped by 27%. In addition to presenting statistics in a misleading way, police 
representatives sometimes misrepresent crime statistics entirely. Gardner (2009) recounts 
a quote from Julian Fantino (p. 248), the former Toronto chief of police: ‘well, [crime] may 
be going down in numbers, but violent crime, it’s been up, it’s been going up for years’. This 
was not true – in fact violent crime had been steadily declining in Toronto. Such distortions 
are not limited to law enforcement personnel either – policy-making departments may also 
convey risk information in unnecessarily angering terms. The UK’s Home Office (2011) 
published a report outlining its new crime-fighting strategy which it justified by asserting 
that ‘despite having one of the most expensive criminal justice systems in the world, Britain 
remains a high-crime country’ and that ‘only half of the public trust our criminal justice 
system to protect them from criminals’ (p. 3). This was at a time when Britain’s crime rate 
was similar to other western European countries’ (Eurostat, 2014). 
Perhaps the most egregious example of a needlessly fear- and anger-inducing 
governmental practice is the issuance of colour-coded terrorism alerts that the DHS 
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operated from 2002-2011. For the most part, rather than being issued with respect to 
specific events and regions that were most likely to attract the attention of terrorists, the 
system was orchestrated such that threat levels covered the entire country on an indefinite 
basis (that is, until the threat level was changed to something else). As well as being colour-
coded, a descriptor was associated with each threat level from ‘low’ through to ‘severe’. In 
practice though, the threat level was never reduced below ‘elevated’ (the third highest alert) 
which was essentially used as the default threat level, it periodically being raised to ‘high’ 
when officials had reason to believe the terror threat might be higher than usual. In reality, 
for the entire period during which the Homeland Security Advisory System was in effect 46 
deaths occurred in the US that were attributable to terrorism. As well as stoking concerns 
about terrorism unnecessarily, the advisory system offered Americans no practical advice 
as to how they should modify their behaviour in response to the terrorist threat. It was 
simply too vague and general to be of any use – its only real effect was giving the issue of 
terrorism heightened prominence, which it did not necessarily deserve. An analogous 
system is still in operation in the UK (the ‘UK Threat Levels’) and, as with the DHS’s system, 
the threat level has never been set lower than the third highest level. They are thus subject 
to the same criticisms regarding their utility as the discontinued DHS system. 
So how might risk information about malicious hazards be better communicated? 
The most succinct answer might be to communicate less of it. In fact, after the DHS’s colour-
coded advisory system had been phased out, it was replaced with a much less sensationalist 
and more functional system called the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS). Under 
this system (which is still in place), alerts are issued on an ad hoc basis, in response to 
specific threats. Information is communicated about what geographical area and what 
infrastructure is likely to be affected by the threat and what actions citizens might consider 
taking to mitigate the threat (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Another example of 
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competent risk communication related to terrorism comes from François Hollande in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attack on the publishers of the Charlie Hebdo magazine, who 
asserted his commitment to the values of the French republic and opined that Muslims were 
the main victims of Islamic terrorism, discouraging the opening up of divisions between the 
Islamic community and other French people (Lichfield, 2015). He also announced plans to 
devote more school time to teaching freedom of religion, freedom of speech and civic duty, 
assured the French that the government was doing everything it could to protect them from 
threats whilst at the same time appealing for vigilance. 
Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, Wessely & Krieger (2007) set out guidelines for what risk 
information about terrorism ought to consist of. They recommend that information should 
be disseminated by trusted sources, be updated on a regular basis, be accurate, provide 
‘useful, relevant advice and information before, during and after a terrorist incident’ (p. 
283) and acknowledge the inherent uncertainty that accompanies living in a liberal 
democracy, encouraging citizens to accept that uncertainty. Between the NTAS and François 
Hollande’s response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings, examples of all these attributes can be 
identified. 
The principle that less risk communication is better information applies even more 
to the case of violent crime than to terrorism. Oliver & Marion (2008) analysed US party 
political crime platforms of both major parties (and third party candidates when they were 
sufficiently important) between 1868 and 2004 and found that of the 76 crime platforms 
analysed, 60 addressed crime in predominantly symbolic terms as opposed to proposing 
policies intended to address specific issues. The outcome of the use of symbolism in 
couching crime discourse is that the perception of crime becomes divorced from reality 
because the number of references to crime in political rhetoric need bear no relation to its 
frequency. Furthermore with no frame of reference, electorates are unable to assess 
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whether new crime policies would be effective at reducing crime. Instead frequent, general, 
and abstract warnings serve to provoke anger at a social problem – anger that, the current 
research suggests, ultimately promotes a distorted perception of the risk and the required 
response to it.  
Alternatively, politicians wishing to address crime ought to cite empirically valid 
issues, and propose solutions to tackle them. For example, shortly after his appointment as 
Justice Secretary in 2010, Ken Clarke announced his intention to end the use of short 
custodial sentences, on the basis that such sentences only put convicts in a position where 
they are likely to re-offend when released (Woodcock & Bogustawski, 2010). Another 
example of an effective crime policy, this one with a more authoritarian flavour, is the Safer 
Cities Programme (implemented in Bradford, Coventry, Hartlepool, Hull, Lewisham and 
Wolverhampton) which was introduced partly to reverse the car crime trend which had 
reached epidemic levels during the 1980s (Webb & Laycock, 1992). Part of the programme 
provided funding for the installation of security cameras in car parks, and a pre- and post-
camera installation comparison, which also compared car parks in which cameras were 
installed with car parks where they were not installed, showed that the policy had proved 
effective in reducing car crime (Tilley, 1993). There is, therefore, scope for the public to 
assign subjective values to the civil liberty of privacy and protection from car crime, and 
decide on that basis whether the trade-off is worthwhile. This contrasts with anger-
characterised approaches to policy, which cite ill-defined (and sometimes illusory) 
problems, propose solutions that do not necessarily relate to the problems and offer no 
concrete criteria for their success to be evaluated on, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle 
where the public is never satisfied that public institutions are able to protect them from 
crime and consequently demand increasingly harsh policies. 
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In addition to their day-to-day law enforcement roles, police can, and do, introduce 
initiatives and communicate those initiatives as well as other crime prevention advice. 
Again, initiatives and advice ought to clearly address certain threats and have apparent or 
measurable outcomes. A particularly high-profile initiative is ‘MetTrace’ (originally 
introduced in London), under which police forces train their officers to check suspected 
stolen goods for Smartwater (a traceable liquid), encourage property owners to apply it to 
their valuables, instruct them as to how to use it and then extensively publicise, in public 
areas, the widespread use of Smartwater and its effectiveness as a means of deterring 
would-be thieves (Metropolitan Police, 2015). Police also publish practical advice relating 
to specific types of crime – to protect against identity fraud, for example, people are advised 
to install internet security software (Thames Valley Police, 2015). Just as importantly, 
campaigns and reasonable safety advice play a part in building and sustaining public trust 
in the police which, as we have seen, is critical to ensuring that the public supports 
proportionate criminal justice measures. By contrast, irresponsible advice would be 
advising women to stay home at night, as happened after the murder of Joanna Yeates 
(Morris, 2011). Clearly it is impractical for many members of the public to stay at home 
every night, and the connotation of the police’s advice was that murder was a serious risk 
across the entire area – a message which is unnecessarily angering. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Malicious hazards form a distinct group, are particularly angering, and this effect may be 
sufficient to account for overestimation of their likelihood, and the personal and 
institutional response required to combat them. By contrast, another feature of malicious 
hazards, the belief that consciously acting human agents are responsible for them, does not 
appear to play a role. One implication is that particular attention to the angering aspects of 
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risk communication is warranted. There may be no intrinsic harm in promoting public 
awareness of malicious hazards, so long as one does not do it in an inflammatory way. This 
gives rise to my suggestions that risk communicators resist assertions that malicious 
hazards are a serious problem, that public institutions cannot be trusted to deal with the 
threat they pose or that offenders are either not caught or are treated too leniently, and also 
refrain from depicting vivid details about exceptionally heinous crimes. A more balanced, 
and ultimately more effective strategy would be to cite specific trends in crime (perhaps 
supported with representative examples) and to propose steps individuals can take to 
attenuate the threat to themselves and measured responses to reverse the trend on a 
societal level. 
Unfortunately, all risk communicators have certain vested interests in risk 
communication: police are motivated to appear effective in keeping the crime rate down, 
while media outlets and politicians may be motivated to emphasise crime to assert their 
pro-social, anti-crime credentials, or to attract viewers or voters. In terms of media, there is 
little to do beyond appealing to journalistic ethics, but politicians might be persuaded to 
change the tone of their crime platforms based on the deleterious effect angering assertions 
about crime’s prevalence have on the perception of institutions they aspire to lead. 
Politicians (in democracies at least) derive their authority from their electorates’ confidence 
in organs of state power, and by undermining that confidence they will ultimately reduce 
their own clout and ability to shape and influence society should they be elected. This is, in 
effect, a tragedy of the commons – the argument I advance is that the short term gains from 
sensationalising malicious hazards are outweighed both by the long term cost to society and 
the cost to the legitimacy of state power and the political establishment. 
I also propose further research, both in respect of the unsettled hypothesis about 
agency beliefs and by way of elaborating on and applying the findings with respect to affect. 
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To answer the agency beliefs question I suggest the identification, or development, and use 
of a more effective priming paradigm, and I have identified three primes that might be of 
interest (Baumeister et al, 2009; Roberts et al, 2015; Winterich et al, 2010). To expand upon 
this thesis’s main finding, the next step is to develop a valid and comprehensive scale for the 
measurement of attitudes related to malicious hazards and then to determine whether 
angry affect predicts greater inclination towards unnecessary preventative action or 
support for inimical policies, mediated by risk perception. 
Overall, I believe that this thesis takes the study of the relationship between 
individual differences variables and attitudes about malicious hazards, and extends it 
beyond descriptive observations. With our understanding that anger is not purely trait-
driven, that it influences risk perception and that risk communication can be framed in such 
a way as to promote angry responses or minimise them, there is now the possibility that 
risk communicators can lead public opinion away from expensive and punitive short-
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Please name 20 distinct hazards that can potentially cause death: 
 
<1st dialog box> 
 
<2nd dialog box> 
 
<3rd dialog box> 
 
<4th dialog box> 
 
<5th dialog box> 
 
<6th dialog box> 
 
<7th dialog box> 
 
<8th dialog box> 
 
<9th dialog box> 
 
<10th dialog box> 
 
<11th dialog box> 
 
<12th dialog box> 
 
<13th dialog box> 
 
<14th dialog box> 
 
<15th dialog box> 
 
<16th dialog box> 
 
<17th dialog box> 
 
<18th dialog box> 
 
<19th dialog box> 
 
<20th dialog box>
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Appendix B  
 
Demographics 
1. Age: _____ 
 
 




a. New Zealand European [ ] 
b. Chinese [    ] 
c. Maori [    ] 









6. How many years have you been in New Zealand ____________ 
 
 
7. Is English your first language?  
a. Yes [    ] 
b. No [   ] 
 
 
8. How would you rate your English language proficiency  
a. Excellent [    ] 
b. Good [    ] 
c. OK [    ] 
d. Poor [    ] 
 
 
9. Are you left of right handed, or ambidextrous? 
a. Left handed [    ] 
b. Right handed [    ] 












Participant Number: _____________________________ 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you are experiencing the following emotions at this 
moment, where 1 is ‘very slightly or not at all’ and 7 is ‘extremely’. 
 
Anger  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Sadness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Disgust  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Happiness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Fear  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 






























This questionnaire concerns your perception of risk. 
 
Out of every 1,000,000 deaths in New Zealand, how many are attributable to the following 
causes? 
 
Your answers need NOT add up to 1,000,000. 
 
Avalanche _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Boating                   _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Cleaning products _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Cold snaps _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Crossing the road _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Cycling _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Domestic animals _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Drinking alcohol _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Driving a car _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Swimming _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Earthquakes _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Eating unhealthy food _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Electricity _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Extreme sport _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Extreme weather _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Fighting _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Fire _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Flying _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Heat waves _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Heights _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Bacteria & Viruses _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Insects _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Violent criminals _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Slippery surfaces _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Smoking _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Team sport _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Taking drugs _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Terrorists _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Travelling by train _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Tsunami _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Volcanic eruption _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
War _____________________ out of 1,000,000 
Wild animals _____________________ out of 1,000,000 






MALOWE-CROWNE Social Desirability Scale 
 
Please read each of the items below and indicate what you generally do or feel using the 
scale provided. Remember there are no right and wrong responses to any of these 
statements. (coding scheme is indicated for the benefit of the reading). 
 
 




2-I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
 
0 1 
3-There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority    
    even though I knew they were right. 
 
0 1 
4- On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too  
     little of my ability. 
 
0 1 
5- No matter whom I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 1 0 
6- There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
 
0 1 
7- I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
 
1 0 
8- I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
 
0 1 
9- I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
 
1 0 
10- I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from  
        my own. 
 
1 0 
11- There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of  
        others. 
   
0 1 
12- I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. 
 
0 1 












In this section you will read a series of scenarios in which an incident occurred – whenever 
something happens, there are usually several different alternative ways of explaining why it 
happened – you will be asked to determine how responsible three different factors are in 
percentage terms. Please make sure your percentages add up to 100%. 
 
On 23rd July 2011, in Nyala, Sudan, a fire broke out in a paper shop. The occupants of the 
shop were away, and as such were unable to alert the emergency services. The fire quickly 
spread to other buildings on the commercial street the shop was located on, forcing those 
inside to attempt to evacuate. The blaze was brought to the attention of the fire brigade by 
one or more of these evacuees, but due to a work timetabling oversight on the part of the 
fire brigade no-one was available to respond immediately. Four teams of firemen had to be 
recalled specially, and they took an hour to arrive. 10 people were killed by the fire, and it 
was widely felt that if the fire brigade had arrived earlier these deaths could have been 
prevented. 
 
On 23rd July 2011, in Nyala, Sudan, a fire broke out in a paper shop. The occupants of the shop 
were away, and as such were unable to alert the emergency services. The fire quickly spread to 
other buildings on the commercial street the shop was located on, forcing those inside to 
attempt to evacuate. The blaze was brought to the attention of the fire brigade by one or more 
of these evacuees, who then made their way to the scene as quickly as possible, equipped with 
four fire engines. They immediately set about extinguishing the fire, but despite their best 
efforts 10 people were still killed by it. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 



















Appendix F  
 
Human agency condition: 










On 24th December 2011, in Dawei, Burma, a tsunami struck. Seismologists had reason to 
believe there was a significant chance of such a natural disaster striking, and warned town 
officials. These town officials could have broadcast public information announcements on 
television and radio as well as leaning on local newspapers to draw attention to the 
potential catastrophe. However, they made no effort to inform the populace, and 50 people 
who were on the beach were killed by the tsunami. 
 
On 24th December 2011, in Dawei, Burma, a tsunami struck. Seismologists had reason to 
believe there was a significant chance of such a natural disaster striking, and warned town 
officials. These town officials immediately went about broadcasting public information 
announcements on television and radio, as well as leaning on local newspapers to draw 
attention to the potential catastrophe using prominent places in their publications. 50 people 
were on the beach anyway however (presumably these danger alerts hadn’t reached them), 
and were killed by the tsunami. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 15th August 1987, BA flight 157, which was on its way from London to Singapore, 
suffered a ‘bird strike’, an event in which the flight path of the aeroplane intersects the flight 
path of birds in the area, and the birds are caught in the jet engines. Such incidents are 
usually avoided by air traffic control warning pilots not to take off. However, on this 
occasion the air traffic control employee responsible was found to have had a high blood 
alcohol content, and clearly hadn’t been concentrating. Because of the bird strike the 
engines failed, bringing the plane crashing to the ground. All 350 passengers on board, all 
members of the crew and the captain and co-pilot died. 
 
On 15th August 1987, BA flight 157, which was on its way from London to Singapore, suffered a 
‘bird strike’, an unfortunate event in which the flight path of the aeroplane intersects the flight 
path of birds in the area, and the birds are caught in the jet engines. Air traffic control wasn’t 
able to alert the pilot as to the ensuing danger because it was unforeseeable. As a consequence 
of the bird strike the engines failed, bringing the plane crashing to the ground. All 350 
passengers on board died. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 













On 25th January 2000, two South African mountaineers attempted an assault on K2, the 
second highest mountain in the world. The mountain poses many perils of its own, but the 
fate that befell the mountaineers was the extreme cold. Temperatures plumbed -40 degrees 
as they neared the top. This was to be expected, but the clothing they had been provided by 
their supplier did not offer as good insulation as the supplier had claimed. Both died. 
 
On 25th January 2000, two South African mountaineers attempted an assault on K2, the second 
highest mountain in the world. The mountain poses many perils of its own, but the fate that 
befell the mountaineers was the extreme cold. Temperatures plumbed -40 degrees as they 
neared the top, and although they were properly and warmly dressed, the unexpected cold 
snap caused them to suffer very severe hypothermia. Both died. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 12th April 1993 in the Austrian alpine village Alpbach, an avalanche struck, killing 25 
residents. Avalanches in much of the Austrian alps are common, but resultant deaths are 
rare because geologists are usually able to predict the occurrence of them and the at risk 
areas are evacuated or cordoned off. In this case the geologists responsible failed to 
anticipate the avalanches, despite considerable evidence that one was going to happen. 
They incurred a considerable amount of criticism from their peers worldwide. 
 
On 12th April 1993 in the Austrian alpine village Alpbach, an avalanche struck, killing 25 
residents. Avalanches in much of the Austrian alps are common, but resultant deaths are rare 
because geologists are usually able to predict the occurrence of them and the at risk areas are 
evacuated or cordoned off. In this case the geologists responsible weren’t able to anticipate the 
avalanche, but it was widely recognised that their job this time was virtually impossible owing 
to the peculiar and unique nature of this avalanche. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 17th August 1981, slightly outside Morecombe Bay, England, two boaters drowned after 
the engine on their speed boat failed. The failure of the engine was attributed to a 
fundamental design flaw on the part of the manufacturer. 
 
On 17th August 1981, slightly outside Morecombe Bay, England, two boaters drowned after the 




How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 





On 21st January 2002 in Prague, Czech Republic, a boy aged 9 was hit by a vehicle while 
crossing the road and killed. It was later found that the driver had not slept for 48 hours and 
was extremely tired. It was generally felt that he shouldn’t have been driving at all. 
 
On 21st January 2002 in Prague, Czech Republic, a boy aged 9 was hit by a vehicle while 
crossing the road and killed. The boy was crossing on a curve, not having yet learnt how to 
cross the road properly, and it was agreed by all parties involved that the driver wouldn’t have 
been able to stop in time. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 17th December 1987 in Vancouver, Canada, an office employee cycling to work suffered 
crashing to the ground, and the impact broke several ribs and caused serious internal 
bleeding, resulting in his death. The bike had been re-tyred only two months ago, so 
evidently the tyres had not been manufactured properly. 
 
On 17th December 1987 in Vancouver, Canada, an office employee cycling to work suffered a 
serious accident when one of the tyres lost its grip on the road due to ice on the road that had 
accumulated the night before. The cyclist was sent crashing to the ground, and the impact 
fractured several ribs and caused serious internal bleeding, resulting in his death. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
On 6th March 2006, in the highly mosquito populated area of Kinshasa, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, woman contracted malaria after sleeping protected by a mosquito net sold to her 
earlier that day which had several holes in that mosquitos presumably got through. As a 
result of complications from the disease, she died a few weeks later. 
 
On 6th March 2006, in the highly mosquito populated area of Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, a woman contracted malaria after being bitten by a mosquito while on her way to 
work. As a result of complications from the disease, she died a few weeks later. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 












On 28th October 1999, in Malaga, Spain, a man died after slipping on a very wet pavement 
and hitting his head hard on a lamp-post. It was early in the morning, and the previous night 
the nightclub next to the pavement had thrown out large quantities of melting ice. 
 
On 28th October 1999, in Malaga, Spain, a man died after slipping on a very wet pavement and 
hitting his head hard on a lamp-post. It had been raining very heavily the night before, and it 
was early in the morning so no-one had had the chance to clear the pavements. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 12th September 2002, in Llanelli, Wales, a rugby player died after being tackled very 
hard, but legitimately. He suffered multiple head injuries and internal bleeding. Although 
the tackle was entirely legal, the pitch of the rugby club he was playing against was partly 
surrounded by concrete walls situated closer to the edge of the pitch than the governing 
regulations permitted. It was against these walls with which the player’s head made impact. 
 
On 12th September 2002, in Llanelli, Wales, a rugby player died after being tackled very hard, 
but legitimately. He suffered multiple head injuries and internal bleeding when his head 
landed hard on the turf. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 30th November 2004, on a railway line running from Avignon to Paris, both in France, a 
train crashed. It was derailed as a result of a points failure, which was blamed on the 
contractor responsible for maintaining the line. Unfortunately the derailment killed 56 
passengers. 
 
On 30th November 2004, on a railway line running from Avignon to Paris, both in France, a 
train crashed after the driver suffered a sudden stroke – there had previously been no reason 




How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 











On 17th April 1978, in Sicily, Italy, the frequently active volcano Mount Etna erupted, killing 
400 residents of a village situated close to it. Volcanologists failed to predict the eruption, 
which was unusual as predicting volcanic eruptions is generally very easy. 
 
On 17th April 1978, in Sicily, Italy, the frequently active volcano Mount Etna erupted, killing 
400 residents of a village situated close to it. Volcanologists failed to predict the eruption 
because the technology which today enables experts to easily predict volcanic eruptions had 
not yet been developed. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 




On 25th May 1985, in the Krugar Park, South Africa, a man on a safari died after being 
ravaged by a lion. He was part of a touring party, which had been informed it was free to 
walk around the national park safe in the knowledge that should an animal pose a danger to 
one of the party it would be shot by the duty ranger. The duty ranger, however, was not 
paying attention at the time because he was talking to his friends. 
 
On 25th May 1985, in the Krugar Park, South Africa, a man on a safari died after being ravaged 
by a lion. He was wandering around the park without supervision – he was armed, but was 
unable to react quickly enough to shoot the animal. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 12th August 1997, in San Diego, United States, a baby was asphyxiated after the family’s 
dog, during the night, climbed into the baby’s cot and fell asleep on the baby’s face, 
suffocating the infant. A newspaper commentator shortly afterwards reminded readers that 
as a routine measure to protect babies sleeping in a room alone, their door should always be 
shut. 
 
On 12th August 1997, in San Diego, United States, a baby was asphyxiated after the family’s 
dog, during the night, climbed into the baby’s cot and fell asleep on the baby’s face, suffocating 
the infant. The usual precaution of shutting the door of the room the baby was sleeping in was 
taken, but the dog somehow managed to open the door.  
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 






On 12th June 1998, on a beach in Miami, United States, a swimmer drowned after finding the 
tide too strong to swim against. The swimmer attempted to attract the attention of the 
lifeguards, but apparently they weren’t paying attention. 
 
On 12th June 1998, on a beach in Miami, United States, a swimmer drowned after finding the 
tide too strong to swim against. The swimmer attracted the attention of the lifeguards, but 
they weren’t able to rescue the swimmer in time. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 7th July 1995 in Detroit, United States, there was a motor car collision in which a driver 
ran a red light and hit another driver who died in the accident. It later emerged that the 
driver who ran a red light had already received points for similar traffic offences many 
times previously, had had his licence revoked and was driving without a licence. 
 
On 7th July 1995 in Detroit, United States, there was a motor car collision in which a driver ran 
a red light and hit another driver who died in the accident. It later emerged that the driver 
who ran a red light had just received a phone call from his wife who was going into labour and 
needed to be transported to the hospital. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 31st August 1996, in Antofagasta, Chile, an earthquake struck.  It wouldn’t have done any 
significant damage except that a recently constructed office block, which was the largest in 
the city, collapsed. It was the only building that entirely capitulated, with others suffering 
minor and easily repairable structural damage. It was widely felt that the contractors who 
had built the office block had used poor quality, unsuitable materials, and that despite it 
being known that the area was prone to earthquakes no earthquake-proof foundations had 
been installed. It was considered that these factors had been largely responsible for the 
building’s collapse. 150 people inside the office block died. 
 
On 31st August 1996, in Antofagasta, Chile, an earthquake struck. A recently constructed office 
block, which was the largest in the city, collapsed. It was the only building that collapsed 
because it stood fairly isolated – where the highest concentration of buildings stood, the 
earthquake wasn’t felt so strongly. 150 people inside the office block died. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 







On 29th February 2008, in Auckland, New Zealand, a 46-year-old homemaker was reported 
to have been electrocuted by a hairdryer that had fallen into her bath while she was in it. 
Despite the company that sold the hairdryer having claimed that it was equipped with 
ground-fault circuit interrupters, which cut off the current when the appliance comes into 
contact with water, it was later found that this wasn’t the case. The woman died as a result 
of the electrocution. 
 
On 29th February 2008, in Auckland, New Zealand, a 46-year-old homemaker was reported to 
have been electrocuted by a hairdryer that had fallen into her bath while she was in it. The 
hairdryer was a cheap one, and as such was not equipped with ground-fault circuit 
interrupters, which cut off the current when the appliance comes into contact with water. The 
woman died as a result of the electrocution. Electricians recommend only purchasing products 
with such safeguards against electrocution. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 25th November 1988, on a beach in New South Wales, Australia, a windsurfer suffered a 
fatal accident. A rip in the tide propelled him off his surfboard, and carried him half a 
kilometre out to sea where he drowned. An error on the part of the coastguard had seen the 
part of the coast where he was surfing classified as safe. 
 
On 25th November 1988, on a beach in New South Wales, Australia, a windsurfer suffered a 
fatal accident. A rip in the tide propelled him off his surfboard, and carried him half a 
kilometre out to sea where he drowned. Because he was so far out, the coastguard was unable 
to see him when he raised his hand to attract attention. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 3rd March 1974, in London, England, after months of torrential downpour parts of the 
city closest to the River Thames were flooded. Many became stranded in their houses, and 
53 unfortunate immobile people died. An order had been sent down to close the Thames 
flood barrier, which would have prevented the deaths, but apparently the operator forgot to 
execute the order. 
 
On 3rd March 1973, in London, England, after months of torrential downpour parts of the city 
closest to the River Thames were flooded. Many became stranded in their houses, and 53 
unfortunate immobile people died. The year after the flood barrier was built to prevent this 
from ever happening again. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 





On 17th July 1997, in Palermo, Italy, a heatwave occurred over a period of several days. 
Temperatures soared to a blistering 45°C. The city is generally well prepared for such 
events since it is situated in the far south of the country, but this time faulty power cables in 
one part of the city which ought to have been repaired some months back meant that 
several thousands of residents were left without air-conditioning. 178 of them died. 
 
On 17th July 1997, in Palermo, Italy, a heatwave occurred over a period of several days. 
Temperatures soared to a blistering 45°C. The city is generally well prepared for such events 
since it is situated in the far south of the country, and all residences are fitted with air-
conditioning units. There were some residents, however, who weren’t able to make it inside 
quickly enough and 178 died of heat stroke. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 19th November 2003, in Merano, Italy, a fatality occurred after a man fell through the ‘Il 
Binocolo’ 50 metre viewing platform. A plank of wood in the floor was loose, a fact largely 
blamed on the council not paying for a regular maintenance check-up. 
 
On 19th November 2003, in Merano, Italy, a fatality occurred after a man fell off the ‘Il 




How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
 
On 1st June 2002, in Delhi, India, a man who had earlier eaten at the Taj Mahal restaurant 
contracted severe food poisoning after eating food contaminated with the clostridium 
perfringens bacteria. The kitchen of the restaurant was found to have adhered to deplorably 
low hygiene standards, and press commentators conjectured that this was the likely cause 
of his death. 
 
On 1st June 2002, in Delhi, India, a man contracted severe food poisoning after eating food 
contaminated with the clostridium perfringens bacteria. He had cooked the food himself, but 
apparently not sufficiently well. Press commentators conjectured that had he cooked the food 
for longer, he would have killed the bacteria responsible. 
 
 
How responsible are the following for the deaths? 
The deceased Other person(s)/organization(s) Bad luck/the circumstances 
  %   %   % 
 
